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1 Variation on ANTOKOLSKAIA (2006) p. 25 where she argues that ‘according to the old trans-
personalistic way of thinking, the individual was subservient to the family, and the family was
in turn subservient to society at large. In contrast the modern personalistic perspective can be
paraphrased by the saying: “family is made for man, not man for the family.”’ This saying is in
turn a variation on the phrase ‘The Sabbath was made for man, not man for the Sabbath’ from
Mark 2:27. 
2 See for instance HOLTRUST (1985) p. 201-203 and HOLTRUST (1993) p. 48 for The Netherlands.
Under English law an unmarried mother did have parental power with regard to her child
(Barnardo v. McHugh [1891] AC 388).
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Children are not made for the family,
but the family is made for children.1
1.1. SETTING THE SCENE
This is a book about children and their parents. It will be obvious to any
observer that there are many different kinds of children and at least about as
many different kinds of parents. Whereas everybody was once a child and has
parents, not every child becomes a parent. Sometimes this is out of choice and
sometimes because, for whatever reason, it just does not happen. Moreover,
there are those who become parents against the odds, for instance because they
are infertile, single or homosexual. There are many different disciplines that
study children and their parents, such as sociology, psychology, child studies and
gender studies, to name but a few. This study concerns a legal question with
regard to the parent-child relationship in two jurisdictions, namely how the law
assigns parents to children.
In times past, when the contemporary foundations for the legal rules relating to
parenthood were given shape, the existence of a legal relationship between
parent and child was determined by whether the child’s parents were married.
Married men were presumed to be the biological fathers of their wives’ children.
Since most children were born within marriage, and those born outside marriage
had no legal parents,2 or only one parent, biology, relationship status and the
Machteld Vonk, 'Children and their parents'
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3 See ANTOKOLSKAIA (2006) p. 443-454; DE BOER (1993) p. 1-9; HOLTRUST p. 37-63; CRETNEY
(2003) p. 543-565.
4 Custody of Children Act 1891 in England, see CRETNEY (2003) p. 628-670 for more informa-
tion; in The Netherlands the 1905 Children Acts. ‘The shift in thinking about the legal
relationship between parents and children has mostly taken place around the end of the
eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century, when from different corners of Dutch
society a call came to limit the power of the father in order to protect the interests of the child.
It was no longer accepted that a father had unlimited power over his children, in which
everything was allowed. The power of fathers is more and more the subject of close scrutiny
and it falls to the government to intervene in the family when this is necessary’. BRUNING
(2001), p. 9 [translation by VONK].
4 Intersentia
legal status of the child were strongly intertwined.3 Married fathers were attri-
buted with parental power with regard to their children, which gave them
complete control over their children’s lives until the late 19th century.4
Figure 1: The three legal dimensions as one
The situation for the married father was like that depicted in Figure 1, he was
(presumed to be) the child’s biological and legal parent and he was the sole
holder of parental responsibility. These three aspects of the parent-child rela-
tionship are referred to in this study as the three legal dimensions of the child’s
family circle: I. biological/genetic parenthood, II. legal parenthood and III.
parental responsibility. In Figure 1 these three dimensions overlap completely.
Married mothers were biological and legal parents, but did not automatically
become holders of parental responsibility with regard to their children until the
late 20th century, despite the fact that they were expected to raise and care for
Machteld Vonk, 'Children and their parents'
Introduction
5 In England a married woman only acquired parental responsibility over her children auto-
matically after the introduction of the Guardianship Act 1973 (see for the historic develop-
ments: CRETNEY (2003) p. 566-576). In The Netherlands automatic joint parental responsibility
for the married mother was introduced in 1947. For a historic overview of the law regarding
parental responsibility in The Netherlands see JEPPESEN (2008) forthcoming. 
6 England: in 2005 (2006 figures not yet available) 42% of children were born out of marriage.
Of this group of extramarital children 80% were registered on the joint information of the
parents. In 2000, five years earlier, almost 40% of children were born out of marriage. (Birth
Statistics Review of the Registrar General on births and patterns of family building in England
and Wales, 2005 Series FM1 no.34) to be found at www.statistics.gov.uk. The Netherlands: in
2006 37% of children were born outside marriage, five years earlier in 2001 this was only 27%.
Information on the recognition of extramarital children is not available; in principle the child
can be recognised by the mother’s male partner on the occasion of registering the birth (or at
a later date). CBS 2007 Statistisch bulletin 63e jaargang, no.7, 15 februari 2007 www.cbs.nl. 
7 Developments in this field in The Netherlands: TAKES (2006) p. 25-50 and England: CRETNEY
(2003) p. 540-544 and RICHARDS (2006) p. 53-72.
8 It is very likely that the children in the latter group are far less numerous than the number of
children born outside marriage; however, for the individual child this makes no difference
with regard to the necessity to regulate the legal status of all these groups of children. 
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the children concerned.5 Figure 1 depicts the contemporary position of the
child’s birth mother, regardless of her relationship status and her genetic link
with the child. In contrast, demographic trends such as the increasing number
of children born outside marriage6 and other developments such as the advance-
ment of assisted conception techniques seem to have weakened the position of
the biological father. The position of the unmarried biological father is by no
means similar to that of a married father; he will not have access to legal parent-
hood and parental responsibility automatically, he will need to undertake certain
actions and may or may not succeed. In short, the three legal dimensions of
Figure 1 do not automatically overlap for an unmarried father.
Other trends, such as the fact that donor insemination has become more or less
accepted,7 and increasing acceptance of the fact that some same-sex couples are
raising children together,8 contribute to the fact that the three legal dimensions
no longer necessarily overlap There are, for instance, parents with parental
responsibility who are not legal parents, legal parents who are not biological
parents and biological parents who are not legal parents.
Machteld Vonk, 'Children and their parents'
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9 I will use the term parent as a generic term, which includes all the adults who are either part
of the child’s family unit or have some kind of parental relationship with the child outside the
family unit, this may be a genetic link, a gestational link or a social link on the basis of parental
responsibility.
10 Variation on the following words by John Dewar ‘The decreased importance of marriage raises
questions about what techniques we use to render relationships visible in law, and, once
visible, what consequences we attach to them.’ DEWAR (2000) p. 66. 
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Figure 2: The three legal dimensions diverging (some examples)
The law in England and The Netherlands has adapted to these changes to some
extent, but has on the other hand adhered to a number of established concepts.
For instance, the principle that a child can have only two legal parents has
remain unchanged,9 even though this may not always be the case in the percep-
tion of the child or the parents involved. Questions to be answered by the com-
parison and analysis of the two legal systems are for example: does the child’s
relationship with these ‘surplus’ parents warrant the recognition and protection
of the law, and if so, are the existing possibilities for establishing parent-child
relationships sufficient or are new models required? Or to rephrase a question
asked by John Dewar10 in the context of relationships: the decreased importance
of heterosexual (life-long) marriage as the principal family unit raises questions
about what techniques we use to render other parents-child relationships visible
in law, and, once visible, what consequences we attach to them.
Machteld Vonk, 'Children and their parents'
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11 In both jurisdictions social parents without a legal status do have the obligation to act in the
child’s best interests. Social parents who have entered into a formalised relationship with one
of the child’s legal parents also become financially co-responsible for the child concerned.
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1.2. THE THREE (LEGAL) DIMENSIONS OF THE
CHILD’S FAMILY CIRCLE
It is relevant at this point to take a closer look at the three legal dimensions of
the child’s family circle, namely: biological parenthood, legal parenthood and
parental responsibility.
I. The first dimension concerns the biological and/or genetic parenthood of
the child. In the overall majority of cases this dimension will contain two
parents: a biological father and a birthmother, but since the introduction of
IVF this dimension may contain an additional mother, namely a genetic
mother.
II. The second dimension: legal parenthood may only contain two parents in
both England and The Netherlands; these parents may or may not be the
child’s biological or genetic parents.
III. The third dimension: parental responsibility may consist of only two
parents in The Netherlands and more than two parents in England, these
parents may be legal parents or non-legal parents.
The position of purely social parents without any legal recognition is not in-
cluded in this diagram.11 However, if room for the visualisation of the position
of purely social parents is to found, it may be included in the third dimension.
Figure 3: The three legal dimensions separated
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12 BAINHAM (1999) p. 31: ‘If we therefore want to ask the question ‘what is a parent?’ we need to
ask further questions about whether we are seeking to establish genetic parentage, invest
someone with the status of a legal parent or merely give to that person the legal powers and
duties which are associated with raising a child and are encapsulated in the legal concept of
‘parental responsibility.’ 
13 BAINHAM (2003) p. 31: ‘Perhaps […] there needs to be a re-evaluation of the circumstances in
which it is appropriate to allocate to individuals the status that goes with these distinctive
concepts.’
14 There are, however, differences in the strength of the husband’s legal parenthood if it is not
based on biology between the two jurisdictions, these differences will be extensively discussed
in the relevant chapters. 
15 E.g. Court of Appeal for Ontario, AA v BB, 2007 ONCA 2.
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By disentangling these three legal dimensions, one may gain an insight into the
meaning of the different dimensions in the attribution of legal parent-child
relationships.12 After all, legal parents are not necessarily biological/genetic
parents and holders of parental responsibility are not necessarily legal parents.
If the points of access to the different dimensions can be distilled from the law,
it becomes possible to asses whether other parents who meet the same criteria
may also have access to dimension II and III.13 For instance, presence in the
biological parenthood dimension is not the only means of access to the legal
parenthood dimension; a husband will, for instance, become a legal parent by
virtue of his marriage to the mother at the time of the child’s birth without being
a biological parent.14 Moreover, some biological parents, such as sperm donors,
never become legal parents. Their place may be taken by a non-biological parent
who then becomes the child’s legal parent. The same is true with regard to
parental responsibility; legal parents are no longer the only parents who may
have access to the legal parenthood dimension. Under certain circumstances
social parents may acquire parental responsibility, for instance by court order.
The advantage of clearly distinguishing between the three dimensions may be
that both the existence of biological parents and non-biological parents may be
recognised in law. For instance, where in the past insemination with donor
sperm in a marriage was covered up with a complete replacement of the biologi-
cal father by the legal father, nowadays, this replacement is no longer complete.
With a view to the interests of the child in knowledge about his or her genetic
history, the child has been given the right of access to identify information about
the sperm donor. Furthermore, it may also open the possibility for the legislature
in a jurisdiction to abandon the concept that a child may only have two legal
parents, since legal parents are not necessarily biological parents. Moreover, it
may make it possible for a jurisdiction to recognise the three-partite legal
parenthood of a child from a foreign jurisdiction.15
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1.3. RESEARCH QUESTION
In recent years, there has been a substantial amount of attention being given to
the legal position of adults in same-sex relationships, but far less attention has
been paid to the legal position of children growing up in these families. At first
it was assumed that no children would be growing up in such families. For
instance, the Dutch registered partnership introduced in 1998 was aimed at
regulating the legal relationship between couples who could or would not marry,
and not the legal position of children born into or growing up in these partner-
ships.16 However, it has since become clear that children do grow up in non-
traditional relationships, with different-sex parents or same-sex parents, be it
children who are born during the relationship with the help of a third pro-
creational party or children from a previous relationship.
Consider for instance the following case: a couple in a non-marital registered
relationship (A and B) have decided to start a family. However, because the birth
mother’s partner cannot provide the necessary genetic material, either because
the partner is infertile or because the partner is a woman, they make use of
donor sperm donated by a sperm donor (C).
c  + b        f b
A: Bio mother      B: Non-bio father  Child C: Bio father
or
c  + c        f b
A: Bio mother      B: Non-bio mother  Child C: Bio father
Many questions are raised by this case concerning the responsibilities and rights
of the three parties involved with regard to each other and the child. For in-
stance, can the child establish a legal relationship with at least two or even all
three parents involved? Does it make a difference whether the couples use an
unknown donor from a clinic or, for instance, from a family member?
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17 English law is a formal ‘term of art’ that describes the law in force in England and Wales. See
the England and Wales Interpretation Act 1978, Schedule 1. Hereinafter, references to England
will mean England and Wales.
18 The ECtHR has established that there may be family life between a child and a non-biological
parent X.Y.Z. v. United Kingdom; it is however, unclear what the exact position of the ECtHR
is concerning the relationship between same-sex parents with regard to family life. In Karner
v. Austria the court stated that ‘Where the Contracting States’ margin of appreciation was
narrow, […] the principle of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought
to be realized did not merely require the measure chosen to be suitable for realising the aim;
it also had to be shown that it was necessary to exclude homosexual couples from the scope of
the legislation in order to achieve that aim.’ See M v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions
[2006] UKHL 11 and WIKELEY (2006) p. 542-547 for the position under English law. See
FORDER (2002) p. 992-995 for a discussion of Dutch case law on the question whether there can
be family life between same-sex partners and their children. Also FORDER & SAARLOOS (2007)
p. 65-74.
19 This is inherent in both legal systems. A child may not always automatically acquire two legal
parents, but in both jurisdictions there is the possibility to have the legal parenthood of a
biological parent established. This notion is confirmed in the Children’s Convention in article
7 which concerns the child’s right to know and be cared for by his or her parents.
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The example reveals some of the complexities involved in assigning parents to
children in atypical family relationships, in particular where there are more than
two candidates to fulfil the position of a parent in the child’s life. Therefore, this
study focuses on the legal position of children born into families where only one
of the parents is genetically or biologically related to the child; this includes
children born into same-sex families as well as different-sex families. Two juris-
dictions will be included in this research: England17 and The Netherlands.
This study aims to answer the question of what are the implications for children
born into these families if their current legal position is assessed on the basis of
the notion that
– a child’s family situation deserves legal protection;18 and
– a child should have the possibility to acquire two legal parents.19
These two notions are derived from the presumption that it is inherent in the
legal systems of the two jurisdictions that children in so-called typical families
do have the opportunity to acquire two legal parents (legal parenthood) and that
their family situation is adequately protected (parental responsibility). These
presumptions will be tested in Chapter 3 on the legal position of children and
parents in families where both parents are genetic and biological parents (a
typical family). Subsequently, the legal position of children and parents with
regard to legal parenthood and parental responsibility in a number of other
family types will be described and compared, namely step-families, surrogate
families and, finally, families with one biological parent and one non-biological
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20 NUSSBAUM (1999), p. 5.
21 RAWLS (1971) p. 302. In Rawls’ theory of justice social and economic inequalities are to be
arranged so that they are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, See for the implica-
tions of Rawls’ theory of justice in parent-child relationships DWYER (2006) p. 106-122 for the
theoretical underpinnings of relationship rights for adults and p. 123-169 for the relationship
rights of children.
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parent (atypical families). The aim of studying the different family categories is
to place the legal position of a child born into a family with one biological parent
and one non-biological parent in a larger perspective, so as to obtain knowledge
about all possible solutions available in the two jurisdictions at present.
In both jurisdictions the law is in a transition from a parent-centred family law
to a child-centred family law. In line with this transition the focus must shift
from the differences between the parents to the equivalent nature of the needs
and rights of the child. In this context it may be relevant to consider the follow-
ing quote from NUSSBAUM:
‘Human beings have a dignity that deserves respect from laws and social
institutions. This idea has many origins in many traditions; by now it is
the core of modern liberal democratic thought and practice all over the
world. The idea of human dignity is usually taken to involve an idea of
equal worth: rich and poor, rural and urban, female and male, all are
equally deserving of respect, just in virtue of being human, and this
respect should not be abridged on account of a characteristic that is
distributed by whims of fortune. Often, too, this idea of equal worth is
connected to an idea of liberty: to respect the equal worth of persons is,
among other things, to promote their ability to fashion a life in accor-
dance with their own view of what is deepest and most important.’20
It is in essence the dignity of the child, in this case the child born into an atypi-
cal family that deserves respect. This respect is best expressed in the law not by
stressing the fact that the child’s legal position vis-à-vis his or her parents cannot
be the same as that of the overall majority of children because his or her parents
are not the same as those of the overall majority of children, but by departing
from the notion that all children should have the most favourable legal position
in life.21
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22 NUSSBAUM (1999) p. 15 ‘The traditional Western heterosexual family – consisting of a male
breadwinner, female homemaker, and several children - is rapidly becoming less common in
The United States [as is the case in England and The Netherlands]. (Of course in many parts
of the world it has never existed, and one dividend of thinking about feminism internationally
is that one comes to see the many different ways in which children have been cared for with
good results.)’
23 See BOS (2004) p. 11-30 for an overview of scientific publications on lesbian families and family
functioning, and more recently BOS et al. (2007) p. 38-48. Also GARTRELL et al. (1996) 272-281,
GARTRELL et al. (1999) p. 362-369, GARTRELL et al(2000) p. 542-548 and GARTRELL et al. (2006)
p. 175-192 for a longitudinal study of children in lesbian families.
24 BOS et al. (2007) p. 38-48.
25 SCHWENZER (2003) p. 143-158 and ODERKERK (1999) p. 67-88.
26 KOKKINI-IATRIDOU (1988) p. 187-190.
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This research does not deal with the question whether children should grow up
in same-sex families;22 the point of departure is the fact that children are born
into and do grow up in same-sex families. Studies undertaken in this field so far
shows that children do fare well in same-sex families.23 As in most families, the
well-being of the children depends on the parents and their willingness to invest
in their children.24
Solutions to the possible problems found with regard to the position of children
born into families with one biological parent and one non-biological parent will
be sought within the possibilities offered by the concepts in the existing system
in the two jurisdictions. On the one hand, because this system works sufficiently
well for the overall majority of children, and, on the other, because this is likely
to be the most feasible approach to strengthening their position within their
family.
1.4. METHODOLOGY
1.4.1.  COMPARATIVE METHOD
Use has been made of a functional (problem-solving) comparative approach.25
The functional approach has been chosen because it allows for comparison at the
most detailed level, namely at the level of the different family forms that will be
defined in Chapter 2. The comparison is in part successive in order to provide
detailed information about both jurisdictions (Chapter 3). Once the brunt of this
information has been provided, the comparison becomes largely simultaneous
(Chapters 4 to 8).26
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28 The stages as such were not introduced in this article for the first time by ÖRÜCÜ. See for
instance ÖRÜCÜ (2004) p. 52-58, in particular p. 56: ‘Traditional black-letter-law oriented
comparative law research […] would regard description as the final stage of the inquiry. Even
the conceptualization stage might be suspect.’
29 ÖRÜCÜ (2007) p. 37-40.
Intersentia 13
The aim of studying this subject in a comparative manner is to uncover and
analyse the differences and similarities and the strengths as well as the weak-
nesses of the approaches taken under English and Dutch law towards biological
parenthood, legal parenthood and parental responsibility. The ultimate aim of
such a comparison and analysis is to evaluate what the jurisdictions may learn
from each other.
In order to be able to conduct a comparison the objects to be compared must be
sufficiently similar to make comparison useful. The objects to be compared are,
on the one hand, the factual family situations in the two jurisdictions and how
the law regards these families. On the other hand, the legal institutions legal
parenthood and parental responsibility form part of the comparison. These
instruments themselves are not the object of the comparison since the aim of the
comparison is not the content of legal parenthood or parental responsibility, but
its aim is rather to discover what role these two concepts play in the recognition
of the legal position of children in atypical families.
The comparative method includes description, comparison and explanation,27 but
may also include, as ÖRÜCÜ recommended, conceptualisation and evaluation.28
In a recently introduced methodological blueprint for comparative legal re-
search,29 ÖRÜCÜ distinguishes five stages of comparative research:
1. conceptualization
2. description
3. identification of similarities and differences
4. analysis and explanation
5. evaluation.
This approach has, in broad terms, been applied in this book. The structure of
the book illustrates the research stages described above.
1.4.2.  STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK
The book consists of four parts. Part I: It’s all in the family, contains two chap-
ters. Chapters 1 and 2 provide an introduction to the research, and an overview
and categorisation of the family types with which the book is concerned. Chap-
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30 In order to avoid confusion the term commissioning parents will be used, despite the slightly
mercenary connotation, because the term intentional parent is used in a much broader sense
in this book. 
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ter 2 embodies stage 1 by conceptualising the objects of comparison with the
help of a framework designed for this purpose: The family tree. This framework
distinguishes between categories of families and allows for further conceptua-
lization. This framework determines the structure of the rest of the book.
Furthermore, Chapter 2 explains that in order to assess the legal position of a
particular group of children within the family that raises them, it is essential to
look beyond that particular family type and to include other relevant family
types in the research. The research will concern two aspects of the legal parent-
child relationship, namely the establishment of legal parenthood and the attribu-
tion of parental responsibility. It is essential to look at both these aspects in order
to asses the legal position of children born into families with one biological
parent and one non-biological parent.
Part II: Typical families consists of one chapter which describes and discusses the
position of children in different-sex families where both parents are the child’s
biological parents. The legal position of these families is the point of reference
for the description of the legal position of the atypical families.
Part III: Atypical families covers three types of atypical families. In all these
families the child concerned will have more than two parents, not in the sense
of legal parents, but in the sense that he or she has two or three genetic and/or
biological parents and one or more non-biological parents. Chapter 4 discusses
the legal position of parents and children in families that have formed after a
relationship breakdown or the death of one of the parents. In everyday language
these families are often referred to as step-families. In Chapter 5 the position of
parents and children in surrogate families where both the commissioning
parents30 are genetically related to the child is discussed. Subsequently, Chapter
6 is concerned with those families where one of the parents is genetically related
to the child and the other is not. This includes different-sex and same-sex
families. The distinguishing factor between these families and the earlier men-
tioned step-families is the fact that in this family the child is born during the
relationship.
The three family categories are not discussed in the order in which they are
represented in the Family Tree in Chapter 2. The sequence is determined by a
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number of factors. The secondary families are discussed first, because these were
the first of the atypical families to receive some kind of legal recognition. Subse-
quently, the surrogate genetic families are discussed because a substantial
amount of the material covered is relevant for the last family category discussed
in Part III, namely the partially genetic primary families.
The chapters on the different family categories discussed in Part II and Part III
embody stages 2 and 3 of the methodological blueprint. These chapters contain
the descriptions of the families and answer the question of whether and how
parents may acquire the status of a legal parent or parental responsibility. The
identification of differences and similarities (the comparison) takes places in the
chapters themselves at two levels: internally and externally. The internal com-
parison looks at the similarities and differences of the legal position of children
within the jurisdiction and the external comparison looks at the similarities and
differences between the jurisdictions.31 Both the internal and the external
comparison yield relevant information for the countries concerned.
Part IV: All other things being equal consists of Chapter 7 and Chapter 8. The
first of these chapters contains an analysis of the means by which the law
attributes legal parenthood and parental responsibility. This analysis is per-
formed on the basis of a number of fundaments and connecting factors which are
found in the law itself or form the foundation for the law. By approaching the
law in this manner with the factual situation in the different family as the
starting point it becomes possible to evaluate whether the law protects the legal
position of children in families with one biological parent and one non-biological
parent. The analysis in Chapter 7 embodies stage 4 of the comparative research.
It focuses on the fundaments and connecting factors for the attribution of the
status of legal parent and for the attribution of parental responsibility as they can
be deduced from the present legal system. Such an analysis on the level of
fundaments and connecting factors is relevant both for the internal and the
external comparison.
Chapter 8 will return to the research question and by means of the introduction
of a new concept of legal parenthood, procreational responsibility, to amend
possible indiscrepancies found in the two jurisdictions. This chapter concerns
stage 5 of the blueprint, answering the research question, evaluating the results
and proposing improvements.
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1.4.3.  TERMINOLOGY
One of the problems encountered when discussing the legal recognition given
to children and their families is the fact that there is no specific terminology for
all the different family forms and their members. Moreover, the meaning of the
existing terminology is sometimes ambiguous. In order to avoid unclarity, a
number of the terms used in this book will be defined in this section.
First of all, the term parent will be used as a generic term, which means that it
includes all the adults who are either part of the child’s resident family or have
some kind of parental relationship with the child outside the resident family,
this may be a genetic link, a gestational link or a social link based on parental
responsibility. A child’s resident family is the family in which the child spends
the majority of her or his time A child may have more than one resident family
if (s)he spends a substantial amount of her or his time in two different families.
• Legal parent: a parent who has been attributed with the status of legal parent
either on the basis of a presumption, by court order, registration, recognition
or adoption. Under both English and Dutch law a child may only have two
legal parents.
• Full parental status: a parent has so-called full parental status if (s)he is both
regarded as the child’s legal parent and has parental responsibility over the
child.
• Third procreational party: a person who either donates gametes to be used by
others or a person who offers her gestational services to others; a doctor or
a clinic is not regarded as a third procreational party.
• Relational status: instead of marital status the term relational status will be
used in order to include other relational statuses besides married or unmar-
ried.
Family-specific terminology will be defined in the respective chapters. For
readers with a common law background, it is important to keep in mind that the
way the term ‘legal parent’ and in particular the term ‘legal father’ is used, may
not always correspond with the way the term is most commonly used in English
law. However, in comparative law it is necessary to create a set of terms of art
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32 See on the on the importance of the conceptualisation of the legal notions to be compared
ÖRÜCÜ (2004) p. 52-58.
33 For instance in New Zealand the Status of Children Act 1969 includes regulations on the legal
status of the various parties involved in assisted conception with donor material. See CAMPBELL
(2007) for a comparison between the legal position of children conceived with donor material
in the Canadian common law and civil law jurisdictions. Both jurisdictions allow for a child
to have two mothers, however, ‘before any Canadian common law jurisdiction, Quebec (which
is a civil law jurisdiction) officially recognised the possibility of two women to be named as a
child’s ‘natural’ mother’s.’ (p. 13) 
34 Court of Appeal for Ontario, AA v BB, 2007 ONCA 2. 
35 See for instance GLOVER (1989). The Glover Report on reproductive technologies to the
European Commission. p. 13-20 and p. 149-153: ‘We are divided whether reproductive
technology should be made available to people other than infertile heterosexual couples. But
we agree that the birth of a child should not be associated with criminality; and consequently
we agree that no use of these techniques by individuals or couples should be illegal.’
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which can be used to wholly abstract each legal system from its own environ-
ment in order to be able to compare it with another system.32
1.5. CHOICE OF JURISDICTIONS
The choice of jurisdictions has been limited to two jurisdictions: a civil law
jurisdiction (The Netherlands) and a common law jurisdiction (England). The
comparison between a common law jurisdiction and a civil law jurisdiction with
respect to parent-child relationships is potentially interesting, because the
approach to such relationships in the law may differ. Furthermore, English law
forms the basis for other common law jurisdictions, such as Canada and New
Zealand,33 which have introduced progressive legislation with regard to the legal
consequences of assisted conception and the status of children in same-sex
families.34
In addition, having regard to the notion of comparability, it is advisable to
choose jurisdictions that have to some extent adapted their provisions with
regard to parent-child relationships to accommodate different-sex and same-sex
families of which one of the partners is not a biological parent. At the start of
this research in the autumn of 2002 non-biological parenthood in different-sex
families was far more widely accepted than same-sex parenthood in Europe at
that time.35 Only very few countries had undertaken action to regulate the legal
position of children in same-sex families.
England seemed an interesting jurisdiction in this field, because on the one hand
the Children Act 1989 contained provisions for the attribution of parental
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36 See Re C (A Minor) (Residence Order: Lesbian co-parent) [1994] Fam Law 48 and G v F
(Contact and Shared residence) [1998] 2 FLR 799.
37 See HERRING (2003) p. 587-592 and BRIDGE & SWINDELLS (2004) p. 45- 49 and p. 195-197.
38 CURRY-SUMNER (2005) p. 203-210, and WOELKE (2006) p. 2-6.
39 For information on the events leading up to the introduction of registered partnership see:
CURRY-SUMNER (2005) p. 117- 121 and BOELE-WOELKI et al. (2007) p. 5-14.
40 See for more info on the introduction of same-sex marriage, FORDER (2000), 239-277; FORDER
(2001); p. 301-320; SCHRAMA (2002), p. 277-303. For the position in England on same-sex
marriage see Wilkinson v. Kitzinger (No 2) [2007] 1 FLR 295. Also CURRY-SUMNER (2006) p.
2-10 and KIRBY (2007) p. 413-422.
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responsibility by means of a residence order to persons who are not legal parents
but have taken care of the child for a particular period of time. On the basis of
this provision a same-sex partner was granted a residence order with regard to
the child of her female ex-partner.36 Furthermore, English law contained very
specific provisions with regard to children conceived by means of assisted
conception techniques with donated genetic material embodied in the Human
Fertilisation Act 1990 (HFEA 1990). It seems likely that the structure of the so-
called status provisions in this Act might offer interesting starting points for
regulating the position of children in same-sex families conceived with assisted
conception techniques.
Another interesting feature of English law was the fact that the Children and
Adoption Bill was before parliament at the time the jurisdictions were selected.
This Bill proposed to make partner adoption and joint adoption possible for
same-sex couples.37 Although this would not change the fact that the parenthood
of a same-sex partner could not be acquired in the same manner as that of a non-
biological different-sex parent, adoption by a same-sex partner would introduce
the notion that a child can have two legal mothers or two legal fathers. Further-
more, in 2001 and 2002 attempts had been made to introduce Bills that would
allow same-sex couples to register their partnership.38
In 1998, The Netherlands had introduced a new formalised relationship, open
to both same-sex and different-sex couples: the registered partnership.39 Only
three years later marriage was opened up to same-sex couples.40 At first instance,
entering into a registered partnership had no consequences with regard to any
children growing up in the relationship. However, as of January 2002 registered
partners of the same sex and of different sex and married couples of the same-sex
have now been attributed with parental responsibility by operation of law over
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41 Wet van 4 oktober 2001 tot wijziging van Boek 1 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek in verband met
het gezamenlijk gezag van rechtswege bij geboorte tijdens een geregistreerd partnerschap,
Staatsblad, 2001, 468.
42 Some other countries, such as Denmark and Sweden had also made headway in adapting the
law to accommodate same-sex families, mainly by allowing step-parent adoption by a same-sex
partner. Denmark: LUND-ANDERSEN (2003) p. 17-21 and Sweden: SAVOLAINEN (2003) p. 38-39.
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children born into their relationship.41 In 2001 it became possible for same-sex
couples to adopt each other’s children regardless of their relationship status.42
Furthermore, there seemed to be an interesting difference between the jurisdic-
tions with regard to the recognition of social parenthood in general. The exis-
tence of the concepts ‘child of the family’ in English law and the possibility to
grant legal recognition to a person who has a child in his or her care by means
of a residence order, point towards an interpretation of the child’s interests in
connection with non-biological parents that was not as obvious in Dutch law at
that time. All these factors together led to the choice of these two jurisdictions,
with the aim being to compare them and to find how they might both benefit
from such a comparison.
1.6 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Shortly before the closing date of this research project, 1 July 2007, interesting
developments took place in both jurisdictions. In England the Human Tissue and
Embryos (Draft) Bill (hereafter referred to as the Tissue Bill 2007) was published
on 17 May 2007. The Bill proposes far-reaching and monumental changes to the
present provisions on legal parenthood in cases involving assisted conception and
surrogacy regulated in the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (HFEA
1990). These proposals will in particular have consequences for the legal position
of same-sex couples and cohabiting couples. Furthermore, the Tissue Bill pro-
poses amendments to some of the parental responsibility provisions in the
Children Act 1989 (CA 1989) to reflect the new approach to same-sex parent-
hood. The law in force in England on 1 July 2007 is the focus of the comparison,
however, the proposals made in the Tissue Bill will also be discussed.
In The Netherlands The Minister of Justice and the Minister of Youth and the
Family have recently installed a commission to investigate possibilities for the
automatic attribution of the status of legal parent to the birth mother’s female
Machteld Vonk, 'Children and their parents'
Chapter 1
43 Dutch Second Chamber 2006-2007, 30 551, no. 8 and 9. 
20 Intersentia
partner.43 Hopefully this study may contribute to the commission’s investiga-
tions. 
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1 There are no exact figures that prove this presumption is correct. However, considering the
fact that most children grow up in a different-sex family and only about 10% of children live
in a stepfamily, and given the fact that the majority of different-sex families do not make use
of donor gametes (about 10% of different sex couples have fertility problems, the majority of
which will overcome these with the use of their own gametes in particular since the introduc-
tion of ICSE), moreover given recent estimates (BELLIS et all (2005) p. 749-754) that only about
3.7 percent of children are conceived during sex outside the relationship without the knowl-
edge of the male partner, it may be relatively safe to conclude that the group of children that
grows up with their biological parents is larger than the group of children that does not grow
up with their two biological parents.
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CHAPTER 2 
THE FAMILY TREE
2.1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter is the key to the subsequent chapters in Parts II and III of this book.
It aims to introduce the conceptual framework that will be used to order and
compare data on the legal position of a number of different family forms (and
their members) that may be found in contemporary Western societies. The
purpose of the framework created, the family tree, is to facilitate meaningful
legal comparative research on the protection and recognition offered to children
in their resident family. In order to fulfil this purpose it has been necessary to
formulate criteria for a sub-classification of families that yield comparable units.
The family tree will not only facilitate the study of the legal recognition of
family forms on a national level, but also makes it possible to compare the legal
position of different family forms in any number of legal systems, for instance,
for the purpose of harmonisation. In this part of the book the laws of England
and The Netherlands with regard to the establishment of legal parenthood and
the attribution of parental responsibilities for the various family forms will be
studied and compared. 
As has been mentioned in Chapter 1, families and family structures have
changed during the past century. It is presumed that most children still grow up
with their own genetic parents in a reasonably stable resident family.1 However,
a substantial number of children grow up in other kinds of families, be it unmar-
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stepfamilies. Furthermore, the number of children born outside marriage in England has
increased from 12% of all live births in 1980 to 42% in 2005 (National Statistics, Social Trends
No. 37, 2007). In The Netherlands one in every ten families with children is at present a
stepfamily (Stichting Stiefgezinnen Nederland). Furthermore, the number of children born
outside marriage has increased from 3% of all live births in 1980 to 37% in 2006. (EUROSTAT
2004 and CBS 2007). There are no exact figures on the number of children growing up in same-
sex families. However, in sociological publications reference is made to the lesbian baby boom
following easier access to donor insemination as of the 1980s. ‘In most Western industrialized
societies the total number of lesbians who have given births to a child within a lesbian
relationship amounts to several thousands.’ BOS (2004) p. 33. In The Netherlands some 9% of
same-sex families have dependent children living with them (18% of the female same-sex
couples and 1% of the male same-sex couples) CBS, Bevolkingstrends 2006 dl. 1, Heerlen/Voor-
burg, p. 6.
3 In Re D (Contact and PR: Lesbian mothers and known father) [2006] EWHC 2 Fam, the five
year old child who is growing up in a female same-sex family calls her biological mother
‘Mummy’ and her other mother ‘Ma’. (no. 57). However, no mention is made of what she
called her half-sister’s two fathers. Another example comes from this same case where the
child’s father resented being referred to as a sperm donor because he felt that he was so much
more to the child than just a sperm donor. In the heading of the case he is referred as ‘known
father’, which is probably more acceptable.
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ried families, stepfamilies, lone-parent families or same-sex families.2 In order to
study, describe and analyse to what extent contemporary Dutch and English
family law recognise and protect these families, it is necessary to develop criteria
on the basis of which one can classify different family types. The purpose of such
criteria and the subsequent classification of various family forms does not
purport to make value judgements as to the most suitable family form in which
children should be raised. Instead the classification is intended to recognise that
in today’s contemporary society children are growing up in a variety of different
family forms. All these children are entitled to protection of their family life
pursuant to art. 8 ECHR. Moreover, children may not only have family life with
their parents and other family members in their resident family, but also with
parents and family members outside their resident family. An example of such
a situation is that of a child living in a step-family, who may have family life
both with her or his stepfather and her or his legal/biological father; or a child
living with a lesbian couple, who may have family life with her or his mother’s
female partner and with the known sperm donor who has regular contact with
the child. 
One of the things that become clear from the examples in the previous paragraph
is the problem of terminology. Language, both legal and colloquial, has failed to
create suitable names for all these different family members.3 The family tree
described in this chapter does not claim to create the legal or everyday language
Machteld Vonk, 'Children and their parents'
The family tree
4 Art. 7 of the Children’s Convention requires the state to safeguard, as far as possible, the child’s
right to know and be cared for by its parents.
5 The family tree as it is depicted on the opposite page contains no information on genetic
parents outside the resident family. However, the family pictures, which are depicted and
explained below, as well as the description and comparison in the subsequent chapters, does
contain information on the genetic parents outside the resident family.
6 England: The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (Disclosure of Donor Informa-
tion) Regulations 2004; The Netherlands: Wet donorgegevens kunstmatige bevruchting, Staats-
blad 2002, no. 240. Art. 7 Children’s Convention.
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necessary to name the different parents, but it will offer a conceptual framework
from which one is able to discuss the different family types that exist in contem-
porary society and to analyse and compare to what extent they are recognised
and protected by the law.
2.2. THE FAMILY TREE
2.2.1.  THE BRANCHES OF THE TREE
The classification of families in the family tree is first of all based on the question
whether or not a child is genetically related to the parent(s) in her or his resident
family. Furthermore, the sex and the (legal) status of the relationship of the
partners heading the family play a part in the sub-classification of these families,
as will be explained below. Since the purpose of the family tree is to facilitate
meaningful legal comparative research on the protection and recognition offered
to children in their resident family, it is necessary to find criteria for the sub-
classification of families that yield comparable units. Given the fact that the
existence of a genetic link has for a long time been one of the primary reasons
for attributing parents with parental status under Dutch and English law, the
existence or absence of such a link is a useful criterion for the main classification.
The classification will give an insight into the extent to which the law has come
to accommodate families where, for one reason or another, there is no genetic
link between one or both of the parents and the children they raise (the resident
family).4 However, the classification of families in the family tree not only allows
for research into the protection and recognition of the child’s resident family,
but also takes account of the fact that a child may have a genetic link with one
or more parents outside the resident family.5 Given the recent emphasis on the
child’s right to know its origins,6 and ECtHR case law on art. 8 ECHR, which
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7 This may for instance include the right of a biological father with family life (ECtHR, Keegan
v. Ireland, Appl. no. 16969/90, 26 May 1994) or a known donor with family life to be heard
in the child’s adoption proceedings.
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may require a court to take the interests of genetic parents with family life into
account,7 this is indeed vital.
The family tree has three levels: main branches (level 1), sub-branches (level 2)
and twigs (level 3). 
(1) The classification of the main branches is based on the existence or absence
of a genetic link between the child and the other family members: genetic
families, where the child is genetically related to both parents in the resident
family, partially genetic families, where the child is genetically related to one of
the parents in the resident family, and non-genetic families, where the child is
not genetically related to either of the parents in the resident family. Two of the
main branches have a further classification on this level: the genetic families can
either be classified as traditional genetic families, where the mother herself gives
birth to her and her partner’s genetic child, or as surrogate traditional families
where the partners supply the genetic material for the child, but a third party,
a surrogate mother, gestates and gives birth to the child. Moreover, the partially
genetic families can either be classified on this level as partially genetic primary
families, where the child is raised in the family it was originally born into, or as
partially genetic secondary families, where the child is no longer raised in its
primary family, but in a family that one of her or his parents has formed with a
new partner. In this research traditional genetic families will be refered to as a
typical family. The other family categories will be refered to as atypical. 
(2) On the second level the partially genetic families and the non-genetic fami-
lies in the tree have the following sub-branches: different-sex families, female
same-sex families and male same-sex families. Since the genetic family at present
always consists of a different-sex couple and their children, the second level only
concerns different-sex families. 
(3) On the third level the different family types are further classified on the basis
of the legal status of the relationship of the parents (married, non-marital
registered relationship or non-formalised relationship, which may range from
long-term cohabitation to a one-night stand).
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Figure 4: The Family Tree
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2.2.2.  FAMILY PICTURES
For the sake of clarity, the different family types – including the genetic or
gestational parent who is not part of the child’s resident family – have been
depicted with the help of the pictograms below. The family pictures consist of
a number of icons (in incremental shades of grey to black) representing the
parents and the children involved. The icons to the left of, and including the
child, form the child’s resident family. The icon(s) to the right hand side of the
child represent the parent(s) outside the child’s resident family. In real life the
child may of course live in two separate resident families, for instance, in the
case of a co-parenting arrangement where the child spends approximately 50
percent of her or his time with one set of parents and the rest of her or his time
with another set. Where relevant such situations will be discussed. 
Furthermore, in these pictures no account has been taken of the fact that the
parent(s) outside the resident family may have a partner who also has a social
relationship with the child. An example is the new partner of a non-resident
parent, or the (fe)male partner of the known sperm donor. Where relevant these
partners and their status with regard to the child will be discussed in the chap-
ters and sections concerned. 
First the different icons used for the mothers will be explained, then those used
for the fathers and finally those used for the children.
Mothers
A distinction has been made between four types of mothers:
cBiological and genetic mother = woman who supplies the ovum and gives
birth to the child;
cGenetic mother = woman who supplies the ovum, but does not give birth
to the child; 
cGestational mother = woman who gives birth to the child, but does not 
supply the ovum; and
cNon-biological mother = woman who raises the child but is not 
genetically related and has not given birth to the child.
Where the term birth mother or biological mother is used, this includes both the
biological and genetic mother and the gestational mother. Only where it is
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8 In England one may discern a third category of fathers namely genetic fathers who donate
their sperm for third-party use in accordance with the provisions of the HFEA 1990. However,
since this distinction as such does not exist in The Netherlands the genetic father is covered
by the term biological father.
9 However interesting the suggestions made in JOHNSON (1999) p. 54, I will use the term
biological father for the man who provides the sperm whether through sexual intercourse or
not. Whether the doctor inseminating a woman or placing an embryo in a woman can be
regarded as a ‘coital father’ and thus a biological parent lies outside the scope of this reach.
Moreover, I strongly doubt whether couples involved in AID or IVF will regard the doctor as
such, which does of course not mean that a doctor may not regard himself as such.
10 See section 2.2.1(1) for an explanation of the terms of primary and secondary families.
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relevant for the understanding of the specific family situation, will a distinction
be made between a biological and genetic mother and a gestational mother.
Fathers
Fathers have been divided into biological fathers and non-biological fathers.8
There are only two types of fathers, because a father is either genetically related
to a child or not; there is no other biological factor such as gestation, which may
need to be taken into account.9 
bBio father = man who supplies the sperm 
bNon-bio father = man who raises the child but is not genetically related
Children
For the children concerned two different icons are used, not on the basis of their
genetic relationship to the parents in their resident family, but on the basis of
the question whether the resident family is the child’s primary or secondary
family.10
f= the resident family is the child’s primary family 
dore= the resident family is the child’s secondary family
2.3. GENETIC FAMILIES 
Genetic families consist of two parents who are both genetically related to the
children they raise. This is more or less the standard family and in general it is
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is correct. However, on the basis of a number of figures given earlier on, it may be relatively
safe to conclude that the group of children who grow up with their biological parents is larger
than the group of children who do not grow up with their two biological parents. 
12 See section 1.4.3 for a definition of this term.
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presumed that the majority of families in England and The Netherlands are
genetic families.11 There are, however, two kinds of genetic families: the tradi-
tional genetic family and the surrogate genetic family. In the first kind of family
the mother gives birth to her and her partner’s own genetic child. In order to
become pregnant they may have had to resort to assisted conception techniques
such as AI or IVF but they have not made use of a third procreational party12 to
conceive a child. This is the point at which the traditional and the surrogate
genetic family differ; the surrogate family has come about with the help of a
third procreational party, namely a surrogate mother. The surrogate mother is
implanted with an embryo created with both the commissioning parents’
gametes, which means that the child to whom the surrogate mother gives birth,
is genetically related to both the commissioning parents. 
TRADITIONAL GENETIC FAMILY
c  + b  f
Bio mother Bio father   Child
The man and the woman are both genetically related to the child and the
woman gives birth to the child herself.
SURROGATE GENETIC FAMILY 
c + b  f c
Genetic mother Bio father  Child Gestational mother
The man and the woman are both genetically related to the child, but have made
use of the services of a surrogate mother to carry and give birth to their child.
2.4. PARTIALLY GENETIC PRIMARY FAMILIES
The sub-classification made for this family type is that the couple heading the
family may be a couple of different sex, a female same-sex couple or a male
same-sex couple. Despite the fact that in all these cases only one of the parents
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is a genetic parent, the legal consequences may differ considerably both for the
child and its parents. Another important factor is that all these couples require
the help of a third procreational party to have a child, this may either be a sperm
donor, an egg donor or a surrogate mother. The legal status of this third pro-
creational party may also differ considerably and determines whether and how
much manoeuvrability there is for the non-genetic parent to acquire (some)
parental status with regard to the child. 
DIFFERENT-SEX COUPLES 
a. Sperm donation (or mother has sexual intercourse with someone other than
her partner willingly or unwillingly)
c + b  f b
Bio mother Non-bio father  Child Bio father
Different-sex couples may consider using donated sperm to conceive a child, if
the male partner is infertile or the carrier of a hereditary disease or condition.
The woman may conceive through AI or IVF in a hospital, through self-insemi-
nation at home or through sexual intercourse with a third party (with or without
her partner’s consent or knowledge). 
b. Egg donation 
c +  b f   c
Gestational mother  Bio father  Child   Genetic mother
Different-sex couples may consider using donor eggs to conceive a child, for
instance if the female partner does not have working ovaries or is the carrier of
a hereditary disease or condition. She is, therefore, unable to conceive a child of
her own, but may carry a pregnancy established with a donor egg to term. Since
this procedure requires the egg donor to undergo invasive medical treatment and
a synchronisation of the menstrual cycles of both women involved, it can only
take place in a hospital.
c. Surrogacy 
In this section two examples of surrogacy with the gametes of one of the partners
in a different–sex relationship will be discussed. 
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c +  b  f  c
Non-bio mother Bio father  Child  Bio mother (surrogate)
The first case concerns an example of traditional surrogacy. For whatever reason
the female partner of the couple concerned cannot (or will not) carry a preg-
nancy to term. The couple may decide to use the services of a surrogate mother,
who subsequently gives birth to her own genetic child conceived with the sperm
of the commissioning father. In this case the surrogate mother is both the child’s
genetic and gestational mother. The commissioning father is the child’s biologi-
cal father. The commissioning mother, however, has no genetic relationship
with the child. Of course, it is also possible that the couple use a donor egg,
which is fertilised with the commissioning father’s sperm and subsequently
placed in the surrogate mother. In that case the surrogate mother is the child’s
gestational mother and not also her or his genetic mother. 
c + b f c b
Genetic mother Non-bio father Child Gestational mum Bio dad
The second case concerns an example of gestational surrogacy with donor sperm.
The commissioning mother does produce eggs but is unable or unwilling to carry
a pregnancy to term; the commissioning father is infertile or the carrier of a
hereditary disease or condition. The couple engage a surrogate mother who is
implanted with an embryo created with the commissioning mother’s egg ferti-
lised with donor sperm. This means that the commissioning mother is geneti-
cally related to the child, the surrogate mother is the child’s gestational mother
and the commissioning father has no genetic link with the child.
FEMALE SAME-SEX COUPLES
a. Sperm donation
c + c  f b
Bio mother Non-bio mother  Child Bio father
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BOS (2004). 
14 Conception may also take place through sexual intercourse. 
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By definition female same-sex couples13 wanting a child need to make use of
donor sperm. Conception may take place through AI or IVF in a hospital or
through self-insemination at home.14 
b. Egg donation 
c + c f b
Gestational mother Genetic mother  Child  Bio father
The most likely scenario for egg donation in a female couple is where one of the
women supplies an egg, which is then fertilised with donor sperm and subse-
quently implanted into the other woman. 
c. Surrogacy
c + c f c  b
Genetic mother Non-bio mother Child  Gestational mother Bio father
One of the women supplies the egg, which is subsequently fertilised with donor
sperm. As neither of the women is able or willing to carry a pregnancy to term,
they engage a surrogate mother to carry the child. This situation is not very
likely to occur, since in most cases one of the women will be able and willing to
become pregnant.
MALE SAME-SEX COUPLES
a. Surrogacy (and possibly egg donation)
b + b  f c
Bio father Non-bio father  Child Bio mother
Male same-sex couples will always have to enlist the help of a surrogate mother
if they want to raise a child that is genetically related to one of them. The sur-
rogate mother may carry a child of her own conceived with one of the commis-
sioning fathers’ sperm in which case she is both the child’s genetic mother and
gestational mother (biological mother), or she may be implanted with an embryo
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15 It is not necessarily so that the original parent in the secondary family is always genetically
related to the child. The original parent may be a consensual non-genetic parent.
16 BAINHAM in his handbook on children’s law divides families into married families, unmarried
families and social families. ‘Here, the expression ‘social family’ is used to embrace any family
unit in which a child is looked after wholly or partly by someone who is not her or his
biological or legal parent. It includes, therefore, guardians, step-parents, foster-parents,
relatives and others such as the cohabitant of the parent.’ BAINHAM (2005) p. 219. The social
family clearly covers a broader spectrum of families than the secondary partially genetic
family.
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consisting of a donor egg fertilised with one of the commissioning father’s sperm
in which case she is only the child’s gestational mother.
2.5. PARTIALLY GENETIC SECONDARY FAMILIES
In partially genetic secondary families one of the parents is genetically related
to the children and the other is not. Of importance is the qualification secondary
since this means that this is not the resident family in which the conception and
birth of the child was planned and desired.15 Secondary families are often
referred to as stepfamilies, but since this does not always include non-marital
secondary families, the term has been avoided in this context.16 
Of importance in the context of secondary families is the very likely existence
of a parent who is not a part of the present resident family. This other parent
may be the child’s second genetic parent and may have the status of a legal
parent and/or have parental responsibility over the child. The variations in
partially genetic secondary families may be enormous. There may be children
from more than one previous relationship involved. The children in the new
family may not only have a non-resident parent but also a non-resident ex-step-
parent. The previous as well as the present relationship may be a same-sex
relationship or a different-sex relationship. The previous relationship may have
been a different-sex relationship whereas the present relationship is a same-sex
relationship or the other way round. In short the child’s primary family may
have been any of the families depicted in the family tree, with the exception of
the partially genetic secondary families. 
The discussion of secondary families in Chapter 8 will focus on the parents in the
present relationship and the parent(s) in the child’s primary family. Parent(s)
from families that may have existed in between the child’s primary family and
the child’s present secondary family will only receive minimal attention. The
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17 UK figures: some 82% of stepfamilies with dependent children have children living with them
from the mother’s previous relationship, some 13% will have children living with them from
the father’s previous relationship and some 5% will have children living with them from
previous relationships of both partners. (Social Trends no. 36.) NL figures: most children (80%)
will continue to reside with their mother after divorce and the father is given a right to contact
with the children. About 10% of children will reside with their father after divorce. Only
about 4% of divorced parents are actually co-parenting. FOKKEMA et al. (2002) no. 18.
18 See previous footnote.
Intersentia 33
family pictures below include the genetic parent outside and – between brackets
– a possible non-genetic parent in case the child’s primary family was not headed
by two genetic parents.
DIFFERENT-SEX COUPLES
c + b de b 
Bio mother Non-bio father  Children   Bio father 
The majority of children living in partially genetic secondary families will live
with their mother and her new partner.17 There is very likely to be another
parent outside the resident family whose relationship to the child may vary from
(practically) non-existent to very close with almost equal time spent with both
parents from the primary family. 
or
c + b de c  
Non-bio mother Bio father   Children Bio mother 
A much smaller number of children will live in a family with their father and
his new partner.18 The child is very likely to have a mother outside the present
resident family, unless she is dead or otherwise completely absent from the
child’s life. Again the relationship with the mother may vary from (practically)
non-existent to very close with almost equal time spent with both parents from
the primary family. 
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FEMALE SAME-SEX COUPLES
c + c de b
Bio mother Non-bio mother  Children Bio father
In a secondary family headed by a female couple, the primary family of the
children concerned may, among others, have consisted of their biological mother
and father, or of their biological mother and her then female partner. The
relationship with the other parent may again vary from (practically) non-exis-
tent to very close with almost equal time spent with both parents from the
primary family. 
MALE SAME-SEX COUPLES
b + b de c
Bio father Non-bio father  Children Bio mother 
In a secondary family headed by a male couple the primary family of the chil-
dren concerned may, among others, either have consisted of their biological
father and their biological mother, or of their biological father and his then male
partner.
2.6 NON-GENETIC FAMILIES
In non-genetic families, neither of the parents is genetically related to the child
they raise. The parents in this kind of family may only both acquire full parental
status through adoption. Non-genetic families in general fall outside the scope
of this research. The only type of non-genetic family that falls within the scope
of this study, is the non-genetic surrogate family. Since the legal position of such
a surrogate family with regard to the child is very similar to that of most par-
tially genetic surrogate families, their position will not be discussed separately.
Where there are differences between non-genetic and partially genetic surrogate
families, these differences will be discussed in Chapter 6. Furthermore, the
elements of the adoption process that are relevant for children in families with
one non-genetic parent are discussed in the chapters on partially genetic families
(Chapter 4 and 6) and the chapter on surrogate genetic families (Chapter 5). 
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2.7 WORKING WITH THE FAMILY TREE 
Taking family diversity in contemporary Western society as its starting point the
family tree makes it possible to describe, analyse and compare the recognition
given to parent-child relationships for the different family types. The classifica-
tion into families as made according to the family tree makes it possible for the
reader to select the family situation that he is particularly interested in and
subsequently to read the sections or Chapters concerned. Moreover, the family
tree can also be used to analyse the recognition given to parent-child relation-
ships in other legal systems. Or as ÖRÜCÜ puts it: ‘While it is true that the degree
of generality of the findings in a piece of research covering but two legal systems
can only be limited, the methodological grid carefully worked out in the process
is of far more general application.’19 
Furthermore, the family tree may be used as a checklist to see if all the different
family types have been given due consideration when devising new legislation
with regard to parent-child relationships. Be that as it may, the next four chap-
ters will be concerned with the legal position of children in genetic families,
partially genetic families and non-genetic families in The Netherlands and
England. 
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1 ASSER-DE BOER (2002) no.1 p.1; CRETNEY, MASSON and BAILEY HARRIS (2003) i.e. A-002, also
MUNBY (2005). SEVENHUIJSEN (1987) p. 38-40, refers to this situation as the old liberal paradigm.
2 In The Netherlands 37% of all children were born out of marriage in 2006, there are no figures
as to the number of children recognised by the father before the birth, at the registration of
the birth or after the birth. (CBS at www.cbs.nl). In England and Wales 42% of all children
were born out of marriage in 2005; 80% of the extramarital children were jointly registered
by their mother and father. This leaves a total of 7% of the children born in 2005 who have
one parent only at the time of the birth registration. (National statistics on http://www.
statistics.gov.uk/). Of course this does not imply that these children’s parents will not marry
or enter into a non-marital registered relationship at a later date. See for instance HASKEY
(1997) p. 6-17.
3 TAKES (2000) p. 321-340.
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CHAPTER 3
TRADITIONAL GENETIC FAMILIES
3.1 INTRODUCTION
c + b  f
Bio mother Bio father  Child
The traditional married genetic family has for a long time been the paradigm on
which the law relating to parents and children was based.1 The father was the
head of the family; the mother had little or no influence. During the 20th century
the balance of power within the married family shifted, which not only meant
that a woman became a legal person in her own right, but also that, over time,
she was given the same rights with regard to the children of the marriage as her
husband. However, the increasing divorce rate in the last quarter of the 20th
century created new problems with regard to parents’ rights and duties towards
their children after divorce. In this respect there has also been a tendency
towards full equality for mothers and fathers where parenting after divorce is
concerned. Other trends, such as the increased number of cohabiting parents in
the late 20th century,2 have created problems related to the attribution of paren-
tal rights, in particular with regard to fathers. Furthermore, the introduction of
reproductive technologies in the second half of the 20th century, first the in-
creased use of artificial insemination as of the 1950s3 and later the introduction
of IVF and other assisted conception techniques in the late 20th century, created
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be discussed in Chapter 6.
5 See previous footnote.
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new problems for the traditional genetic family, in particular with regard to the
attribution of rights to the unmarried father. Moreover, the possibility to store
sperm, eggs and embryos for use at a later date, possibly after the death of one
of the parents, has created problems with regard to the attribution of parental
status. The consent of the parties has come to play a pivotal role in these matters.
Where relevant these issues will be discussed. 
This chapter will discuss the attribution of the status of a legal parent and the
acquisition of parental responsibility for traditional genetic families. The first
part of the chapter is concerned with legal parenthood and the second part of the
chapter with parental responsibility. Legal parenthood will be discussed for
English and Dutch law separately (sections 3.2 and 3.3). Both jurisdictions will
cover the legal position of married couples (sections 3.2.1 and 3.1) and unmarried
couples (sections 3.2.2 and 3.3) and Dutch law will also cover the legal situation
of registered partners (section 3.2).4 Under the headings of these different
relationship statuses, the position of the birth mother and her partner with
regard to legal parenthood will be discussed. Depending on the relationship
status of the persons concerned, a number or all of the issues listed below will
be discussed:
• establishment of paternity by operation of law
• voluntary establishment with maternal cooperation
• voluntary establishment without maternal cooperation
• involuntary establishment 
• paternity and assisted conception
• denial/rebuttal of paternity 
• post-mortal procreation.
The discussion of each jurisdiction will conclude with an internal comparison
(sections 3.2.3 and 3.3.4) and the entire discussion of legal parenthood will
conclude with an external comparison (section 3.4).
Parental responsibility will be discussed in the same manner: first England
(section 3.5) and subsequently The Netherlands (section 3.6). Both jurisdictions
will cover the legal position of married couples (sections 3.5.1 and 3.6.1) and
unmarried couples (sections 3.5.2 and 3.6.3) and Dutch law will also cover the
legal situation of registered partners (section 3.6.2).5 For these different statuses
the legal position of the birth mother and her partner with regard to the acquisi-
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tion of parental responsibility will discussed. Depending on the status of the
relationship between the birth mother and her partner a number or all of the
following issues will be discussed:
• attribution of parental responsibility by operation of law
• attribution to the father with(out) maternal cooperation
• ttribution to a father who is not a legal parent
• termination and relationship breakdown.
The section on each jurisdiction will conclude with an internal comparison
(sections 3.5.3 and 3.6.4) and the entire section on parental responsibility will
conclude with an external comparison (section 3.7). 
3.2. ENGLAND: LEGAL PARENTHOOD
c  + b  f
Bio mother Bio father  Child
Under English law legal parenthood is in principle determined by rules of
common law which are mainly based on biological facts. There are a number of
presumptions with regard to the paternity of a child that may be rebutted if the
man concerned is not the child’s biological father. These presumptions are: the
man is married to the mother, the man is registered on the birth certificate, or
the man has entered into a parental responsibility agreement with the mother.
However, in the last decades the advance of assisted conception techniques has
required a somewhat different approach to the idea of legal parenthood. In cases
where couples use their own genetic material and do not require the services of
a third procreative party, the common law rules continue to apply with regard
to the resulting child’s parentage: legal parenthood is based on genetic facts.
However, in case couples make use of donated materials or require the services
of a third procreational party (such as a surrogate mother) a number of provi-
sions apply that diverge from the common law principle that parentage is based
on genetic facts. These so-called status provisions are included in the HFEA
1990:6 section 27 HFEA 1990 determines that the woman who gives birth to a
child is the child’s mother. Section 28 HFEA 1990 concerns the legal parental
status of the mother’s male partner in case the couple have used donated sperm
or in case the man was deceased before the sperm or embryo was placed in the
woman’s womb (post-mortal procreation). If the conditions set out in section 28
HFEA 1990 are met, the mother’s husband or male partner will become the
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7 See section 29 HFEA 1990 which describes the effects of the provisions of sections 27 and 28
HFEA 1990.
8 For purposes of child maintenance a man may be presumed to be a child’s father pursuant to
s. 26 of the Child Support Act 1991. This section of the CSA 1991 contains a list of 8 cases in
which the Secretary of State may make a maintenance calculation on the assumption that the
alleged parent is the child’ s father even where he denies his paternity (s. 26 CSA 1991
introduced by s. 15 CSPSSA 2000). This presumption may be rebutted by the man concerned
by applying for a declaration that he is not the child’s father under s. 55A FLA 1986 (s. 27(1)(a)
CSA 1991.
9 The Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust v Mr A, Mrs A and Others [2003] EWCA 259 (QBD),
which will be discussed later on, concerns the boundary between legal parenthood on the basis
of a genetic link and legal parenthood on the basis of the HFEA 1990.
10 S. 34(2) BDRA 1953 and s. 10(1)(a) BDRA 1953.
11 S. 34(2) BDRA 1953 and s. 10(1)(d) and (e) BDRA 1953.
12 See for instance (Re R (IVF) (Paternity of Child) [2003] 1 FLR 1183 and on appeal [2005]
UKHL 33 which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.
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child’s legal father by operation of law (in the case of post-mortal procreation in
name only).7 
At present the situation is as follows. A man’s legal parenthood8 with regard to
a particular child can be established on one of the following grounds:
a. he is genetically the father of the child and no other man is to be treated as
the child’s father pursuant to s. 28(2) and (3) HFEA 1990,9 nor has an adop-
tion order been granted to another man;
b. one of the following legal presumptions applies and has not been rebutted:
(a) the man married to the woman giving birth is the child’s father; (b) the
man registered on the child’s birth certificate is the child’s father10  and (c)
the man who has entered into a parental responsibility agreement with the
mother is presumed to be the child’s father;11  
c. he is the child’s legal father according to the status provisions of s. 28 HFEA
1990;
d. an adoption order has been made in his favour.
If a man can prove neither of these facts, he will not be regarded as the child’s
legal parent, despite his intention to become the child’s parent.12 
Furthermore, the HFEA 1990 contains provisions in relation to post-mortal
procreation, the storage of eggs, sperm and embryos, provisions relating to the
required consent of the parties concerned and the transfer of parental rights in
case of surrogacy arrangements. Even though most of the status provisions in the
HFEA 1990 apply to assisted conception with the use of donated gametes, the
Act is also relevant where couples make use of assisted conception services with
their own gametes. In recent years a number of disputes have had to be decided
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13 Re B (Parentage) [1996] 2 FLR 15.
14 Evans v Amicus Health Care Ltd [2003] EWHS 2161, [2004] EWCA 727, Evans v. the United
Kingdom, Appl. no. 6339/05, 7 March 2006. 
15 R v HFEA ex parte Blood [1996] WLR 1176 (HC), [1997] 2 All ER 687 (CA), [1997] 2 FLR 742.
16 The Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust v Mr A, Mrs A and Others [2003] EWCA 259 (QBD).
17 The consultation closed on 25 November 2005.
18 HFEA (2005b), 05/33273.
19 The Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust v Mr A, Mrs A and Others [2003] EWCA 259 (QBD),
[2003] 1 FLR 1091.
20 It would be interesting to know if Mrs B could have contested Mrs A’s legal parenthood if Mrs
B’s eggs had been fertilised with Mr A’s sperm and subsequently placed in Mrs A.
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by the courts in cases where couples made use of their own gametes. For in-
stance where the male partner argues that he acted as a sperm donor instead of
an intended father13 or where one of the partners withdraws consent to the use
of the stored embryos,14 or in case one of the partners dies and the other wants
to make use of the other partner’s stored gametes,15 or if the IVF centre acciden-
tally swaps genetic material with that of another person.16 In 2005 the HFEA
1990 was subject to a public consultation.17 Where relevant the HFEA’s
response18 to this consultation and the Tissue Bill published by the Minister of
Health pursuant to this consultation will be discussed. 
To clarify some issues with regard to the boundaries between the attribution of
legal parenthood on the basis of the genetic link between father and child and
the attribution of legal parenthood on the basis of s. 28 HFEA 1990, it may at this
point be relevant to discuss the latter of the cases referred to in the previous
paragraph: The Leeds Teaching Hospitals.19 The case concerned two married
couples (Mr and Mrs A on the one hand and Mr and Mrs B on the other) who
had both undergone ICSE procedures at the Leeds Teaching Hospital. Acciden-
tally, the sperm of Mr B was mixed with Mrs A’s eggs. Subsequently, Mrs A
became pregnant and gave birth to twins of mixed race (couple A were white
and couple B were black). It was clear that Mrs A was the children’s legal
mother pursuant to s. 27 HFEA 1990 since she had given birth to the twins.20
Both Mr A and Mr B applied for their paternity to be established. The question
to be decided was whether s. 28 of the HFEA 1990 was applicable, in which case
Mr A would be the children’s legal father. However, since Mr A did not consent
to the fertilisation of Mrs A’s eggs with Mr B’s sperm, he consented to his own
sperm being used, he could not be regarded as the child’s legal father pursuant
to s. 28(2) of the HFEA 1990. Moreover, the court held that even if s. 28(3) could
be construed to apply to married couples, Mr and Mrs A were not ‘treated
together’ within the meaning of that subsection. Mr B, on the other hand, could
be regarded as the child’s legal father pursuant to common law principles, since
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21 Re R (IVF) Paternity of Child) [2003] 1 FLR 1183 was held to apply. This case, which has
subsequently been decided on appeal by the House of Lords ([2005] UKHL 33), will be
discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
22 SHELDON argues that the Leeds judgement is in line with a ‘trend against the 1990 Act’s clear
attempt to impose the model of the nuclear family towards an acceptance that knowledge of,
and contact with, more than one father may be in the child’s best interest. One father is better
than none, but, in some circumstances, it is now accepted that two may be better than one.’
p. 547. 
23 Ampthill Peerage Case [1977] AC 547 at p. 577: Maternity is ‘proved demonstrably by parturi-
tion’. 
24 See the section 3.2.2 for more information on giving up a child for adoption.
25 See for instance LAW COMMISSION REPORT NO. 118 (1992) p. 147-149.
26 These provisions will be discussed in Chapter 6 on partially genetic primary families.
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he was the child’s biological father.21 In this case the marital presumption of
paternity was resolutely set aside in order to give legal recognition to genetic
facts.22
In the sections below a number of issues relating to the establishment and
rebuttal of legal parenthood will be discussed. First the situation for married
couples will be explained and subsequently the situation for unmarried couples.
The sections on England will conclude with a comparison between the establish-
ment of a legal parent-child relationship where the parents are married and the
establishment of a legal parent-child relationship where the parents are in a non-
formalised relationship.
3.2.1. MARRIAGE
Maternity
The mother of a child is the woman who gives birth to the child.23 A mother
cannot deny her maternity nor does she have a specific right to give up her child
for adoption.24
Establishment of paternity
If the man is married to the mother at the time of the child’s birth, he is pre-
sumed to be the child’s legal father.25 This presumption is rebuttable if he is not
the child’s biological father, provided none of the status provisions in the HFEA
1990 apply.26 
Rebuttal of paternity
The paternity of a married biological father cannot be rebutted. 
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27 ‘Articles 59 and 60 EC Treaty conferred on the applicant a directly enforceable right to receive
medical treatment in another Member State unless interference with that right was justified.’
R v HFEA ex parte Blood [1996] WLR 1176 (HC), [1997] 2 All ER 687 (CA), [1997] 2 FLR 742.
Mrs Blood took her husband’s sperm to Belgium where she was successfully treated. She has
meanwhile given birth to two children created with her dead husband’s sperm.
28 Provisions relating to post-mortal procreation were inserted in the HFEA 1990 by the Human
Fertilisation and Embryology (Deceased) Fathers Act 2003.
29 S. 29(3A)-(3D) HFEA 1990.
30 Explanatory note to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Deceased) Fathers Act 2003.
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Post-mortal procreation
In the aftermath of R v HFEA ex parte Blood refered to earlier, legislation was
introduced to make the registration of the child’s father in case of post-mortal
procreation possible. The facts of the case were the following: Shortly after Mr
and Mrs Blood had decided to try for children, Mr Blood became fatally ill. As
he very rapidly became comatose, Mrs Blood convinced the doctors to collect
and store his sperm for her future use. Since Mr Blood never actually consented
to the use of his sperm by Mrs Blood after his death, the HFEA refused to
authorise Mrs Blood to use Mr Blood’s sperm to conceive a child. Eventually, the
Court of Appeal authorised Mrs Blood on the basis of European Community
law27 to take her deceased husband’s sperm abroad and use it to become preg-
nant. After the case was decided, the question was whether and how the de-
ceased father of the child could be named on the birth certificate. 
The Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Deceased Fathers) Act 2003 subse-
quently amended the HFEA 1990 to make it possible for the child’s mother to
register the deceased father on the child’s birth certificate, subject to the afore-
mentioned conditions. If a woman is artificially inseminated after the death of
her husband with his sperm or an embryo created with his sperm is placed in the
woman after his death and the husband consented to the use of his sperm/the
embryo after his death, he may be registered as the child’s father within 42 days
of the child’s birth on the birth certificate by the mother (s. 28(5A) and s. 28(5I)
HFEA 1990).28 The same applies where an embryo created with donor sperm
before the death of the husband is placed in the woman after the death of the
husband (s. 28(5C) HFEA 1990). This registration in principle has no further
legal consequences,29 it only serves as a ‘symbolic acknowledgement of their
father on their birth certificate.’30 The explanatory note to the HFE (Deceased
Fathers) Act 2003 states that this ‘registration will not confer upon the child any
legal status or rights as a consequence of that registration.’ It is essential that the
deceased husband gave his consent in writing to the use of his gametes or the use
of the embryo created with donor sperm and to being registered as the father of
the resulting child, and that he did not withdraw this consent before his death.
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31 See for instance Re B (Adoption natural parent) [2002] FLR 196 and BAINHAM (2002) p. 288-
291.
32 Keegan v Ireland (1994) 18 EHHR 342, Re H; Re G (Adoption: Consultation of unmarried
fathers) [2001] 1 FLR 646; Re A (A Child) (Adoption: Father’s involvement) [2001] 1 FLR 302;
Re B (Adoption by one natural parent to the exclusion of the other) [2001] 1 FLR 589.
33 Re B (Parentage) [1996] 2 FLR 15: ‘I find that if Parliament had intended to alter or amend
general principles as to parenthood, specific enactment would have been made in the 1990 Act,
particularly as certain gamete donors are specifically excluded from being treated as fathers
under s 28(6). I find fatherhood concerns genetics and the provision of sperm which results in
the birth of a child, unless either there is a presumption of legitimacy which affects the
situation or there is statutory intervention such as, for example, the change of status afforded
by adoption or freeing for adoption. I do not find an act of sexual intercourse is a prerequisite
to fatherhood because manual introduction of sperm into the cervix has long been recognised
as a possible though rare means of conception which has not prevented the donor being a
father. A blood test or DNA test to establish paternity does not require additional proof of
sexual intercourse. The statutory declaration signed by the respondent is prima facie proof of
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If the mother does not register her deceased husband as the father in the birth
register, the child has no way to establish the man’s paternity (as registration
only has a symbolic function, this does not deprive the child any more of legal
rights than if his father was registered.)
3.2.2.  NON-FORMALISED RELATIONSHIP
Maternity
The mother of the child is the woman who gives birth to the child. A mother
cannot deny her maternity nor does she have a statutory right to give up her
child for adoption. However, if she indicates that she is unwilling or unable to
look after the child, her child will be looked after by others.31 If she persists in
her intention to give up the child for adoption, it may be adopted once it is 16
weeks old and has lived with the prospective adopters for at least 10 weeks if the
child was placed with the adopters by an adoption agency or pursuant to a order
by the High Court (s. 42(2) ACA 2002). If the child has a legal father with
parental responsibility his consent to the adoption is required. However, if the
court considers that it is in the child’s best interest to be adopted despite the
father’s refusal to consent, adoption will take place. An unmarried father with-
out parental responsibility may need to be consulted if there has been a signifi-
cant relationship between the parents or between the father and the child.32 
Voluntary establishment of paternity with(out) maternal cooperation
If the mother and the biological father are not in a formalised relationship, the
child’s biological father is nevertheless regarded as the child’s father under
common law.33 This does not mean that there is a presumption of paternity for
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fatherhood. In all the circumstances, therefore, I conclude that in any event the respondent
is the father of the twins and comes within the terms of Sch. 1 to the Children Act 1989.’
34 S. 34(2) in combination with s. 10(1)(a) BDRA 1953; Brierley v Brierley and Williams [1918]
p. 257.
35 Declaration of parentage s. 55A Family Law Act 1986 inserted by s. 83 Child Support Pensions
and Social Security Act 2000.
36 After a declaration of paternity re-registration will take place it appears to the registrar that
the birth should be re-registered (s. 14a(1)(b) BDRA 1953. After a parental responsibility order
re-registration may take place at the request of the mother or the father in whose favour the
order was made provided no other person has been registered as the child’s father (s. 10A(1)
and (1)(e) BDRA 1953). 
37 As BAINHAM states there are a number of legal consequences that flow automatically from the
legal status of being a parent which are not dependent on the possession of parental responsi-
bility. His position is the same as that of all other parents for the purpose of succession; he is
liable for child maintenance. BAINHAM (2005) p. 203-204. 
38 S v McC (formerly S) and M (S intervening) [1970] 1 All ER 1162.
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the unmarried father akin to that of the married father, but that his paternity
may, if the need or wish arises, be established on the basis of the fact that he is
the child’s biological father. There are a number of ways in which an unmarried
father may have his paternity established voluntarily. He may become a legal
parent through registration on the birth certificate with the mother’s consent34
or by having his paternity established by a court pursuant to s. 55A Family Law
Act 1986,35 either as a free-standing application or in the course of, for instance,
an application for parental responsibility or contact.36 Furthermore, during the
course of family law proceedings such as an application for a parental responsi-
bility order pursuant to s. 4 CA 1989 findings of paternity can be made; such
findings only bind the parties. 
A father, in particular if his paternity is not in dispute, need not per se establish
his paternity to be regarded as the child’s father. However, as there is no pre-
sumption that he is the child’s father akin to the marital presumption of pater-
nity, he is not automatically granted parental rights.37 Therefore, there may be
advantages for him to being legally known as the child’s father, for instance with
regard to the recently introduced attribution of parental responsibility by
operation of law to unmarried fathers upon registration on the child’s birth
certificate. Also when an unmarried father whose paternity is not established,
either by registration or by a court, wants to apply for parental responsibility
pursuant to section 4 CA 1989 or for a section 8 order (CA 1989) his paternity
may need to be established during the proceedings (if it is disputed) to confirm
that he may apply for an order without the leave of the court. Should it be
necessary to establish the man’s paternity, the interests of the child are not the
court’s sole consideration,38 nor may the paternity issue be transformed into a
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39 Re H (a minor) (blood tests: parental rights) [1996] 2 FLR 65.
40 Re H (a minor) (blood tests: parental rights) [1996] 2 FLR 65.
41 Family Law Reform Act 1969: Part III, Sections 20 and 21; s. 26 Family Law Reform Act 1969
relates to the standard of proof needed to rebut the presumption (on the balance of probabili-
ties instead of beyond reasonable doubt). SI 2001/777 Family Law Reform Act 1987 (Com-
mencement No. 3) Order 2001: ‘This Order brings into force on 1st April 2001 section 23 of,
and paragraphs 21 to 25 of Schedule 2 to, the Family Law Reform Act 1987. These provisions
amend Part III of the Family Law Reform Act 1969 (c. 46) (tests for determining parentage),
by making it possible for samples to be taken of bodily tissue and bodily fluid other than blood
and for scientific tests to be used to establish whether a person is the mother of the person
whose parentage falls to be determined, as well as whether a person is the father.’
42 For instance Thorpe LJ in Re H and A (Children) [2002] 1 FLR 1145 para. (30). ‘In the nine-
teenth century, when science had nothing to offer and illegitimacy was a social stigma as well
as a depriver of rights, the presumption [of paternity] was a necessary tool, the use of which
required no justification. This common law presumption, only rebuttable by proof beyond
reasonable doubt, was modified by section 26 of the Family Law Reform Act 1969 by enabling
the presumption to be rebutted on the balance of probabilities. But as science has hastened on
and more and more children are born out of marriage it seems to me that the paternity of any
child is to be established by science and not by legal presumption and inference.’ See FORTIN
(2005) p. 394-398 and BAINHAM (2005) p. 193-197.
43 See also s. 14 BDRA 1953.
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disguised application for leave to apply and judging the paternity issue by the
criteria set out in s. 10(9) CA 1989.39 The issue of paternity must be judged ‘as a
free standing application entitled to consideration of its own’,40 which means
that despite the fact that it may seem very unlikely that a contact or parental
responsibility order will be made, that in itself does not prevent the court from
establishing the man’s paternity.
The fact that the child’s father is married to a woman other than the child’s
mother is no impediment to his registration on the birth certificate as the child’s
father. If the mother is married to a man other than the child’s biological father,
the presumption of paternity within marriage may be rebutted, not only by the
members of the resident family, but also by the biological father himself.41
During the last few decades there has been a tendency in English law towards
establishing the truth with regard to a child’s parentage instead of adhering to
the marital presumption of paternity.42 
Where parents marry after the birth of the child it will be legitimated pursuant
to s. 2 Legitimacy Act 1976.43 This will also confer joint parental responsibility
on the parents in accordance with s. 2(3) CA 1989.
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44 Section 27 which defines the meaning of mother under the HFEA 1990 centres on the carrying
of a child as a result of placing an embryo or sperm and eggs in a woman. The woman who
carries and gives birth to the child is regarded as the child’s mother, regardless of the existence
or absence of a genetic link.
45 See the sub-section on post-mortal procreation further on in this section.
46 This rather vague term has been given meaning in a series of judgements which will be
discussed in depth in Chapter 6.
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Involuntary establishment of paternity
If the father is unwilling to establish his paternity voluntarily, any person may
apply to the court for a declaration of the father’s paternity provided that the
person making the application has a sufficient personal interest in the making
of the declaration (s. 55A(3) Family Law Act 1986). A number of applicants are
deemed to have such a personal interest and therefore do not have to substanti-
ate it before the court, namely where an applicant is seeking to have it estab-
lished that (a) the applicant is the parent of a named person; (b) a named person
is the parent of the applicant; or (c) a named person is the other parent of a
named child of the applicant (s. 55A(4) Family Law Act 1986). However, the
court may refuse to hear any application where it concerns a child, if it considers
that the determination of the application would not be in the best interest of the
child. There is no period of limitation for filing an application for a declaration
of parentage.
Paternity and assisted conception
If the couple have had to resort to assisted reproduction with their own genetic
material, the man is in principle regarded as the child’s legal father under
common law.44 The HFEA does not contain status provisions for the father in
case the partners make use of assisted conception techniques with their own
genetic material, except where one of the partners is already deceased before the
gametes or embryos are used.45 However, as it may at times be difficult to
establish whether the unmarried father is acting as a donor or as a participant in
the process of helping the woman conceive, the HFEA may of course be rele-
vant. If an unmarried couple use donor sperm the notion of ‘receiving treatment
together’ plays an important role. The man will only be regarded as the child’s
legal father if he receives treatment together with the woman.46 
This notion of ‘receiving treatment together’ and the requirement of consent for
a specific use of gametes as laid down in Schedule 3 to the HFEA 1990, are cru-
cial in determining whether an unmarried father can be regarded as the child’s
legal parent. With regard to unmarried biological fathers a number of cases are
of particular interest for determining the boundaries of these notions. Since the
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47 For instance U v W (Attorney General intervening) [1997] 2 C.M.L.R. 431 in para 51: ‘The test
in section 28(3)(a) is not whether the man consented either to be deemed in law to be the
father of the prospective child or to become legally responsible for him: it is whether the
relevant treatment services were provided for the woman and him together. It stretches the
requisite mental element in the man too far to require either form of such consent. In my view
what has to be demonstrated is that, in the provision of treatment services with donor sperm,
the doctor was responding to a request for that form of treatment made by the woman and the
man as a couple, notwithstanding the absence in the man of any physical role in such treat-
ment.’
48 Re B (Parentage) [1996] 2 FLR 15.
49 Re R (IVF: paternity of child) [2005] 2 FLR 843: ‘But important though legal certainty is, it is
even more important that the very significant legal relationship of parenthood should not be
based on a fiction (especially if the fiction involves a measure of deception by the mother).
Infertility treatment may be very protracted and a general rule of ‘once together, always
together’ (absent express withdrawal of his acknowledgment by the male partner, or review
by the clinic) could produce some very undesirable and unjust consequences.’
50 Evans v Amicus Health Care Ltd and Others [2005] Fam 1. The approach taken by English law
in this matter has been judged not to interfere with the applicants rights under s. 8 of the
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status provisions in the HFEA 1990 are primarily concerned with fathers who
are not genetically related to the children conceived through assisted concep-
tion, these notions will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.47
The first case concerns the demarcation of the notion of ‘receiving treatment
together’. The case concerned an unmarried woman who conceived twins
through artificial insemination with her married lover’s sperm.48 The question
in this case was whether the lover should be regarded as a donor or as the legal
father of the twins. The issue was of particular importance with regard to child
maintenance. The man and woman concerned had been having an affair for
some time. The affair ended but the man was, nevertheless, willing to help the
woman conceive a child, first through sexual intercourse and later by donating
sperm for AI. The court concluded that the fact that the man had attended the
hospital with the woman to donate sperm combined with the other factors of the
case indicated that there was a ‘joint enterprise’ as a result of which the man
should be regarded as the child’s legal father. 
Two more recent cases also concerned the notion of ‘receiving treatment to-
gether’ in combination with the question when consent to the use of one’s
gametes can no longer be withdrawn. In these cases it was held that ‘receiving
treatment together’ is a continuous process which runs until the embryo or
sperm is placed in the womb of the woman.49 During this whole period of time
the consent of the parties must continue to exist, which means that consent can
be varied or withdrawn until the embryo/sperm is placed in the woman.50 The
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ECRM by the ECtHR. Evans v. the United Kingdom, Appl. no. 6339/05, 7 March 2006 and 10
April 2007 (Grand Chamber). 
51 Consultation Q 22 concerning withdrawal or variation of consent. HFEA (2005) considers that
storage with only the continued consent of one of the partners should be allowed, since the
other partner can always object to the later use of the stored embryos. ‘However, any change
in the law would need to carefully consider the risk of embryos being implanted without the
former partner’s knowledge and consent.’ Q. 53 on equalising the position of married and
unmarried fathers under the HFEA 1990. The HFEA suggests the creation of a presumption
that a woman’s unmarried male partner is the legal father of the child, unless he can show that
he did not consent to legal fatherhood. In the Tissue Bill the approach has been taken that
where the male or female partner of the birth mother has consented to being the child’s other
legal parent and the birth mother has consented to her partner becoming the child’s legal
parent, the male or female partner will be treated as the child’s other legal parent (cl. 42, 43,
49 and 50). See for more information on this topic section 6.2.
52 S. 28(5B) HFEA 1990 refers to the registration and s. 28(5I) HFEA 1990 to the effect of the
registration.
53 Provisions inserted by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Deceased Fathers) Act 2003.
See the explanatory note to the Deceased Fathers Act 2003: ‘The Act allows a man to be
registered as the father of a child conceived after his death using his sperm or using an embryo
created with his sperm before his death. This registration will not confer upon the child any
legal status or rights as a consequence of that registration.’ (Since Peper v Hart one is allowed
to refer to these documents.)
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continued consent to the use of gametes confirms the fact that there is a joint
enterprise and thus automatically confers legal fatherhood on the man.51 Once
the sperm/embryo is placed in the woman, consent can no longer be varied or
withdrawn. 
Rebuttal of paternity
If the legal father is the child’s biological father it is not possible for any party
or himself to rebut his paternity, unless the father should be regarded as a sperm
donor pursuant to 28(6) of the HFEA 1990.
Post-mortal procreation
If a woman is inseminated after the death of her partner with his sperm or an
embryo created with the partner’s sperm or with donor sperm is placed in the
woman after her partner’s death and the partner consented to the use of his
sperm/the embryo after his death and the registration as the child’s father on the
birth certificate after his death, the deceased partner may be registered by the
mother as the child’s father on the birth certificate, provided the couple were
receiving treatment together before his death either by a person to whom a
licence applies or outside the United Kingdom.52 This registration has no further
legal consequences; it only serves as a symbolic registration with regard to the
child’s paternity, s. 29(3A-3D) HFEA 1990.53 
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54 In response to the Department of Health consultation on the HFEA 1990 question 53, the
HFEA suggests that the position of the unmarried father ‘could be equalised [with that of the
married father] by creating a presumption that a woman’s unmarried male partner is the legal
father unless, as is the case for a married man, he can show that he did not consent to father-
hood. This could be facilitated if all men were required to sign a form agreeing to be recognised
52 Intersentia
3.2.3. INTERNAL COMPARISON
Maternity
No differences exist on the issue of maternity: the woman who gives birth to the
child is the child’s legal mother regardless of her relational status.
Establishment of paternity
The main difference between the acquisition of the status of legal parent for
married and unmarried fathers lies in the fact that the former is attributed with
legal parenthood by operation of law and the latter needs the mother’s consent
or a court order to establish his legal parenthood, unless he is considered to be
the child’s father pursuant to s. 28 HFEA 1990. From the point of view of the
child this means that if he or she is born into a marriage he or she will have two
parents by operation of law, and if born outside marriage he or she will have one
legal parent by operation of law and may or may not acquire a second parent in
the course of time. Thus for a child born into a non-formalised relationship the
crucial factor determining whether he/she will have a legal father shortly after
his/her birth is the mother’s consent.
Denial/rebuttal of paternity
There is no difference between married and unmarried fathers where the
rebuttal of the presumption of paternity is concerned. Their paternity may be
rebutted if they are not the child’s biological father, provided that none of the
status provisions of s. 28 HFEA 1990 apply. Furthermore, there are no time-
limits.
Paternity and assisted conception
Both for married and unmarried fathers who make use of assisted conception
techniques with their own genetic material the standard rules of common law
with regard to legal fatherhood apply. Only where there is disagreement on the
intention of the father as to whether he meant to be a sperm donor or whether
he meant to be the child’s father do the provisions of the HFEA 1990 become
relevant. Problems such as these can be avoided by requiring the man in such
cases to sign a consent form immediately before the insemination or embryo
transfer in which he agrees to become the resulting child’s legal father.54 
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as the child’s father immediately before the embryo transfer or donor insemination.’
55 S. 28(5A) and (5C) HFEA 1990.
56 S. 28(5B) and (5D) HFEA 1990.
57 In this thesis extensive use has been made of the translation of Book 1 of the Dutch Civil Code:
SUMNER & WARENDORF (2003).
58 Dutch Second Chamber 1999-2000, 26 673, no.5, p.20.
59 Embryowet, Staatsblad 2002/338.
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Post-mortal procreation
The names of both married55 and unmarried fathers56 may be registered on the
birth certificate of the child ‘conceived’ by their partner after their death, if they
consented to the use of their sperm or the embryo created before their death,
and to their registration on the birth certificate. In principle, such registration
has no further legal consequences. 
3.3. THE NETHERLANDS: LEGAL PARENTHOOD
c + b f
Bio mother Bio father  Child
Regulations with regard to parentage are laid down in Book 1 of the Dutch Civil
Code, which deals with the law of persons and families.57 The central principle
of the Dutch law on legal parenthood can be summarised as follows: a child
always has a mother and may have a father.58 Legal motherhood is established
through giving birth or through adoption (art. 1:198 DCC). Legal fatherhood is
established by marriage to the child’s mother, by recognition with or without
the mother’s consent, by adoption or by the judicial establishment of paternity
(art 1:199 DCC). 
Besides the Dutch Civil Code, the Embryo Act59 is of importance for issues
related to legal parenthood and assisted reproduction as it includes provisions
with regard to the possibility of gamete donation to third parties or scientific
research, the storage of gametes, the use of gametes after the death of the pro-
vider and the written consent required for the use of these gametes. This Act
does not contain status provisions; provisions relating to the assignment of legal
parenthood in cases of assisted conception can only be found in the DCC. Art.
2(2) of the Embryo Act requires IVF clinics to draw up a protocol, which should
contain provisions concerning the storage of embryos. A committee consisting
of, among others, members of the medical profession and policy makers has
Machteld Vonk, 'Children and their parents'
Chapter 3
60 KWALITEITSINSTITUUT VOOR DE GEZONDHEIDSZORG CBO (2003). A recent review of the Embryo
Act (ZONMW (2006)) shows that 6 of the 14 licensed IVF clinics are using the Model.
61 Hof Arnhem, 16 April 2002, NJ 2002/344; Art. 7 Embryo Act.
62 See for more information on this topic OUDHOF (2002) p. 288-298.
63 A recent review of the Embryo Act (ZonMw (2006) p. 64) has shown that there have been very
few requests by partners of deceased persons to be allowed to use the stored gametes. Five of
the Dutch IVF clinics are willing to provide post-mortal procreation services (p. 66). In this
same Evaluation, however, it is pointed out that an increasing number of couples request to
make use of assisted conception techniques where one of the partners is terminally ill. There
are no guidelines on how clinics should handle such requests. 
64 For more information on this subject see the legal parenthood section for mothers in a non-
formalised relationship.
65 See for instance Hoge Raad 1 December 2000, NJ 2001/317. In this case the parents were too
old under Dutch law to adopt a child, so they brought a newborn baby girl from abroad and
registered her as their own child.
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drawn up a model protocol, which contains additional rules and forms that can
be used for registering consent to the storage of gametes.60 If one of the partners
withdraws his/her consent, the gametes/embryos will be destroyed and cannot
be used by the other partner. The same rule applies if one of the partners dies,
unless the deceased partner has given explicit written consent to his gametes
being used by the other partner after his death.61 If the party concerned has
given consent to the use of his gametes or embryos that have come into existence
with the use of his gametes, the partner of the deceased may in principle use
these gametes to become pregnant.62 Most clinics maintain a two-year consider-
ation period after the death of one of the partners before the partner concerned
may actually use the gametes.63 
In the sections below a number of issues relating to the establishment and denial
of legal parenthood will be discussed. First, the situation for married couples will
be discussed, then the situation for couples in a registered partnership and
subsequently the situation for unmarried couples. This part will also conclude
with a comparison between the establishment of a legal parent-child relationship
where the parents are married, where the parents are in a registered partnership
and where the parents are in a non-formalised relationship.
3.3.1.  MARRIAGE 
Maternity
The legal mother of a child is the woman who gives birth to the child (art. 1:198
DCC). The mother’s relational status is of no relevance. A mother cannot deny
her maternity nor does she have a statutory right to give up her child for adop-
tion.64 In order to avoid fraudulent registration of maternity,65 art. 1:19e(8) DCC
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66 It is not possible to establish exactly how frequently Registrars make use of this possibility.
KAMPERS (2006) p. 264, states that it happens from time to time. 
67 Midwifes and doctors do not have the obligation to provide such proof.
68 See for instance Hof Leeuwarden 6 October 2004, LJN: AR3391.
69 See for a case concerning the question whether the birth mother’s deceased partner consented
to post-mortal use of his sperm: Hof Arnhem 16 April 2002, NJ 2002/344.
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grants the Registrar of Births, Deaths, Marriages or Registered Partnerships the
right to ask for proof at the time of the registration of the birth that the woman
registering as the child’s mother did indeed give birth to the child.66 He may for
instance ask for a certificate from a midwife or obstetrician who was present at
the child’s birth to prove that the mother did give birth to the child concerned
(art. 1:19b DCC).67 In case of fraudulent registration of maternity the court can
order the name of the fraudulent declarer to be struck from the birth certificate
and replaced with the name of the actual mother.68 
Establishment of paternity
If the father is married to the mother at the time of the child’s birth, he is the
child’s legal father by operation of law (art. 1:199(a) DCC). 
Denial of paternity
A married biological father cannot deny his paternity. A married father can deny
his paternity if he is not the child’s biological father unless he was aware of the
pregnancy before the marriage, or unless he consented to an act that may have
led to the coming into existence of the child (art. 1:200 DCC). The mother can
deny her husband’s paternity on the same grounds unless the husband consented
to an act that may have led to the coming into existence of the child. The child
can always deny the married father’s paternity on the ground that he is not the
child’s biological father. There are strict time-limits for filing an application for
a denial of paternity: the mother shall lodge such an application within one year
after the child’s birth, the father shall lodge such an application within one year
after he became aware of the fact that he was presumed not to be the child’s
biological father. The child shall lodge such an application within three years
after he or she became aware of the fact that the man was presumed not to be his
or her biological father. However, if he or she became aware of this fact during
his minority, the application shall be lodged within three years after the child
reaches the age of majority (art. 1:200(5) and 1:200(6) DCC).
Post-mortal procreation
In the case of the use of assisted conception techniques after the death of the
husband with his sperm69 or an embryo created with his sperm or with donor
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70 Art. 2(3)(f) Embryowet requires the earlier mentioned protocol to contain rules on the use of
gametes and embryos after the death of the person(s )concerned. The earlier mentioned
Modelreglement Embryowet requires IVF clinics to ensure that in case couples want to
consent to post-mortal procreation, they do this on a separate consent form: section 4.4.
71 See for an evaluation of post-mortal procreation from the perspective of the child’s interests
T. OUDHOF (2002) p. 288-298.
72 For instance Hof Amsterdam 8 July 2004, LJN: AQ0621.
73 The information supplied for a married mother’s legal parenthood in this chapter also applies
to a mother in a registered partnership. 
74 For more information on this subject see the subsection on the birth mother in section 3.3.3.
75 Hoge Raad 16 February 2001, NJ 2001/571.
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sperm, the mother and/or the child may have the father’s paternity established
on the basis that he, as the mother’s life-companion, consented to an act that
may have resulted in the birth of the child (art. 1:207 DCC). The man must have
consented to the use of his sperm/the embryo after his death (art. 7 Embryo
Act).70 This establishment of paternity has no consequences with regard to the
man’s estate since he was already deceased before the mother became pregnant
with the child. This bars the application of art. 1:2 DCC pursuant to which a
child (still) in its mother’s womb is considered to be already born whenever his
interests require this.71 However, the judicial establishment of paternity will
create legal familial ties with the father’s family, which means that the child may
for instance inherit from his paternal grandparents in his father’s stead (art.
4:10(2) DCC).72
3.3.2.  NON-MARITAL REGISTERED RELATIONSHIP
Maternity
The woman who gives birth to the child is the child’s legal mother,73 she cannot
deny her maternity and has no statutory right to give up her child for adoption.74
Voluntary establishment of paternity with(out) maternal cooperation
If the child’s father and mother are in a registered partnership at the moment of
the child’s birth, the father does not become a legal parent by operation of law.
He may, however, recognise the child with the mother’s consent (art. 1:204(c)
DCC). If the mother refuses to consent to the recognition of the child by the
father, he may apply to the court to have the mother’s consent replaced with the
consent of the court, provided that he is the biological father and the child was
begotten in a natural way (art. 1:204(3) DCC). The starting point is that it is in
principle in interests of the child and the biological father that his legal parent-
hood is established.75 However, the biological father does not have a straightfor-
ward right to have his paternity established. The court will have to balance the
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76 Hoge Raad 12 November 2004, NJ 2005/248.
77 Hoge Raad 16 February 2001, NJ 2001/571. 
78 Hoge Raad 16 June 2006, NJ 2006/339.
79 The term life-companion may be confusing here as it is often used in a sense that specifically
does not refer to married couples and registered partners but to other couples in a close per-
sonal relationship. See for instance Dutch Second Chamber 1995-1996, 22 700 no. 21, p. 2 and
SCHRAMA (2004) p. 158 on the so-called ‘other life-companion’. However, from the parliamen-
tary debates it is clear that the term life-companion in art. 1:207 DCC is meant to include a
registered partner (Dutch Second Chamber 1996-1997, 24 649 and 25 189 no. 35, p. 35.) 
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various interests of the parties concerned, the biological father, the mother and
the child.76 The court will only replace the mother’s consent if recognition is not
contrary to the interests of the mother in an undisturbed relationship with her
child or to the interests of the child. In 2001, the Dutch Supreme Court estab-
lished that recognition is contrary to the child’s interests if it creates a real risk
that the child will be unable to develop in a well-balanced manner.77 In practice
it is difficult to find a clear line followed by the different courts, as is illustrated
by a case that recently came before the Dutch Supreme Court and was reverted
back to one of the appeal courts for a new decision. The mother in question had
been abused by the biological father, for which he had been convicted. Never-
theless, the lower court found that the interests of the biological father in
recognising his child outweighed the interests of the mother and child in non-
recognition.78 
Involuntary establishment of paternity
In case the man is unwilling to recognise the child, both the mother and the
child may apply to the court to have the father’s paternity established (art. 1:207
DCC), regardless of whether the child was conceived in a natural way or
whether the couple have had to resort to assisted reproduction with their own
gametes, provided the man can be regarded as the mother’s life-companion79 and
has agreed to an act that may have resulted in the conception of the child. Legal
establishment of paternity cannot take place if the child already has two parents.
Given the fact that the couple have entered into a registered partnership, the
man will be regarded as the woman’s life-companion. 
An application for the judicial establishment of the man’s paternity has to be
filed by the mother within five years after the child’s birth or if there is uncer-
tainty with regard to the identity or the abode of the presumed begetter, within
five years from the date on which the mother became aware of the begetter’s
identity or abode, unless the child by that time has reached the age of 16. The
child may at any time file an application for the establishment of the presumed
begetter’s paternity. 
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80 Hoge Raad 24 January 2003, NJ 2003/386. 
81 Art. 1:207(1) DCC; See for more detailed information the same section under the heading
marriage. 
82 Art. 7 Embryo Act. Art. 2(3)(f) Embryo Act requires the earlier mentioned protocol to contain
rules on the use of gametes and embryos after the death of the person(s) concerned. The earlier
mentioned Modelreglement Embryowet requires IVF clinics to ensure that in case couples
want to consent to post-mortal procreation, they do this on a separate consent form: section
4.4.
83 The information supplied earlier in this chapter under 3.2.2.1. for the married mother’s
maternity applies to the mother in a non-formalised relationship as well.
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Paternity and assisted conception
If the registered couple have had to resort to assisted conception techniques with
the use of the man’s own sperm, the child has not been begotten in a natural
way. In that case the biological father is regarded as a sperm donor where the
establishment of his legal parenthood without the mother’s consent is con-
cerned. This means that he does not have the right to apply to the court to have
the mother’s consent replaced, should she refuse to consent to his recognition
of the child. However, if there is family life between the father and the child it
seems likely that on the basis of the rights encapsulated in Art. 8 ECHR the court
might hear his case and possibly replace the mother’s consent on the basis that
the mother has no interests in refusing consent that deserve to be respected.80
There is no room for balancing the interests of the parties involved; if the
mother has an interest that deserves to be respected, the court will in principle
not give consent. The father is, however, liable for child support during the
child’s minority and young majority pursuant to art. 1:394 DCC.
Denial of paternity
A biological father who is a legal parent cannot deny his paternity. 
Post-mortal procreation
In the case of post-mortal procreation with the consent of the deceased male
partner, the mother and/or the child can have the paternity of the man estab-
lished by a court on the basis that, as the mother’s life-companion, he consented
to an act that may have resulted in the conception of the child.81 The man must
have consented to the use of his sperm/the embryo after his death.82
3.3.3.  NON-FORMALISED RELATIONSHIP
Maternity 
The woman who gives birth to the child is the child’s legal mother; she cannot
deny her maternity.83 The mother has no statutory right to give up her child for
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84 See WAANDERS (2006) p. 12-13.
85 See STICHTING AMBULANTE FIOM (2005).
86 Art. 1:228(1)(e) DCC.
87 Art. 1:228(1)(d) DCC.
88 See, for instance, ANTOKOLSKAIA (2002) p. 790-791.
89 Art. 1:204 (1)(e) DCC.
90 Pursuant to a recent judgement by the Hoge Raad (Hoge Raad 27 May 2005), the close personal
relationship between the married man and the child or between the married man and the
child’s mother has to exist at the time of the application for recognition; the court has to
establish its existence before recognition takes place. The fact that family life between the
married man and the child has come into existence after the recognition took place will not
prevent the recognition form being declared void on the basis of the fact that no such family
life existed at the time of the recognition. See also BOELE-WOELKI (2005) p. 5312-5314.
91 It may be that the situation is not as clear-cut as it is described here. See Chapter 6.5.2.2. 
92 Art. 1:204 (1)(f) and 1:200 (1) DCC and Dutch Second Chamber 1996-1997, 24 649 no. 6 p. 22.
Note that the biological father has no method for asserting his paternity if the mother or her
husband does not challenge the marriage father’s paternity. See for instance Hoge Raad 21
December 1990, NJ 1991/741 which concerned the question whether this is in breach of art.
8 ECHR. However, since the Dutch Supreme Court in that particular case considered that the
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adoption.84 However, if she indicates that she is unwilling or unable to take care
of her child there are mechanisms in place which will ensure that the child will
be looked after.85 If the mother persists in her intention to give up the child, the
child may be adopted when it is three months old, provided the mother has
reached the age of 16 at that point.86 If the child has a legal father, his consent
to the adoption is required.87
Voluntary establishment of paternity with(out) maternal consent 
If the man and the woman are not in a formalised relationship at the time of the
child’s birth, the man does not become the child’s legal father by operation of
law. He may recognise the child with the mother’s consent, unless he is married
to another woman at the time of the child’s birth.88 However, if the court is
convinced that the married man and the woman have (or have had) a relation-
ship that is sufficiently similar to a marriage or that there is a close personal
relationship between the man and the child,89 he may recognise the child (with
the mother’s consent or the court’s consent if the mother refuses to consent).90
If the father is married to another man or is in a registered partnership with
another man or another woman, he is free to recognise the child with the
mother’s consent, regardless of his marriage or registered partnership.91 
If the mother is married to another man, the child already has a legal father and
thus the biological father may only recognise the child after the mother or her
husband has successfully challenged the husband’s paternity.92 If the mother is
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biological father in question had other means to attain the desired goal, it did not decide on
this question in principle.
93 Art. 1:204(2) DCC. Rechtbank Haarlem, 19 June 2005, LJN: AT8396 100612/04-854 and
101020/04-1024. (In this judgment the court refused consent among other things because after
recognition the father may, pursuant to a recent judgement of the Dutch Supreme Court,
request joint parental responsibility over the child, which in this case would constitute an
interference in the mother’s relationship with the child.
94 Hoge Raad 16 February 2001, NJ 2001/571.
95 Dutch Second Chamber 1995-1996, 24 649, no. 3, p. 1.
96 Art. 1:207 (1) DCC. See Hof Leeuwarden 11 June 2003, LJN: AG0212. The man and the woman
in this case had two biological children together, one born during their marriage and one born
more than a year after their divorce. The first child was conceived before the marriage, but as
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in a registered partnership or if she is married to another woman, there is no
second legal parent by operation of law and the biological father is free to recog-
nise the child with the mother’s consent unless he is married to another woman.
Should the mother refuse to consent to recognition by the biological father, he
can only ask the court to replace the mother’s consent if he has begotten the
child with the mother in a natural way.93 The starting point is that it is in the
best interests of the child and the biological father for his legal parenthood to be
established. However, the court will only replace the mother’s consent if the re-
cognition is not contrary to the interests of the mother in an undisturbed rela-
tionship with the child or to the interests of the child. The Dutch Supreme Court
established in 2001 that recognition is contrary to the child’s interest if it creates
real risks that the child will be unable to develop in a well-balanced manner.94
The subsequent marriage of the child’s parents has no consequences for his or
her legal status. If the unmarried father did not recognise the child before the
marriage, the marriage itself will not make him the child’s legal father. Legitima-
tion due to the subsequent marriage of the parents was abolished in 1998 in
order to end discrimination between children born within and children born out
of marriage.95 If the unmarried father wants to establish legal familial ties with
his child, he will have to recognise the child either before or after the marriage.
Involuntary establishment of paternity
If the father refuses to recognise the child, the mother or the child may have the
father’s paternity established provided the child was begotten in a natural way.
However, if the child was not conceived in a natural way, but through AI or IVF
with the man’s own sperm, the mother or the child may only have the father’s
paternity established if the man can be regarded as the mother’s life-companion
who consented to the treatment which brought the child into existence.96
Machteld Vonk, 'Children and their parents'
Traditional genetic families
she was born during the marriage the man was presumed to be the father. The second child
had been conceived by means of artificial insemination with the man’s sperm after their
divorce. Since the child was conceived artificially and the man and woman could no longer be
regarded as life-partners, the man was not considered to be the child’s legal father but was to
be regarded as a sperm donor. This meant that he did not have to pay child support, despite the
fact that he was the child’s biological father and must have consented to the use of his sperm
to help his former wife conceive his child.
97 Hoge Raad 24 January 2003, NJ 2003/386. 
98 Art. 2(3)(f) Embryowet requires the earlier mentioned protocol to contain rules on the use of
gametes and embryos after the death of the person(s) concerned. The earlier mentioned
Modelreglement Embryowet requires IVF clinics to ensure that in case couples want to
consent to post-mortal procreation, they do this on a separate consent form: section 4.4.
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Paternity and assisted conception
If the couple have had to resort to assisted conception techniques with the
partner’s own gametes, the man cannot ask the court to replace the mother’s
consent to recognition (art. 1:204(3)) since the child has not been begotten in a
natural way. However, if there is family life between the biological father and
the child, the court might hear the man’s case and possibly replace the mother’s
consent on the basis that the mother has no interests in refusing consent that
deserve to be respected.97 There is no room for balancing the interests of the
parties involved, if the mother has an interest that deserves to be respected, the
court will in principle not replace the mother’s consent. Despite the fact that the
man concerned will not become the child’s legal father he is, however, liable for
child support during the child’s minority and young majority pursuant to art.
1:394 DCC.
Denial of paternity
An unmarried biological father cannot deny his paternity once it has been
established (art. 1:200(1) and (3) DCC).
Post-mortal procreation
In case of post-mortal procreation with the consent of the deceased male partner,
the mother and/or the child can have the paternity of the father established by
a court on the basis of the fact that as the mother’s life-companion he consented
to an act that may have resulted in the conception of the child (art. 207(1) DCC).
The man must have consented to the use of his sperm/the embryo after his death
(art. 7 Embryo Act).98
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99 In art. 1:200(3) and 1:207(1) DCC the word begetting is used, also where artificial insemination
is referred to. The choice for the word begetting in this context is confusing. See also ASSER-DE
BOER (2002) no. 705.
100 The father and the mother cannot deny the father’s paternity if he consented to the use of
donor sperm; the child, however, may deny paternity in that case.
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3.3.4.  INTERNAL COMPARISON: LEGAL PARENTHOOD
Maternity
The woman who gives birth to the child is the child’s legal mother regardless of
whether she is married, in a registered partnership or not in a formalised rela-
tionship.
Establishment of paternity
The legal status of the father’s relationship with the mother is crucial in deter-
mining the legal status of the child. The pater est quem justea nuptiae demon-
strat presumption that establishes the father’s legal parenthood within marriage
has not been extended to non-marital registered relationships. Furthermore, the
legal status of a child born into a registered partnership is akin to the legal status
of a child born into a non-formalised relationship, which means that the child
will only have one legal parent by operation of law. Whether the child will have
a second legal parent, depends for a large part on the willingness of the child’s
mother to allow the father to become a legal parent. In this respect the distinc-
tion between a begetter (a biological father who begets a child in a natural way)
and a donor (a biological father who contributes to the conception99 of a child
in an artificial way) under Dutch law, does complicate matters for the unmarried
biological father if he and his female partner have had to resort to assisted
conception techniques. 
In conclusion, one can say that although the relational status of the mother is
immaterial to her legal parenthood, the relationship and legal status of the father
in relation to the mother is of the utmost importance in determining his legal
parenthood. Only children born into a marriage have two legal parents by ope-
ration of law. The others, even those whose parents marry after their birth, have
to depend on the willingness of their parents to undertake action or will have to
undertake action themselves to establish the paternity of their biological fathers.
Denial of paternity
The marital presumption of paternity can be challenged by the father, the
mother and the child if the legal father is not the child’s biological father under
strict conditions and time-limits.100 A third party outside the married family
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101 Hoge Raad 12 November 2004, NJ 2005/248. In this decision the Dutch Supreme Court con-
cluded that in accordance with the parliamentary history regarding art. 1:204(3) DCC it is
possible for a begetter who has neglected to ask the court to replace the mother’s consent to
his recognition of the child concerned, to invalidate the recognition of a man other than the
begetter if the child’s mother only consented to the recognition of the child by this other man
solely for the purpose of harming the begetter’s interests. See also NUYTINCK (2005) p. 733-738
on this case. 
102 Dutch Second Chamber 1996-1997, 24 649 and 25 189, no. 35, p. 35.
103 The begetter does not have the right to have his legal parenthood established by means judicial
establishment of paternity. See EVERS (2004) p. 11-16.
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cannot dispute the legal fatherhood of the mother’s husband, even if this third
party can prove that he and not the husband is the child’s biological father.101
This means that the legal parenthood conferred on the mother’s husband by
virtue of their marriage can only be challenged by members of the married
family: the mother, her husband and the child (provided they are aware of the
truth). The same protection for marriage may be found in the fact that a married
man can only under very strict circumstances recognise a child begotten with a
woman who is not his wife.
Paternity and assisted conception
According to the provisions in the Dutch Civil Code an unmarried father or a
father in a registered partnership who does not beget his own biological child in
a natural way, does not have the right to apply to the court to have the mother’s
consent replaced by the consent of the court. The mother and the child, on the
other hand, may have such an unmarried father’s paternity established by a
court, provided he can be regarded as the mother’s life-companion. During the
parliamentary debates on the introduction of the judicial establishment of
paternity in 1998, the then Secretary of State stated that a father would not be
given the right to apply for judicial establishment of his paternity, since in such
a procedure there is no room for balancing the interests of the parties con-
cerned.102 The begetter has the possibility to ask the court to replace the mother’s
consent to recognition; during this procedure the parties’ interests will be
balanced.103
Post-mortal procreation
In cases of post-mortal procreation the status of the relationship of the parents
is not relevant, since fatherhood in such cases is established by judicial establish-
ment of paternity provided the man, as the mother’s life-companion, consented
to the use of his sperm or the embryo after his death.
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104 This difference may however be important where the man concerned is not the biological
father of the child. 
105 See s. 55A Family Law Act 1986.
106 Where a person is to be treated as the father of a child by virtue of subsection (2) or (3) above,
no other person is to be treated as the father of the child s. 28(4) HFEA 1990.
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3.4. EXTERNAL COMPARISON: LEGAL PARENTHOOD
Maternity 
The position of the legal mother in the two jurisdictions is identical. The woman
who gives birth to the child is the child’s mother irrespective of the legal status
of her relationship with the man who provided the genetic material to conceive
the child. She cannot deny/rebut her maternity. 
Establishment of paternity
In both jurisdictions there are four ways in which a biological father’s paternity
may be established: 
1. automatically;
2. with the mother’s consent;
3. without the mother’s consent; and 
4. without the father’s consent.
(1) In both jurisdictions paternity is automatically established if the father is
married to the child’s mother. Unmarried fathers either require the mother’s
consent or a court order to establish their paternity. 
(2) In England unmarried fathers may obtain the status of legal parent with
maternal consent through registration on the child’s birth certificate and in The
Netherlands through recognition with maternal consent. The difference between
these two means of establishing paternity (recognition does not constitute a
rebuttable presumption whereas registration on a birth certificate does) is not
relevant if the father concerned is the biological father of the child.104 
(3) The two jurisdictions diverge slightly more on whether and how a biological
father may obtain the status of legal parent without maternal consent. In Eng-
land, any biological father (except where s. 28(4) HFEA 1990 applies) may have
his paternity established in a separate application for a declaration of parentage105
or he may have his paternity established in the course of any civil proceedings
in which his parentage falls to be determined, such as an application under s. 4
CA 1989 for parental responsibility or an application under s.8 CA 1989 for a
residence or contact order (note the exception in the HFEA 1990 s. 28(4)).106 In
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Intersentia 65
The Netherlands, however, a biological father may only have his paternity
established without maternal cooperation if he has begotten the child with the
mother in a natural way. If the child was not begotten in a natural way, he might
apply to the court to replace the mother’s consent on the basis of art. 8, ECHR.
However, whether this course of action will be successful remains to be seen.
The Dutch unmarried father cannot have his own paternity established as the
English unmarried father can pursuant to s. 55A Family Law Act 1986. Only the
mother and the child can apply to the court for the legal establishment of
paternity.
(4) If a biological father refuses to have his paternity established, his paternity
may be established in both jurisdictions against his will. There are, however,
substantial differences between the two jurisdictions with regard to the persons
who may apply to the court to have the biological father’s paternity established
and the time period during which such an application may be filed. In England,
any person may apply to the court for a declaration of the parentage of any
person provided that the person making the application has a sufficient personal
interest in the making of the declaration (s. 55A(3) Family Law Act 1986). There
is no statutory period of limitation with regard to filing such a request. In The
Netherlands, however, only a very limited group of persons (the mother and the
child) may apply for judicial establishment of a biological father’s paternity. The
period of time during which the mother may file such an application is limited;
the period during which the child can file such an application is unlimited. 
Denial/rebuttal of paternity
Both in The Netherlands and in England a biological father cannot deny his
paternity or rebut a presumption of paternity unless he should be regarded as a
sperm donor under the HFEA 1990 under English law.107 
 
Paternity and assisted conception
The position of the unmarried father who resorts to assisted conception with his
own sperm with his female partner differs in the two jurisdictions where the
child’s mother does not consent to his becoming a legal parent. In England, the
biological link determines whether the father may, if the mother refuses to
consent to his registration on the child’s birth certificate, ask the court to make
a declaration of paternity on his behalf. In The Netherlands this unmarried
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father will, despite his genetic link with the child and his intention to become
the child’s parent, be regarded in law as a sperm donor if the child’s mother
refuses to consent to recognition; he cannot have his own paternity established
pursuant to art. 1:207 DCC. On the other hand, in both jurisdictions the man’s
paternity may be established against his will either at the request of the child or
the child’s mother. 
Post-mortal procreation 
In both jurisdictions it is possible to register or establish the paternity of the
mother’s partner where his sperm was used or an embryo created with his sperm
or with donor sperm after his death, provided he gave his consent to the use of
his sperm or the embryo before his death and did not withdraw it. Under
English law there is the additional requirement that the man must have con-
sented to his registration as the child’s father on the birth certificate. 
There are however differences with regard to the consequences of such registra-
tion or the establishment of paternity. Registration of a deceased father in
England has no other effect than to record the truth about who was intended to
be the child’s father. In The Netherlands the deceased man’s paternity may be
established if, as the mother’s life-partner, he consented to an act that may have
resulted in the coming into being of the child. Judicial establishment of paternity
may have legal consequences, not with regard to the father’s estate, but the child
will have legal familial ties with the father’s blood relatives, such as his father’s
parents and siblings. Legal familial ties have consequences for instance in the
field of the law concerning surnames and the law relating to nationality. More-
over, because of the fact that the child will have legal familial ties with his
father’s parents, he or she will inherit his father’s share at the death of his
grandparents.
An English case under Dutch law and vice versa
Case 1
Finally, it might be interesting to look at a case from both jurisdictions and to
consider how the case concerned might have been solved in the other jurisdic-
tion. For instance how would the English case discussed earlier, The Leeds
Teaching Hospitals,108 have been resolved under Dutch law? Under Dutch law
as it stands Mr A would be the legal father of the twins to whom Mrs A gave
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ing to an act that may have resulted in the conception of the child, such as artificial insemina-
tion with donor sperm or consent to sexual intercourse with another man. Dutch First
Chamber 1997-1998, 24 649, no. 11d, p. 5 and 6. 
110 Hof Leeuwarden 11 June 2003, LJN: AG0212.
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Intersentia 67
birth by virtue of his marriage to her. If he is unwilling to except his legal
parenthood of the twins, he may deny his paternity on the basis of the fact that
he is not the biological father of the children and did not consent to an act that
may have resulted in the conception of the children. Whether this application
will succeed remains to be seen; a court may after all determine that the fact that
the hospital made a mistake with regard to the sperm used does not invalidate
his consent.109 Only if Mr A succeeds in denying his paternity will Mr B be free
to recognise the twins, provided (since he is a married man) that he has devel-
oped a close personal relationship with the children. Should Mrs A be unwilling
to consent to Mr B’s recognition of the twins, he will in principle not have
recourse to the court for the mother’s consent to be replaced since he is regarded
as a sperm donor. It is, however, likely that the court may consider hearing his
case on the basis of his rights under Article 8 EHCR. In short, if Mr A does not
dispute his paternity, Mr B has no possibility to become the child’s legal parent.
As was described earlier the outcome of the case in England was completely
different, Mr B was judged to be the child’s legal father on the basis of his
genetic relationship with the child. Since the HFEA 1990 was not applicable, the
genetic relationship between the child and Mr B takes precedence over the fact
that the child’s mother was married to another man at the time of the child’s
birth. 
Case 2
How would the Dutch case decided in 2003 on the legal parenthood of a di-
vorced couple who had two children, one conceived and recognised by the man
before their marriage and one conceived through artificial insemination with the
man’s sperm after the marriage be decided under English law?110 The Dutch
Court of Appeal decided that the man should be regarded as a donor and did not
have to pay child support. Since little is known about the factual background, it
is difficult to say exactly how the English court would decide this case. However,
it is very likely that under English law the case would centre on the question
whether the woman and her ex-husband were ‘receiving treatment together’.
According to Evans111 this would mean that the couple were receiving treatment
together ‘so long as the couple were united in their pursuit of treatment, what-
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ever might otherwise be the nature of the relationship between them’. This
qualification, in combination with the judgment in Re B (Parentage),112 could
very likely lead to the conclusion that the man should be regarded as the child’s
legal father. 
Also in case 2, the outcome in England would differ substantially from the
outcome of the case in The Netherlands. This is mainly due to the different legal
consequences attached to the genetic link between the provider of the sperm and
the child when the child is not conceived in a natural way. This topic will
receive further attention in Chapters 6 and 7.
Some concluding remarks
One of the major differences between English and Dutch law concerning the
establishment of a father’s legal parenthood is the fact that under English law
legal parenthood is based on biological truth with the exception of the situations
described in the HFEA 1990. Under Dutch law legal parenthood is also for a
large part based on biological facts, but the establishment of the biological truth
is in some situations less important than in others, for instance if this would
interfere with the protection of marriage or with the mother’s right to self-
determination. There are three situations by means of which this difference may
be illustrated. First of all, it is, in principle, not possible for a married man to
recognise a child begotten with a woman who is not his wife, whereas in English
law this is possible, subject to the child’s interests. Secondly, it is also not possi-
ble for a man who has not begotten a child with his female partner in a natural
way, but through assisted conception with their own gametes, to have his
paternity established against the mother’s will. This, again, is not a problem in
England. Thirdly, it is also not possible for a biological father who has begotten
a child with a married woman, to deny the paternity of the woman’s husband
and to establish his own paternity, for instance in order to acquire parental
responsibility over the child or to apply for a contact order.
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Table 3.1: Attribution of the status of a legal parent to the child’s biological
father
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113 For detailed information on parental responsibility see LOWE (2005).
114 For a concise introduction to the whole of the CA 1989, see PREST & WILDBLOOD (2005) p. 311-
322. For more extensive information see, for instance, the following books on the Children Act
1989: WHITE, CARR, and LOWE (2002) p. 1-91, or more recently LOWE & DOUGLAS (2007) p.
369-435.
115 S. 2(5) CA 1989.
116 J v C [1970] AC 668 at 710-711. Lord MacDermott’s definition of what the application of the
welfare principle entails: ‘A process whereby, when all the relevant facts, relationships, claims
and whishes of parents, risks, choices and other circumstances are taken into account and
weighed, the course to be followed will be that which is most in the interest of the child’s
welfare as that term has now to be understood. That is the first consideration because of its
importance and the paramount consideration because it rules upon or determines the course
to be followed.’
117 Re A (minors) (Residence Orders: Leave to apply) [1992] Fam 182. See also WHITE, CARR and
LOWE (2002) p. 22-33 for an extensive discussion of when the paramountcy principle applies.
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3.5. ENGLAND: PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY
c + b  f
Bio mother Bio father Child
Provisions relating to parental responsibility113 may be found in the CA 1989. In
this section a very brief introduction will be given to some relevant provisions
regarding parental responsibility in the CA 1989.114 S. 2 and 4 CA 1989 concern
the attribution or acquisition of parental responsibility by parents, s. 4A concerns
the acquisition of parental responsibility by step-parents. It is important to note
that parental responsibility may be attributed to more than one person with
regard to the same child.115 Furthermore, so-called section 8 orders, which may
concern, among other things, contact and residence, are of particular importance
and will be discussed later. 
Two essential features of the CA 1989 are the paramountcy principle and the
welfare checklist embodied in section 1(3) of the Act. The paramountcy princi-
ple provides that when a court has to determine a question with respect to a
child’s upbringing, the administration of a child’s property or the application of
any income arising from the child’s property, the court’s paramount consider-
ation should be the child’s welfare.116 This applies, for instance, when the court
is considering an application on the basis of s. 4 or s. 8 CA 1989. The para-
mountcy principle is however not applicable in all private and public proceed-
ings; it does not apply, for instance, where the court is considering whether a
person should be given leave to apply for a s. 8 order, since these proceedings do
not directly concern the child’s upbringing.117 If the paramountcy principle is
not applicable in proceedings this does not mean that the child’s welfare is not
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119 Payne v Payne [2001] 1 FLR 1052, CA.
120 The recently introduced Adoption and Children Act 2002 contains a similar welfare checklist
in the first section. 
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taken into account in such proceedings, it is just not the paramount consider-
ation of the court.118
The second essential feature of the CA 1989, the welfare checklist, is embodied
in s. 1(3) of the Act. It contains a list of relevant factors that courts must take
into account in a limited number of cases specified in s. 1(4) CA 1989, namely
when the court decides a question with regard to a section 8 order in a contested
case. The welfare checklist list is not limitative and the court may take other
relevant factors into account. Moreover, the court may apply the welfare check-
list in proceedings other than those listed under s. 1(4) if it deems this appro-
priate.119 The welfare checklist includes issues such as having regard to the
ascertainable wishes and feelings of the child (s. 1(3)(a)), the physical, emotional
and educational needs of the child (s. 1(3)(b) and the likely effect of a change of
circumstances on the child (s. 1(3)(c)).120 
Parts I and II of the CA 1989 are most relevant with regard to the attribution of
parental responsibility (s. 2, 3, 4, 4A) and so-called section 8 orders – orders
relating to contact, prohibited steps, residence and specific issues. The Act
contains rules as to who may be attributed with parental responsibility, either
by operation of law, by registration, by agreement or by court order. With
regard to section 8 orders the CA 1989 in broad terms distinguishes between
three groups of persons:
1. Automatic leave: those who can apply for any section 8 order without the
leave of the court: parents, guardians, or special guardians (s. 10(4)(a)), step-
parents with parental responsibility (s. 10(4)(aa)) and any person in whose
favour a residence order is in force with respect to the child (s. 10(4)(b) CA
1989).
2. Automatic leave for residence and contact orders: those who can apply for
section 8 orders relating to residence or contact without the leave of the
court: any party to a marriage or a civil partnership (whether or not subsist-
ing) in relation to whom the child has lived as a child of the family (s.
10(5)(a) and (aa)); any person with whom the child has lived for a period of
a least three years (s. 10(5)(b); any person who has the consent of all those
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who have a residence order in respect to the child; any person who has the
consent of the local authority that has a residence order in relation to the
child; and any person who has the consent of each of those who has parental
responsibility with respect to the child. (s. 10(5)(c)(i-iii) CA 1989).
3. Leave required: those who cannot apply for any or a particular section 8
order without first seeking leave of the court. In principle any person,
including the child itself, can seek the leave of the court to apply for a section
8 order. Section 10(9) contains a number of issues the court needs to take into
account when deciding whether to grant a person leave to apply for a section
8 order.121 As mentioned earlier the paramountcy principle does not apply in
proceedings concerning leave to apply for a section 8 order.
Furthermore, subsection 10(5A-7A) CA 1989 relates to specific persons in
specific circumstances. For instance, a local authority foster parent may apply for
a residence order if the child concerned has lived with him for a period of at
least one year prior to the application (s. 10(5A)). 
In the sections below a number of issues relating to the acquisition and possible
loss of parental responsibility will be discussed. First, the situation for married
couples will be explained and subsequently the situation for unmarried couples.
The sections on England will conclude with a comparison between the acquisi-
tion of parental responsibility where the parents are married and where the
parents are living in a non-formalised relationship.
3.5.1.  MARRIAGE 
Attribution 
Married parents will have joint parental responsibility by operation of law
pursuant to s. 2(1) of the CA 1989. 
Termination and relationship breakdown
Parental responsibility acquired by parents by virtue of marriage cannot be
terminated by a court at the request of either one of the parents; it continues to
exist jointly after divorce and neither parent can apply for sole parental responsi-
bility.122 Parents are, however, free to agree on the exercise of their parental
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whether contact should be allowed is defined in this case as ‘whether the fundamental
emotional need of every child to have an enduring relationship with both his parents is
outweighed by the depth of harm which in the light, inter alia, of his wishes and feelings the
child would be at risk of suffering by virtue of a contact order.’
124 S. 8(1) CA 1989: ‘’a prohibited steps order’ means an order that no step which could be taken
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in the order, shall be taken by any person without the consent of the court.’
125 S. 8(1) CA 1989: ‘’a specific issue order’ means an order giving directions for the purpose of
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126 S. 14A-14G CA 1989, inserted by s. 115 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 as an alterna-
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responsibility (they may delegate it to a third party (s. 2(10) and (11) CA 1989).
Parental responsibility acquired through marriage can only be terminated by
adoption or a parental order. It also ceases to exist by operation of law when the
child reaches the age of 18 or when the child dies. Even though parental respon-
sibility cannot be terminated by a court unless a subsequent adoption or parental
order is made, it can, however, be limited by court order to such an extent that
it becomes practically meaningless. For instance, where the mother has been
granted a residence order after divorce and the father has not been granted a
contact order.123 Furthermore, a prohibited steps order124 or a specific issue
order125 may severely limit a parent’s exercise of parental responsibility. A
guardianship order126 imposed in favour of a third party also severely restricts a
parent’s ability to exercise parental responsibility. The special guardian may
exercise parental responsibility to the exclusion of all other holders of parental
responsibility (apart from another special guardian) s. 14C CA 1989.
3.5.2.  NON-FORMALISED RELATIONSHIP
Attribution to mother
A mother in a non-formalised relationship will have parental responsibility over
her children by operation of law pursuant to s. 2(2)(a) CA 1989. Whether the
mother herself has reached the age of majority is not relevant for the attribution
of parental responsibility, underage mothers will also acquire parental responsi-
bility by operation of law as well. 
Attribution to father with maternal cooperation
The father will have parental responsibility if he has acquired it in accordance
with the provisions in the CA 1989.127 Before the introduction of s. 4(1)(a)
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129 PICKFORD (1999) p. 143-160.
130 See for instance LEWIS (2002) p. 125-149. Already proposed by the Law Commission in 1979
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131 S. 4(1)(a) CA 1989. 
132 S. 4(1)(a) CA 1989.
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135 See for instance (Adoption by one natural parent to the exclusion of the other) [2001] 1 FLR
589. In this case adoption by the unmarried father was not allowed, he was given a residence
order instead since the court thought it unlikely that the mother would interfere in the child’s
life plus the fact that there were art. 8 ECHR considerations. Granted leave to appeal to the
House of Lords allowed by Re B [2001] UKHL 70. See also BRIDGE (2003) p. 60 and BAINHAM
(2005) p. 277-279.
136 S. 51(4) ACA 2002.
137 S. 46(1) ACA 2002.
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Children Act128 in December 2003, a father could acquire parental responsibility
by entering into a responsibility agreement with the mother or by a court order
granting him parental responsibility. However, as it turned out, very few unmar-
ried fathers were aware of the fact that they did not have parental responsibility
by virtue of their being a legal father.129 In line with the trend to involve fathers
in their children’s lives130 the law was changed to confer automatic parental
responsibility on fathers who register as fathers on their children’s birth certifi-
cate.131
At present unmarried fathers can obtain parental responsibility in a number of
ways with or without the mother’s cooperation. If the mother cooperates he may
acquire parental responsibility by virtue of registration as the father on the
child’s birth certificate,132 by entering into a parental responsibility agreement
with the child’s mother133 or by marrying the child’s mother after the birth of
the child as a consequence of which he will be attributed with joint parental
responsibility pursuant to s. 2(1) and (3) CA 1989 and s. 1(3)(b) Family Law
Reform Act 1987. 
Attribution to father without maternal cooperation
If the mother is unwilling to cooperate, the father may acquire parental
responsibility by applying to the court for a parental responsibility order.134 If
the father wants the child to live with him, he can apply for a residence order
pursuant to s. 8 and s. 10(4) CA 1989, which will require the court to make a
separate parental responsibility order pursuant to s. 12 (1) CA 1989. Further-
more, an unmarried father may adopt135 his child to the exclusion of the
mother,136 which will also confer parental responsibility on him.137
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responsibility order is independent of contact!).
139 Laid down in Re H (Minors)(Parental Responsibility: Parental Rights)(no. 3) [1991] Fam 151.
See also Re G (A minor) (Parental responsibility order) [1994] 1 FLR 504.
140 Re P (Terminating Parental Responsibility) [1995] 1 FLR 1048: ‘In considering whether to
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to imagine that the court would make a parental responsibility order if none already existed.
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In recent years the attribution of parental responsibility to an unmarried father
has come to be regarded as a seal of approval for the father. It has in particular
been considered important for the child that his unmarried father is given this
seal of approval.138 Furthermore, a number of criteria have been developed in
case law to determine whether an unmarried father should be attributed with
parental responsibility, namely the degree of commitment the father has shown
to the child, the degree of attachment between father and child and the reasons
why the father is applying for the order, in short CAR (Commitment, Attach-
ment and Reason).139
Attribution to father who is not a legal parent
Whether or not the father is a legal parent in principle makes no difference with
regard to his options to acquire parental responsibility with or without the
mother’s cooperation. If the mother does not cooperate, the father may apply to
the court for parental responsibility pursuant to s. 4(1) CA 1989. If his paternity
is in doubt, this may be established during this procedure pursuant to s. (20)(1)
of the FLRA 1969 by means of blood or DNA testing.
Termination and relationship breakdown
An unmarried father’s parental responsibility acquired under s. 4(1) CA 1989 can
be terminated by a court order at the request of any holder of parental responsi-
bility (including the father) and the child concerned pursuant to s. 4(3) CA 1989.
In the decision on the termination of the unmarried father’s parental responsibil-
ity the welfare of the child is paramount.140 Once the father with parental
responsibility has married the child’s mother his parental responsibility can no
longer be terminated. Moreover, the parental responsibility of a father who has
parental responsibility by virtue of a residence order can only be terminated if
the residence order is terminated (s. 12(4) CA 1989).
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3.5.3.  INTERNAL COMPARISON
Attribution to mother
A child’s mother will have parental responsibility over her child by operation
of law pursuant to s. 2(1) CA 1989 if she is married to the child’s father or
pursuant to s. 2(2)(a) CA 1989 if she is not married to the child’s father.
Attribution to father
The married father will have parental responsibility by operation of law, where-
as the unmarried father may acquire it by registering on the child’s birth certifi-
cate with the mother’s consent, or by entering into a parental responsibility
agreement with the mother or through a court order.141 
Termination and relationship breakdown
The parental responsibility of a mother and a married father can only be termi-
nated by a parental order (with their consent) or by an adoption order (with
their consent or without their consent if this in the child’s best interests (s.
52(1)(b) ACA 2002)). The parental responsibility of the unmarried father may
also be terminated by the above-mentioned orders; however, if his parental
responsibility was acquired under s. 4(1) CA 1989 it may also be terminated by
a court order at the request of any holder of parental responsibility (including
the father) and the child pursuant to s. 4(3) CA 1989. 
Concluding remarks
The mother’s status of legal parent and her acquisition of parental responsibility
are not influenced by the state and the legal status of her relationship with the
child’s father. This, however, is not so where the child’s father is concerned. His
legal relationship with the child is determined by the status of his relationship
with the mother, by the extent to which the mother is willing to cooperate with
his intention to acquire a legal relationship with the child, and if the mother is
unwilling by the decision of a court on his application for a declaration of his
paternity or parental responsibility under the CA 1989. 
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& VONK (2005).
143 Wet van 30 oktober 1997 Wijziging van onder meer Boek 1 BW i.v.m. invoering gezamenlijk
gezag ouder en partner en gezamenlijke voogdij, Staatsblad 1997/506.
144 Hoge Raad 27 May 2005, NJ 2005/485 recently confirmed in Hoge Raad 28 April 2006, NJ
2006/284 and Hoge Raad 28 April 2006, LJN: AV0656.
145 Wet van 4 oktober 2001 Wijziging van Boek 1 BW i.v.m. het gezamenlijk gezag van rechts-
wege bij geboorte tijdens geregistreerd partnerschap Staatsblad 2001/468.
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3.6. THE NETHERLANDS: PARENTAL 
RESPONSIBILITY
c + b f
Bio mother Bio father Child
Regulations with regard to parental responsibility142 are laid down in Book 1 of
the Dutch Civil Code, which deals with the law of persons and families. In the
law relating to parental responsibility there is a clear tendency towards joint
parental responsibility for all parents unless this poses a severe threat to the
child’s wellbeing. Examples of this tendency are the continuation of joint
parental responsibility after divorce introduced in 1998,143 a number of recent
judgements of the Dutch Supreme Court144 making it easier for unmarried fathers
to acquire parental responsibility without the mother’s cooperation, and the
introduction of joint parental responsibility for couples in a registered partner-
ship in 2002 over children born into the registered partnership.145
In the sections below a number of issues relating to the acquisition and possible
loss of parental responsibility will be discussed. First the situation for married
couples will be discussed, then the situation for couples in a registered partner-
ship and subsequently the situation for unmarried couples. This part will also
conclude with a comparison between the acquisition of parental responsibility
where the parents are married, where the parents are in a registered partnership
and where the parents are in a non-formalised relationship.
3.6.1.  MARRIAGE
Attribution
Married parents acquire joint parental responsibility over their children by
operation of law according to art. 1:251(1) DCC. 
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146 Hoge Raad 10 September 1999, NJ 2000/20.
147 For an extensive study of the continuation of parental responsibility after divorce in The
Netherlands and Denmark see JEPPESEN (2008) forthcoming.
148 Wijziging van Boek 1 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek en het Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechts-
vordering in verband met het bevorderen van voortgezet ouderschap na scheiding en het
afschaffen van de mogelijkheid tot het omzetten van een huwelijk in een geregistreerd part-
nerschap (Wet bevordering voortgezet ouderschap en zorgvuldige scheiding) Dutch Second
Chamber 2004-2005, 30 145 no. 1-26. The Bill has been accepted by the Second Chamber and
is yet to be approved by the First Chamber.
149 Pursuant to the advice of the commission set up in 1996 to investigate among other things, to
look into the position of children in same-sex relationships (the Kortmann Commission), the
idea was to introduce a provision that would attribute lesbian couples who had entered into
a registered partnership with joint parental responsibility over a child born into their relation-
ship by operation of law. However, the government argued that from the point of view of the
child’s best interests, it would be difficult to defend that different-sex partners would not be
attributed with joined parental responsibility over children born into their registered partner-
ship. Dutch Second Chamber 1999-2000, 27 047, no.3, p.1. See also BOELE-WOELKI et al. (2007)
p. 11-12.
78 Intersentia
Termination and relationship breakdown
Moreover, as of 1998 parents continue to have joint parental responsibility over
their children after divorce (art. 1:251(2) DCC), unless the continuance of joint
parental responsibility creates an unacceptable risk that the child may suffer
harm.146 In 2003 joint parental responsibility continued after divorce in about
92% of all cases.147 In 2005, the then Minister of Justice introduced a Bill in the
Dutch Second Chamber that would require parents to draw up a parenting plan
during the divorce process to safeguard the welfare of children and the con-
tinued involvement of both parents in the child’s life after divorce.148 This
parenting plan does not affect, however, the general rule that parental responsi-
bility continues automatically after divorce.
3.6.2.  NON-MARITAL REGISTERED RELATIONSHIP
Attribution
Parents in a registered partnership will have joint parental responsibility over a
child born into their relationship, unless the child already has legal familial ties
with a third parent outside the partnership. If the father has recognised the
child, he will have joint parental responsibility with the mother pursuant to art.
1:253aa DCC and if he has not recognised the child, he will have joint parental
responsibility with the mother pursuant to art. 1:253sa DCC, unless the child
already has a second legal parent outside the registered partnership. There is no
difference in the content of the parental responsibility acquired pursuant to
these two different sections.149
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150 See CURRY-SUMNER (2005) Chapter 5 for an extensive description of legal matters relating to
the Dutch registered partnership.
151 Hoge Raad 28 March 2003, NJ 2003/359.
152 Dutch First Chamber 2000-2001, 27 047, Handelingen 2 October 2001 p. 2-46. 
153 Registered partners may dissolve their partnership by mutual consent by means of the registra-
tion of a dated declaration signed by both partners and one or more advocates or notaries by
the Registrar of Births, Deaths, Marriages and Registered Partnerships: art. 1:80c(c) DCC.
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Termination and relationship breakdown
In the case of separation the same rule applies as for marriage: in principle joint
parental responsibility will continue after a relationship breakdown. This,
however, is not explicitly stated in the Dutch Civil Code since not all of the rules
pertaining to parental responsibility within marriage have been made applicable
to registered partnerships (arts 1:253aa and 1:253sa DCC).150 Article 1:253n DCC
concerning the termination of the joint parental responsibility of unmarried
parents (which also applies to parents in a registered partnership) grants the
court the competence to terminate the parents’ joint parental responsibility (at
the request of one or both of the partners) in the case of a change of circum-
stances or when joint parental responsibility was attributed on the basis of
incorrect or incomplete information. The Dutch Supreme Court ruled in 2003
that the termination of a relationship is in and of itself not a sufficient change of
circumstances to warrant the termination of joint parental responsibility.151 It is
thus in principle in the best interest of the child for joint parental responsibility
to continue after separation unless there is an unacceptable risk that the child
will suffer harm.
From the point of view of the child there is one important difference ensuing
from the fact that his parents have entered into a registered partnership instead
of a marriage. In the case of a divorce, the court may give an order ex officio
concerning the continuation or discontinuation of joint parental responsibility
if it appears to the court that a child aged twelve or older (or younger if the child
is able to appraise its own interest in the matter) would appreciate this (art.
1:251a DCC). This rule has not been extended to children of parents who are in
a registered partnership (art. 1:253sa(2) DCC). During the parliamentary debates
on the introduction of joint parental responsibility by virtue of a registered
partnership, this issue was discussed. The then Secretary of State152 did not
consider it to be a problem since registered partners may dissolve their partner-
ship by mutual agreement without court intervention.153 However, if one of the
registered partners does apply to the court for the dissolution of his partnership,
the court has no authority to make summary judgments in matters relating to
children (art. 1:253aa DCC and art. 828 CCP). However, a number of district
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154 For instance Rechtbank Leeuwarden 12 November 2003, LJN: AN8913. The court stated that
even after studying the parliamentary history it did not understand the reasons for the
exception. In the case at hand, the children concerned were born during a marriage which was
later turned into a registered partnership, which makes their situation very much comparable
to the situation of children in divorce proceedings. The court found it in particular unclear
what interests this exception is supposed to protect since the interests of the children con-
cerned seem to be disregarded. In the same sense Rechtbank Den Haag 6 March 2006, LJN:
AY5653.
155 Rechtbank Maastricht 8 January 2004, LJN: AO3414. See also CURRY-SUMNER (2005) p. 150.
156 The term custody includes both guardianship and parental responsibility art. 1:245(2) DCC.
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courts154 have questioned the rationale for this exception and the Maastricht
District Court155 has even declared this rule to be in breach of art. 8 ECHR.
3.6.3.  NON-FORMALISED RELATIONSHIP
Attribution to mother
The child’s mother will have parental responsibility as of the moment of the
child’s birth unless she lacks the capacity for parental responsibility at the time
she gives birth (arts 1:253b(1) and 1:246 DCC). The mother will, for instance,
lack the capacity for parental responsibility if she has not reached the age of 18.
If she is between 16 or 18 years of age she may apply to the court to be attributed
with parental responsibility (art. 1:253ha DCC). The court will only grant the
request if it seems to the court to be in the best interests of both the mother and
the child. Once she has reached the age of 18 she will automatically be vested
with parental responsibility, unless someone else at that time is attributed with
parental responsibility, or the mother lacks the capacity for parental responsibil-
ity on other grounds (art. 1:253b DCC). 
Attribution to father with maternal cooperation
Parents in a non-formalised relationship will not have joint parental responsibil-
ity by operation of law. The child’s mother will have sole parental responsibility
as of the moment of the child’s birth. The father and mother may obtain joint
parental responsibility, provided that the father has recognised the child, by
registering their joint parental responsibility in the parental responsibility
register (art. 1:252(1) DCC). There are a number of reasons for which the clerk
of the court can refuse the registration of joint parental responsibility: 
(a) either one or both parents lack the capacity to exercise parental responsibil-
ity; 
(b) one or both parents have been divested of parental responsibility and the
other parent exercises parental responsibility; 
(c) custody156 over the children has been entrusted to a guardian; 
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157 For instance Rechtbank Rotterdam 11 October 2005, LJN: AU4409, this decision was reversed
in Hof ’s Gravenhage 23 August 2006, LJN: AY7335. See also COPPENS (2002) p. 103-105.
158 For instance VONK (2006a) p. 457-459 who states that on the basis of the parliamentary history,
in particular Dutch Second Chamber 1992-1993, 23 012, no. 3, p. 7 and p. 23 it may be
concluded that parents will acquire joint parental responsibility over their legal children by
operation of law through marriage.
159 Since only two persons may have parental responsibility under Dutch law, the father will only
be attributed with parental responsibility through recognition during the marriage if the
mother has sole parental responsibility.
160 Since the position of children born and recognised before their parents entered into a regis-
tered partnership, it has been proposed to clarify the law on this point: Dutch Second Cham-
ber, 2006-2007, 29 353, no. 21.
161 Hoge Raad, 27 May 2005, LJN: AS7054 recently confirmed in Hoge Raad 28 April 2006, LJN:
AV0656 and Hoge Raad 28 April 2006, NJ 2006/284. Also Hof ’s Gravenhage 13 December
2006, LJN: AZ6514.
162 Dutch Second Chamber, 2004-2005, 29 353, no. 3.
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(d) the provision in the custody of the child has ceased to exist; 
(e) the person who has parental responsibility exercises it jointly with a person
other than a parent. 
Should the parents marry after the birth of the child, this will have no conse-
quences for the child’s legal status. Whether the marriage will have consequen-
ces with regard to parental responsibility is disputed. Before 1998, when the
concept of the legitimation (wettiging) of a child through its parents’ marriage
was discarded as being discriminatory with regard to children born out of
wedlock, unmarried parents would acquire joint parental responsibility over
their children by their subsequent marriage. Some157 argue that as a consequence
of discarding the concept of legitimisation, unmarried parents will no longer
acquire joint parental responsibility over the children recognised by the unmar-
ried father by virtue of their subsequent marriage. However, others158 hold the
view that the fact that children are no longer legitimised by their parents
subsequent marriage, does not imply that unmarried fathers who recognised the
child before the marriage or who recognise the child during159 the marriage will
no longer acquire parental responsibility by virtue of the marriage.160 
Attribution to father without maternal cooperation
If the father has recognised the child, but the mother is unwilling to register
their joint parental responsibility, the father may apply to the court for sole
parental responsibility or for joint parental responsibility (art. 1:253c DCC). This
later option was developed through case law161 and is at present embodied in a
Bill.162 Whether the father will indeed be given joint parental responsibility
against the mother’s wishes depends on the criteria against which the request
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163 A lesbian co-mother cannot avail herself of this right. However, even here art. 6 EVRM and
8 EVRM has been applied by Dutch courts to make this right available for a co-mother: see
Rechtbank Groningen 20 June 2006 LJN: AY8301 and 17 October 2006, LJN: AZ0755.
164 Dutch Second Chamber, 2004-2005, 29 353 no. 8, p. 1. 
165 Dutch Second Chamber, 2004-2005, 29 353, no. 10.
166 In the Bill’s course through parliament another amendment has been filed regarding the
attribution of joint parental responsibility to the mother and her life-companion as of the
moment of the child’s birth if the couple are not in a formalised relationship. At present they
may apply for joint parental responsibility pursuant to art. 1:253t DCC once the child is born.
Dutch Second Chamber, 2004-2005, 29 353, no. 14/15. 
167 A more extensive discussion on this form of parental responsibility may be found in sections
4.4.2 and 4.3.3.3.
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will be tested.163 According to the Bill that is presently before parliament the
court may grant joint parental responsibility to the father against the mother’s
wishes if it appears to the court that such a decision could be in the child’s best
interest.164 However, a number of Members of Parliament165 have filed an
amendment stating that the criterion applicable in decisions on the termination
of joint parental responsibility should be made applicable to the attribution of
joint parental responsibility, namely the request must be granted unless the court
is convinced that there is an unacceptable risk that the child will suffer harm.166
Attribution to father who is not a legal parent
If the father has not recognised the child (whether he does not want to, because
another man has already recognised the child or because the mother refuses to
give her consent) the mother and the father can together apply to the court for
joint parental responsibility of a parent with a person other than a parent. (art.
1:253t DCC).167 He does, however, not have the option to apply for parental
responsibility without the mother’s cooperation. 
Termination and relationship breakdown
If the parents’ relationship breaks down, the existing joint parental responsibility
will continue. Parents may apply to the court to be attributed with sole parental
responsibility after the relationship has broken down, but this does require a
change of circumstances. Art. 1:253n DCC concerning the termination of joint
parental responsibility of unmarried parents (which also applies to parents in a
non-marital registered relationship) grants the court the competence to termi-
nate the parents’ joint parental responsibility (at the request of one or both of the
partners) when there is a change of circumstances or if joint parental responsibil-
ity has been attributed on the basis of incorrect or incomplete information. The
Dutch Supreme Court ruled in 2003 that the termination of a relationship is in
and of itself not sufficient to warrant the termination of joint parental responsi-
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168 Hoge Raad 28 March 2003, NJ 2003/359.
169 Normally, women and men need to be 18 before they can marry or enter into a registered
partnership (arts 1:31(1) and 1:80a(6) DCC), but a couple may marry (or enter into a registered
partnership) if both prospective spouses are 16 years or older and the girl is pregnant or has
already given birth to a child (1:31(2) DCC) provided their parents consent (art. 1:35 DCC) or
the parents’ consent is replaced by that of the sub-district court (art. 1:36 DCC).
170 Hoge Raad 27 May 2005, NJ 2005/485.
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bility.168 It is thus in principle in the best interest of the child that joint parental
responsibility continues after separation unless there is an unacceptable risk that
the child will suffer harm. 
3.6.4.  INTERNAL COMPARISON
Attribution to mother
The status of the mother’s relationship has (practically) no influence on her
acquisition of parental responsibility. The only difference concerns the acquisi-
tion of parental responsibility by underage mothers. Mothers under 16 will not
be attributed with parental responsibility. Married mothers and mothers in a
registered partnership who are between 16 and 18 will acquire parental responsi-
bility by operation of law because they are no longer regarded as minors as a
result of their marriage or registered partnership (art. 1:233 DCC),169 whereas
unmarried mothers will not acquire parental responsibility by operation of law
until the age of 18. However, an unmarried mother who reaches the age of 16
may apply to the court to be attributed with parental responsibility.
Attribution to father 
Fathers will be attributed with parental responsibility by virtue of their marriage
or registered partnership with the child’s mother. If the father is not in a forma-
lised relationship with the mother, he may either be attributed with parental
responsibility by joint registration with the mother in the parental responsibility
register or through a court order pursuant to recent case law, provided his legal
parenthood has been established.170 If the father’s legal parenthood has not been
established he can only acquire parental responsibility with the mother’s cooper-
ation pursuant to art. 1:253t DCC which concerns the attribution of parental
responsibility to a parent and a person other than a parent by court order.
Termination
From the case law it has become clear that the way in which joint parental
responsibility was acquired has no relevance for the grounds on which it may be
terminated. The idea is that joint parental responsibility is in the best interests
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of the child and it will only be attributed to one of the parents to the exclusion
of the other after separation if a continuation of joint parental responsibility
would create an unacceptable risk that the child may suffer harm.
Some concluding remarks
The mother’s legal position with regard to parenthood and parental responsibil-
ity is similar regardless of the state and the status of her relationship with the
child’s father. 
For the father it does make a difference whether he has entered into a formalised
relationship with the child’s mother. It is interesting to note that with regard to
the possibility to acquire the status of legal parent the position of the father in
a registered partnership is the same as the position of a father in a non-forma-
lised relationship, whereas with regard to the possibility to acquire joint parental
responsibility, the position of the father in a registered partnership is the same
as the position of a father in a marriage.
Finally, a brief note on a point which will be discussed in more detail in subse-
quent chapters, but needs to be mentioned here as well.171 Recent changes in
parental responsibility law have made it possible for persons who are not legal
parents to acquire parental responsibility. However, this does not necessarily
prevent a third party (who may or may not be the child’s genetic parent) from
becoming a legal parent – either by recognition with the mother’s consent or by
legal establishment of his paternity. In such a situation there are three parents
with a legal relationship with the child. It is as yet unclear what happens if the
legal parent without parental responsibility applies to the court to be attributed
with joint parental responsibility with the other legal parent to the exclusion of
the ‘social’ parent. 
3.7. EXTERNAL COMPARISON: PARENTAL
RESPONSIBILITY
Attribution to mother
There is no difference with regard to the mother’s attribution of parental respon-
sibility between England and The Netherlands, except for the fact that in
England underage mothers will be given parental responsibility by operation of
law despite their age, whereas in The Netherlands only married underage
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mothers and underage mothers in a registered partnership are given parental
responsibility by operation of law. Unmarried underage mothers can apply to the
court once they reach the age of 16 to be attributed with parental responsibility.
Attribution to father by operation of law
Married fathers in The Netherlands and England acquire parental responsibility
by operation of law. The only possible difference may be the situation where the
parents marry after the birth of the child. In England, the parents acquire
parental responsibility by operation of law by virtue of their subsequent mar-
riage, in The Netherlands there is no consensus among judges and academics
whether this is the case.
Attribution to father with maternal cooperation
One of the major differences between Dutch and English law with regard to the
attribution of parental responsibility concerns the position of unmarried fathers.
In England, as of 1 December 2003, the unmarried father who is registered on
the child’s birth certificate will automatically acquire parental responsibility. He
may, moreover, if the mother does not agree to his registration on the child’s
birth certificate, apply to the court for a parental responsibility order pursuant
to s. 4 CA 1989. For filing such an application it is not relevant whether he has
the status of a legal parent, as long as he is the child’s biological father.
In The Netherlands, the unmarried father does not automatically acquire paren-
tal responsibility upon his recognition of the child; he needs to register, together
with the mother, their joint parental responsibility in the parental responsibility
register (art 1:252 DCC). This registration may be refused by the registrar for a
limited number of reasons set out earlier. However, if the mother is unwilling
to register joint parental responsibility with the father, the unmarried father
may, according to very recent case law, apply to the court for joint parental
responsibility, provided he is the child’s legal father. 
If he has not recognised the child, for instance because the mother refuses to
consent to the recognition, he cannot apply for joint parental responsibility,
unless he first applies to the court for the replacement of the mother’s consent
to his recognition. If the father has not recognised the child but the mother is
willing to share her parental responsibility with the father, they may apply to
the court to be attributed with joint parental responsibility on the basis of art.
1:253t DCC (joint parental responsibility for a parent and a person other than a
parent).
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Attribution to father without maternal cooperation
The legal father of the child can in both jurisdictions acquire parental responsi-
bility without maternal cooperation. In England through a responsibility order
pursuant to s. 4 Children Act or a residence order (s. 8 and 12(2) CA 1989). Until
recently in The Netherlands it was only possible for the unmarried father to
apply for sole parental responsibility to the detriment of the mother’s parental
responsibility (art. 1:253c DCC). However, pursuant to a recent Dutch Supreme
Court judgement, the unmarried father may apply for joint parental responsibil-
ity with the mother, without the mother’s cooperation.
Attribution to father who is not a legal parent
There are considerable differences on this issue between the two jurisdictions.
In England the biological father may apply for parental responsibility over the
child, whether or not he is the child’s legal parent. The term father in s. 4 CA
1989 includes both the biological father who is also the child’s legal father and
the biological father who is not the child’s legal father, provided he is not to be
regarded as a sperm donor pursuant to the HFEA 1990. In The Netherlands, on
the other hand, this does make a difference. An unmarried father who is not the
child’s legal father may not apply for sole or joint responsibility. The only way
he might acquire parental responsibility without becoming a legal parent is by
applying to the court, together with the mother, to be attributed with joint
parental responsibility on the basis of 1:253t DCC (joint parental responsibility
for a parent and a person other than a parent). 
Termination and relationship breakdown
In both jurisdictions joint parental responsibility continues to exist after relation-
ship breakdown. There is however, a difference in the persons with regard to
whom termination of parental responsibility may be requested. In England a
mother’s parental responsibility and a married father’s parental responsibility
cannot be terminated by a court other than upon an application for adoption or
a parental order. The parental responsibility of others may be terminated by a
court upon the request of another holder of parental responsibility, subject to the
child’s interest. In The Netherlands the joint parental responsibility of any
holder may be terminated by the court at the request of the other holder after
relationship break down. However, the court will only grant such a request if
the child would be at risk if the joint parental responsibility continues to exist.
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Table 3.2.:Attribution of parental responsibility to the child’s biological father
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Some concluding remarks
Both in The Netherlands and England the attribution of parental responsibility
to fathers depends on their relationship with the mother. If there is a formalised
relationship with the mother, the father will acquire parental responsibility by
operation of law. Under Dutch law there is an exception to this rule under the
following circumstances: 1: the father is in a registered partnership with the
mother; and 2. he has not recognised the child, 3. the child has a legal parent
outside the partnership. 
If the father is not in a formalised relationship with the mother he needs her
consent or a court order to acquire it with the mother. In England, the consent
of the mother is needed at the moment of the registration of the father as the
father on the child’s birth certificate, as registration automatically confers
parental responsibility on the father. In The Netherlands, this cooperation is
needed in the sense that the parents may only register their joint parental
responsibility in the parental responsibility register together. Recognition of the
child as such does not confer parental responsibility on the father in The Nether-
lands.
The most substantial difference between England and The Netherlands concerns
the fact that in The Netherlands a biological father who has not managed to
establish his legal fatherhood cannot acquire parental responsibility without the
mother’s cooperation, whereas the English father who finds himself in the same
position can do so. 
In both jurisdictions mothers and married fathers are attributed with parental
responsibility by operation of law. Despite the fact that the procedure by which
unmarried legal fathers acquire parental responsibility differs substantially, it is
in both jurisdictions possible for the unmarried father to acquire it with the
mother’s consent or by a court order. There are substantial differences where the
position of the unmarried father who has not established his legal parenthood
is concerned. This may well be due to the different approach to paternity
described earlier. In the eyes of the law the biological father in England is the
child’s father (unless the HFEA 1990 applies), whereas in The Netherlands the
biological father only becomes a father once his legal parenthood has been
established.
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3.8. CHILDREN AND THEIR LEGAL POSITION 
VIS-À-VIS THEIR PARENTS 
In the introduction the presumption was made that children in typical families
have the opportunity to acquire two legal parents and that their position in their
resident family is adequately protected. This chapter has undertaken to describe
and compare the legal position of children and parents with regard to legal
parenthood and parental responsibility in the two jurisdictions. 
3.8.1.  LEGAL PARENTHOOD
From this chapter it may be concluded that all children, except those children
conceived by a single mother by means of anonymous sperm donation, may in
principle acquire two legal parents. There is one minor exception under English
law with regard to children conceived by means of post-mortal procreation. The
name of their intentional or biological father may be registered on the birth
certificate by the child’s birth mother, but this registration has no legal effect.
It does not place the child in a legal relationship with the deceased parent’s
family.
In general the child has a strong position with regard to the establishment of the
legal parenthood of a biological father, if this father is unwilling to do so volun-
tarily. If the child applies to a court to have the legal parenthood of this parent
established, the interests of this parent do not play a role in the court’s decision,
whereas when a parent applies to have his legal parenthood established, the
court will take the interests of the child into account.
3.8.2.  PARENTAL RESPONSBILITY
With regard to parental responsibility the situation is somewhat more complex.
The child has no influence on the acquisition of parental responsibility by his or
her parents; he or she cannot apply to the court to attribute his or her unmarried
biological father with parental responsibility. The possibility for parents to
acquire parental responsibility is closely connected with the recognition by the
law of their importance in the child’s life. For different-sex parents who have
entered into a formalised relationship, this importance is nowadays undisputed
in law, even after relationship breakdown. However, where the parents are
unmarried, the recognition of the importance of the unmarried father in the
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172 The CEFL proposes in their Principles on Parental Responsibility that legal parents should be
attributed with parental responsibility, BOELE-WOELKI et al. (2007b) principle 3:5.
173 Partially genetic secondary families (Chapter 4) and partially genetic primary families (Chapter
6).
174 Surrogate genetic families (Chapter 5) or partially genetic surrogate families (Chapter 6.5).
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child’s life is not yet complete.172 It has, however, increased steadily over the
years to such an extent that in the overall majority of cases the child’s legal
parents both have standing to apply for parental responsibility if they do not
acquire it by operation of law.
At the end of this chapter it may be concluded that children born into families
where both parents are genetic and biological parents in the overall majority of
cases have the possibility to acquire two parents. Furthermore, it may be con-
cluded that in general their legal position in their family situation receives
adequate protection. With this knowledge in mind, it is time to study and
analyse the legal position of children in atypical families, where one of the
child’s parents is not a biological parent173 or where the child is genetically
related to one or both of its parents, but is born into a different family.174 As has
been mentioned in Chapter 1, the aim of studying the different family categories,
is to place the legal position of a child born into a family with one biological
parent and one non-biological parent in a larger perspective, so as to obtain
knowledge about all possible solutions available in the two jurisdictions at
present.
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ATYPICAL FAMILIES
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1 The other original parent may be a biological, a legal or a social parent. This means that not all
secondary families are partially genetic; a small group of secondary families may be non-
genetic. For instance, where the resident parent is a legal father who is not the child’s biologi-
cal father or the mother in the resident family conceived the child through egg donation.
2 The term step-family is often used; however, in legal terminology step-families only cover
those families where the adults have entered into a formalised relationship. The term partially
genetic secondary family covers both families in a formalised and in a non-formalised relation-
ship.
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CHAPTER 4
PARTIALLY GENETIC SECONDARY 
FAMILIES
4.1. INTRODUCTION
When one of the child’s (legal) parents forms a relationship with a new partner,
who is not the child’s other original parent,1 for instance after separation,2 the
child becomes part of a partially genetic secondary family. There is an enormous
variety in such secondary families, and the legal statuses of the various parties
involved may differ considerably. Secondary families may come into existence
after the child’s parents have separated or one of them has died, and the other
parent subsequently finds a new partner. The new family, however, does not
extinguish the existence of the first family, even though it has fallen apart. Every
secondary family is preceded by a primary family, be it a traditional genetic
family, a partially genetic primary family, a surrogate family or a non-genetic
family. 
Figure 5: Primary families and secondary families overlap
Secondary familyPrimary family A Primary family B
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3 Inspired by MASSON (1983) p.1, who divided step-families into post-divorce, post-death and
illegitimate step-families. Since extramarital (illegitimate) families no longer necessarily have
a special status, they are included in the first group.
4 This complex secondary family is a traditional genetic family from the new baby’s point of
view.
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The parent outside the secondary family will in the majority of cases continue
to have a (legal) relationship with the child after separation; there may, for
instance, be a contact order in place or the parents may have agreed to a co-
parenting arrangement. Also where one of the child’s parents has died, the child
may continue to have contact with the parents and other family members of the
deceased parent. 
There are many ways in which secondary families may be categorised and
described, depending of the aim of the categorization. One may, for instance,
categorise secondary families on the basis of the manner in which the prior
family was ended: by separation or by death.3 Or one may, for example, catego-
rise on the basis of the existence of children in the secondary family and who
brings these children into the family: only one of the partners (simple secondary
family), both partners (mixed secondary family) and whether the partners have
a new child together (complex secondary family). In the last-mentioned case the
secondary family is the primary family for the partners’ new child. These three
types of families may come into being after separation or after the death of one
of the parents. 
Simple secondary family 
c  + b de    
  Ms A     Mr B    Ms A’s Children     
Mixed secondary family 
c  + b de  e    
 Ms A     Mr B  Ms A’s  children         Mr B’s child
Complex secondary family
c  + b de    f
Ms A   Mr B    Ms A’s and/or Mr B’s children   Ms A and Mr B’s new baby4
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5 See for instance HALE, PEARL, COOKE & BATES (2002) p. 633.
6 This category of parents is rare under English law, see section 3.2. 
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There are more ways in which secondary families may be categorized,5 but,
however important these differences may be for the persons involved in the
secondary family, not all of them are relevant to the question of whether and
how the new parent in the secondary family may acquire a legal relationship
with his or her partner’s child. Therefore, this chapter will focus on those issues
that are relevant to the research question: namely which factors are of impor-
tance for the question whether and how the new parent may acquire the status
of a legal parent or parental responsibility.
An important factor is the legal status of the parent outside the secondary family.
It is likely that in a substantial number of secondary families the child(ren) will
have (had) a relationship with the parent outside the secondary family. More-
over, it is likely that this other parent may have a legal relationship with the
child; he or she may for instance be the child’s legal parent, have acquired
parental responsibility or there may be a contact order in place with regard to
the child. The other parent may be:
" a legal parent with parental responsibility;
" a legal parent without parental responsibility;
" a non-legal parent with parental responsibility;
" a biological parent without legal status;6
" a non-biological parent without legal status.
Furthermore, it may be that the legal status of the old and the new relationship
(marriage, non-marital registered relationship or non-formalised relationship)
is an important factor, as well as the sex of the partners. Another important issue
in this chapter is whether new parents may acquire a link with their partner’s
children; and if they may acquire such a legal link, whether this will influence
the child’s legal relationship with the other parent outside the present secondary
family. 
In this chapter the following terminology will be used:
• The resident parent is the parent with whom the child is spending the
majority of his or her time.
• The other (original) parent is the child’s legal or biological parent who is not
a part of the secondary family. This is most likely the parent who was origi-
nally part of the primary genetic or partially genetic family.
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• The new parent is the resident parent’s new partner and is thus the other
adult in the secondary family: relationship status plays no part.
• Where the term step-parent is used, this refers to a new parent who has
entered into a formalised relationship with the child’s parent.
• Partner adoption refers to the adoption of a child by the new partner of one
of the parents regardless of whether they have entered into a formalised
relationship. The term partner adoption is used instead of step-parent adop-
tion because in both jurisdictions the term step-parent refers to a person who
has entered into a formalised relationship with one of the child’s parents, and
thus excludes adoptions by persons who have not entered into a formalised
relationship with one of the child’s parents. 
In order to place the law as it is at present in a wider context, so as to make it
more understandable, the chapter will start with the discussion of some tenden-
cies in the two jurisdictions with regard to the legal relationship between a child
and a new parent (section 4.2). The chapter will continue with a discussion of
the possibilities for the new parent to acquire the status of a legal parent (section
4.3); subsequently attention will be paid to the possibilities to acquire parental
responsibility (section 4.4). It will end with concluding remarks (section 4.5). As
was indicated in Chapter 1, as of this chapter the simultaneous method will be
applied for the comparison of the two jurisdictions. 
For the sake of expediency it will be presumed that the child is living the major-
ity of its time with one of the parents, who will be referred to as the resident
parent. The situation of the other parent will be discussed in this light. It is of
course possible that the child spends a more or less equal amount of time with
both parents in which case he or she would have two resident parents. This,
however, does not make a difference for the research question. Moreover, it is
not the aim of this chapter to give an exhaustive overview of all possible second-
ary families, but to give an overview of the possibilities offered in the two
jurisdictions in order to clarify the relationship between a child and a new
parent. 
4.2. TENDENCIES
In the past few decades both jurisdictions have sought to grant new parents some
rights and duties with regard to their partner’s children. There are duties that
come into being by virtue of the existence of a formalised relationship with the
child’s parent. For instance, both jurisdictions oblige any person without paren-
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7 England: s. 3(5) CA 1989 a person with care of a child but without parental responsibility may
‘do what is reasonable in all circumstances of the case for the purpose of safeguarding and
promoting the child’s welfare.’ See also LOWE & DOUGLAS (2007) p. 435. The Netherlands: art.
1:248 and 1:247(2) DCC: ‘Care and upbringing include the care and responsibility for the
mental and corporal well-being of the child and fostering the development of its personality.’
8 England: during marriage or civil partnership but also after divorce. See BAINHAM (2005) 395-
401, HERRING (2004) p. 183-184 and 302-306. The Netherlands: art. 1:404(2), 1:395 and 1:395b
DCC. The step-parent is only obliged to maintain the stepchild during his marriage or regis-
tered partnership with the child’s parent. See DRAAISMA (2001) p. 22-31.
9 For information on English adoption law see BRIDGE & SWINDELLS (2003) and SWINDELLS &
HEATON (2006); for information on Dutch adoption law see VAN DER LINDE (2007). This book
will not discuss adoption-related topics outside the scope of partner adoption.
10 England: ACA 2002 made adoption possible for unmarried couples and same-sex couples. CPA
2004 amended the ACA 2002 to include civil partners. The definition of a couple in s. 144(4)
includes all these couples. The Netherlands: adoption by unmarried couples became possible
in 1998 and adoption by same-sex couples in 2001.
11 England: s. 46(6) ACA 2002; CASEY & GIBBERD (2001) p. 39-43, BRIDGE & SWINDELLS (2003) p.
229-235; WELLBOURNE (2002) p. 273-282 also [2006] 1 FLR 373. The Netherlands: art. 1:229(4)
DCC; Hof ’s Gravenhage 29 November 2006, LJN: AZ6521.
12 The legal effects of adoption as it was introduced in 1926 were less far-reaching than those of
adoption in its present form. The child, for instance, had no inheritance rights with regard to
the new family. See BRIDGE & SWINDELLS (2003) p. 1-7 and LOWE (2000) p. 313.
13 See MASSON (1983) p. 1-3 and 20-31 and LOWE (2000) p. 312-318.
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tal responsibility who has a child in his care to promote the child’s welfare.7
Furthermore, both jurisdictions make a person without parental responsibility
who enters into a formalised relationship with the child’s parent co-responsible
for the child’s maintenance.8
At different points in the 20th century it became possible in both jurisdictions for
new parents to adopt their partners’ children.9 Until very recently this option
was only open to new parents who had married their partners. Both jurisdictions
have in the past decade expanded the category of new parents who may adopt
their partners’ children to include unmarried and same-sex partners.10 At present
both jurisdictions only have a strong form of adoption which severs the legal
relationship between the other parent and the child. However, it is possible in
both jurisdictions to leave an existing contact order in place or make such an
order during the adoption process.11
In England partner adoption as such was not introduced separately. The Adop-
tion Act 1926 made adoption by relatives possible but did not contain special
provisions with regard to partner adoption.12 However, partner adoptions were
possible under the 1926 Act.13 Adoption by a parent and his or her spouse took
the form of two-parent adoption; this meant that the parent also had to adopt the
child. During the 1960s disquiet about partner adoptions began to grow and it
was questioned whether adoption was an appropriate means of establishing a
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14 SAMUELS (1970) p. 684-685 on the 1969 report by the Association of Child Care Officers;
HOUGHTON REPORT (1972). See LOWE (2000) 319-323, MASSON (1983) p. 20-31 and BRIDGE &
SWINDELLS, p. 8-12. 
15 S. 10(3) Children Act 1975; MASSON (1983) p. 5-6. and CRETNEY & MASSON (1997) p. 645-648.
16 Explanatory Note to the ACA para. 268.
17 S. 46(3)(a) ACA 2002. Explanatory Note to the ACA 2002 para. 147.
18 Wet van 13 september 1979, Staatsblad 1979/501.
19 When adoption by a single person was introduced in 1998 this period was extended to three
years. The rule that applied to single parent adoption also applied to step-parents. As of 2001
the partner and the parent need to have cohabited for three years and taken care of the child
together for one year before they can file an adoption request. For all other kinds of single
parent adoption the term remains three years. See ASSER (2006) p. 621-622.
20 See for instance SCHMIDT (1996) p. 188-189 en DRAAISMA (2001) p. 51-52.
21 Art. 1:253t DCC.
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legal link between new parents and their partners’ children. In reports issued in
1969 and 1972 partner adoption was heavily criticised.14 In 1977 it became
possible for a limited group of new parents to acquire joint custody with the
parent.15 Since the introduction of the CA 1989 new parents may acquire paren-
tal responsibility by means of a residence order. Recently, the ACA 2002 has
introduced the possibility for step-parents to acquire parental responsibility by
agreement with the parents or by a court order. The Explanatory Notes explicitly
state that this is intended to provide an alternative for adoption by the new
parent.16 As of the introduction of the ACA 2002 a parent need no longer adopt
his or her child together with the partner.17 
 
In The Netherlands partner adoption legislation was introduced in 1979, in the
form of two-parent adoption. This meant that the parent, who wanted his new
spouse to become a legal parent to his child, had to adopt his own child together
with the new parent.18 Almost immediately after the introduction of the so-
called partner adoption this possibility was already severely criticised; first of all,
because the parent had to adopt his own child; secondly, because the parent and
the new parent could adopt the child after they had cared for the child together
for only one year;19 and maybe most importantly because this meant that the
child’s legal familial ties with the other parent and his family were permanently
severed.20 It was suggested that it would have been better to create the possibility
for a new parent to acquire shared parental responsibility with the parent, which
would leave the legal connection with the other parent intact. Since the intro-
duction of single parent adoption in 1998, the parent need no longer adopt his
or her child together with the new parent. Furthermore, it became possible in
1998 for a parent and his or her partner to apply for joint parental responsibility.
This meant that the new parent could acquire a legal link with the child without
having to resort to adoption.21 
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22 S. 1(6) ACA 2002: The court or adoption agency must always consider the whole range of
powers available to it in the child’s case (whether under this Act or the Children Act 1989);
and the court must not make any order under this Act unless it considers that making the order
would be better for the child than not doing so. See BRIDGE & SWINDELLS (2003) p. 126 -141
for an extensive discussion of this section. See Re M (Adoption or Residence Order) [1998] 1
FLR 570 for a case prior to the ACA 2002 where a residence order was made despite the
application by the foster parents to adopt the child. 
23 Hof ’s Gravenhage 20 April 2005, LJN: AT4621.
24 S. 10A BDRA 1953.
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It is interesting to note that the timing of the developments described differ
considerably in the two jurisdictions. In 1979 when partner adoption was
introduced in The Netherlands, it had already been argued in England that
partner adoption was not necessarily beneficial for the children and an alterna-
tive in the form of joint custody for a specified group of new parents had been
introduced. This meant that the courts were obliged to consider whether joint
custody would suffice where partner adoption was requested. The English courts
have to consider when deciding on an application for a partner adoption
whether another order, such as a residence order, would be more appropriate.
Moreover, if a less far-reaching order is more appropriate, a court should make
such an order.22 In The Netherlands a court must refuse to make an adoption
order in such a case because the conditions set out in the DCC have not been
met. However, the court may not attribute the parent and the new parent with
joint parental responsibility of its own accord. The court may of course state that
a joint parental responsibility order on the basis of art. 1:253t DCC is the more
appropriate solution.23
4.3. LEGAL PARENTHOOD
In this section concerning the possibilities for a new parent to acquire the status
of a legal parent, two issues will be discussed: re-registration or recognition by
the new parent in section 4.3.1 and adoption in section 4.3.2
4.3.1. RE-REGISTRATION OR RECOGNITION BY THE
NEW PARENT
In England if the child’s parents were unmarried at the time of the child’s birth
and the father has not been registered, the name of the child’s father may be
registered on the birth certificate at a later date, so called re-registration.24 If the
child is 16 years or older, his or her consent to the registration is required. Only
the natural father and the man to be treated as the child’s father pursuant to s. 28
Machteld Vonk, 'Children and their parents'
Chapter 4
25 See X, Y and Z v. U.K. [1997] 2 FLR 892 for a case where a female to male transsexual was
denied the possibility to register as the father of the child conceived by his long-term female
partner with donor-sperm. The Warnock Committee in their report on human fertilisation and
embryology refer to the registration of a non-biological father on the birth certificate in the
case of assisted conception as a legal fiction since ‘the register of birth has always been
envisaged as a true genetic record.’ However, RICHARDS (2006) p. 57 notes that there always
have been registrations by non-biological fathers. Of course this may and probably will also
occur in secondary families.
26 General Register Office form GRO 185: Application by the mother and/or father for the re-
registration of their child’s birth. See also: http://www.gro.gov.uk/gro/content/births/.
27 See also FORDER & SAARLOOS (2007) p. 186-191.
28 There has been discussion in The Netherlands on the nature of recognition, namely whether
it is a declaration of the will to become the child’s father or whether it is a means to prove
paternity. In 1939 the Minister of Justice stated that recognition is a declaration of will and can
therefore be based on a fiction of paternity and need not necessarily be based on biological
truth: See VLAARDINGERBROEK (2004) p. 181. However, in the discussion on introducing the
possibility for a co-mother to recognise her partner’s child, the minister of justice argues that
Dutch parentage law follows the line of biological parentage. This means that recognition by
a man who is not the child’s biological father presents no problem, since, being a man, he
might be a father, whereas recognition by a woman is not possible, since, being a woman, she
cannot be a father. The conclusion of the minister is that parentage law is not the proper forum
to regulate the parenthood of the co-mother. Dutch Second Chamber 2004-2005, 28 457 and
26 672, no 22, p. 8.
29 Art. 1:204(1)(a-f) DCC.
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HFEA 1990 may be registered as the child’s father on the birth certificate.25 On
the documents to be filled out in the case of re-registration26, the persons signing
the form are warned that anyone who is deliberately supplying false information
may be prosecuted.27 This means that the new parent, who is not the child’s
natural father, may not re-register on the child’s birth certificate. If the new
parent does, however, re-register on the birth certificate, this creates a rebuttable
presumption of paternity, and any interested party, in particular the biological
father and the child, would at any time have the possibility to rebut the pre-
sumption of paternity. 
In The Netherlands, a child that has no legal parent outside the secondary family
other than his or her mother may in principle be recognised by his or her
mother’s new male partner with the mother’s consent.28 If the child has reached
the age of 12 his or her consent is also required. Once the child has reached the
age of 16 only the consent of the child is required.29 
Recognition of a child with the mother’s consent is not limited to the child’s
biological father; the mother may in principle give any man consent to recognise
her child. There are, however, restrictions where recognition by a new parent
would infringe on the right of the biological father to recognise his child. For
instance, where the mother gives her new partner consent only in order to
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30 Hoge Raad 18 May 1990, NJ 1991/374; Hoge Raad 24 January 2003, NJ 2003/386. See CURRY-
SUMNER & FORDER (2006) p. 262-265.
31 Hoge Raad 12 November 2004, NJ 2005/248; NUYTINCK (2005) p. 733-738.
32 Hoge Raad 31 May 2002, NJ 2002/470. 
33 Art. 1:205(1) DCC.
34 Art. 1:205(2) DCC.
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frustrate the genetic father’s efforts to become a legal parent, she may be deemed
to have used her right to refuse consent unreasonably.30 On the other hand,
where the biological father has never made a serious effort to obtain consent to
recognise his child, he may under certain circumstances be regarded as having
waived this rights.31
Furthermore, when there are proceedings pending with regard to a request by
the biological father for consent to recognise his child, the effect of consent
given by the mother to another man is suspended until the court has decided
whether or not it will give the biological father consent to recognise his child.32
Recognition creates a legal fact, not a presumption. This entails that paternity
established by recognition may only be challenged by a limited number of
person who may, under very strict conditions such as time-limits, apply for the
nullification of the recognition if it was made by a man who is not the child’s
biological father. 
• The child may apply for nullification, unless the recognition took place
during his or her majority, in which case his or her consent to the recogni-
tion was required. He or she must apply for nullification within three years
after he or she became aware of the fact that that the legal father by recogni-
tion is not his or her biological father, or if the child was a minor at that time,
within three years after reaching the age of majority 
• The man who made the recognition may apply for the nullification, if he was
induced to recognise a child who is not his biological child by threats, mis-
take, deceit or, during his minority, by duress. He must file such an applica-
tion within one year after becoming aware of the deceit or mistake or within
one year after the duress or threat has ceased to be effective.
• The mother may apply for nullification if she was induced to give consent to
the recognition by threats, mistake, deceit or, during her minority, by
duress.33 The same time-limits apply as for the man.
• The Public Prosecution Service may apply for the nullification of the recog-
nition on account of a breach of Dutch public policy, if the person who made
the recognition is not the biological father of the child.34
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35 Under English law this is formulated as consent, under Dutch law the other parent has a right
to veto the adoption.
36 England: ACA 2002 s.1(2): The welfare of the child throughout his life is the paramount
consideration. The Netherlands: art. 1:227(3) DCC: The application can only be granted if the
adoption is manifestly in the best interests of the child. 
37 See BRIDGE & SWINDELLS p. 149-150 (8.30: ‘The ACA 2002 has deleted the unreasonableness
ground under s. 16(2)(b) of the AA 1976 and, thus, at a stroke, removed the legal hurdle under
the old law whereby an adoption considered to be in the child’s interests could nevertheless
be prevented by the parent ‘reasonably’ withholding his or her consent.’)
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In short, this means that in England the mother’s new male partner can only
become a legal parent by adoption of the child, whereas in The Netherlands the
mother’s new partner can become a legal parent either through adoption or
through recognition, provided the child does not already have a legal father. 
4.3.2.  ADOPTION BY THE NEW PARENT
For the overall majority of new parents the only means by which they can
acquire the status of a legal parent is by adopting the child of their partner. In
both jurisdictions a substantial number of requirements need to be met before
adoption can actually take place. These requirements concern, among other
things, the best interests of the child, the consent to the adoption of the other
parent, the nature of the relationship between the new partner and the parent
and the nature of the relationship between the new parent and the child. Of
particular importance in the case of adoption by the resident parent’s new
partner is the consent to the adoption of the other parent.35 However, not only
the child’s other legal parent may play a role in the adoption proceedings, other
parents, social or biological, with or without parental responsibility, may play a
part in the adoption proceedings. Issues relating to the parent outside the
secondary family will be discussed in section 4.3.2.1. Other requirements, in
particular those concerned with the relationship between the new parent and
the resident parent and the new parent and the child, will be discussed in section
4.3.2.2. 
In both jurisdictions adoption must be in the best interests of the child.36 How-
ever, the relationship between the best interests requirement and the other
requirements is different in the two jurisdictions. 
Under English law the best interests of the child is paramount and this require-
ment may override other requirements such as that of parental consent.37 There
is a discussion whether this paramountcy principle is in accordance with art. 8
ECHR which requires the interests of the parties concerned to be balanced.
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38 See FORTIN (2006) p. 299-326 for a very interesting discussion of the paramountcy principle
and children’s rights under the ECHR.
39 Dutch Second Chamber 1995-1996, 24 649, no. 3, p. 14.
40 An interesting case is Rechtbank Haarlem 5 October 2006, LJN: AY9691 where the husband
of the child’s grandmother (a so-called step-grandfather) applied to adopt the child (adoption
by a legal grandparent is prohibited under Dutch law). The child concerned was living with
the grandmother and her husband, and all parties involved agreed with the adoption. How-
ever, since as a result of this adoption the child would lose all legal links with the original
family including the grandmother, the court did not consider this adoption to be in the child’s
best interests and dismissed the application.
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Putting the interests of the child before the interests of any other party may not
be ECHR-compliant.38
In The Netherlands adoption has to be manifestly in the child’s interests. In
determining whether adoption is in the child’s interests the court should con-
sider the position that the child will have as a result of the adoption, but also the
position that the child will lose, such as the child’s interests in being raised by
its own parents. Furthermore, as of 2001 the court has to ascertain that the child
has nothing further to expect from his or her parent(s) in their capacity of
parent(s) now and in the future. Despite the fact that adoption has to be in the
interests of the child, it is not the overriding principle. Adoption may be very
much in the child’s interests but where a parent reasonably objects to the
adoption, the interests of the child are not necessarily the deciding factor. The
court may, however, use the interests of the child to deny an adoption applica-
tion on grounds not explicitly mentioned in the Dutch Civil Code. For example,
the Dutch Civil Code no longer contains a maximum age limit for prospective
adopters; however, the court may find that the adoption of a 5-year-old child by
an 80-year-old male would not be in the child’s interest.39 In much the same way
the adoption of a child by its older brother after the death of the parents may be
denied because it would create confusion as to the child’s origins.40 
In the next two sections a number of criteria will be discussed that are relevant
for adoption by the new partner: first of all, the issue of parental consent to the
adoption (section 4.3.2.1) and subsequently a number of other requirements that
are relevant for the adoption by the new parent (section 4.3.2.2). 
4.3.2.1.  Adoption: consent of the ‘parent’ outside the secondary family
If the child has another parent outside the present secondary family, the only
means by which the new parent may acquire the status of a legal parent is
through adoption, which will terminate the other parent’s status as a legal
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41 Legal parent includes a parent who has become a legal parent through adoption, for instance
where the primary family was a female same-sex family.
42 The term parent includes the birth mother and the married or unmarried father with parental
responsibility, also where he is not registered as such on the child’s birth certificate, even
where such a father is unaware of the existence of the child. See Re AB (Care Proceedings:
Service on husband ignorant of child’s existence) [2004] 1 FLR 527.
43 There is a difference between unmarried fathers and unmarried adoptive fathers in this regard,
s. 4(2A) and s.4A(3) CA 1989. Whereas any holder of parental responsibility or the child may
request the court to terminate the parental responsibility of an unmarried biological father, this
is not true for the parental responsibility of an unmarried adoptive father. His parental
responsibility cannot be terminated, and is in that sense similar to that of a married father. 
44 See sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 of this book.
45 S. 52(1)(b) ACA 2002.
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parent.41 Whether adoption can take place and to what extent the consent and/or
cooperation of the legal parent outside the resident family is required in part
depends on the question whether this second legal parent has parental responsi-
bility with regard to the child. The following situations are to be distinguished:
The other parent has parental responsibility (section 4.2.2.1.1); the other parent
is a biological and/or legal parent but has no parental responsibility (section
4.2.2.1.2); and, finally, the other parent is a social parent (section 4.2.2.1.3). 
A. The other parent has parental responsibility
Under English law, pursuant to s. 52(5) ACA 2002, the consent of a parent with
parental responsibility is required for the adoption.42 Since married parents
continue to hold parental responsibility after divorce, and the parental responsi-
bility of unmarried fathers may only be terminated by a court order at the
request of one of the holders of parental responsibility if this is in the interests
of the child,43 most couples who acquired parental responsibility will continue
to hold it after separation.44 The refusal of a parent with parental responsibility
to consent to adoption by the child’s other parent may be disregarded if the
child’s welfare throughout his or her life requires the court to do so.45 Since the
welfare checklist of s. 1(4) ACA 2002 applies to dispensing with consent, the
court, for instance, has to take into account the likely effect on the child of
ceasing to be a member of his or her family of origin, and the effect the adoption
will have on the child’s relationship with relatives (including his or her mother
and father). What this means in the context of partner adoption remains to be
seen; however, given the tendency to find solutions other than adoption for
forging a legal link between the child and the new parent, the refusal of consent
by a parent with parental responsibility will continue to carry substantial weight.
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46 Art. 1:228(1)(g) DCC.
47 Hof ’s Gravenhage, 22 October 2003, LJN: AN7583. 
48 European Court of Human Rights, 26 May 1994, appl. no. 16969/90, Keegan v. Ireland.
49 Art. 8(1) of the ECHR.
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In The Netherlands a child who has two legal parents with parental responsibil-
ity cannot be adopted by a third person.46 As has been discussed in sections 3.6.1
to 3.6.3, joint parental responsibility is only rarely terminated after the break-
down of a relationship, unless there is a risk that the child may otherwise suffer
serious harm. This means that most separated couples who had acquired joint
parental responsibility during or by virtue of their relationship will continue to
hold it after separation.47 
B. The other parent is a biological and/or legal parent but has no parental res-
ponsibility
This section discusses the position of a (legal) parent without parental responsi-
bility and that of a biological parent who is not a legal parent and has no parental
responsibility. Under English law this issue may be discussed under one heading
since a biological father is a legal parent unless he is to be regarded as a sperm
donor pursuant to the HFEA 1990. Under Dutch law, however, there are impor-
tant differences between the two. Biology in itself does not make a parent a legal
parent. Therefore the position of the legal parent without parental responsibility
and the position of a biological parent who has not become a legal parent are
very different. 
Important in both jurisdictions has been the Keegan judgment of the European
Court of Human Rights.48 Keegan v. Ireland concerned an unmarried couple who
had been living together for some time. During their cohabitation the partners
decided to have a child, shortly after which the woman became pregnant. Some
time later the relationship broke down. After the birth the woman gave up the
child for adoption without informing the child’s father of this decision; only
after the child had been placed in a foster family did she inform the father. As
the unmarried natural father of the child, he had no rights under Irish law to
become involved in the adoption proceedings. If he wanted to make his objec-
tions to the adoption known to the court, he first had to obtain custody of the
child. 
The European Court of Human Rights concluded that the biological father had
a ‘family life’ with the child on the basis of his relationship with the child’s
mother,49 despite the fact that this relationship had broken down before the
birth of the child. Subsequently, the court concluded that the biological father’s
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50 See for instance BRIDGE & SWINDELLS (2003) p. 53-59, LOWE (2000) p. 337 and FORTIN (2005)
p. 438-440 and also Re H; Re G (Adoption: Consultation of unmarried fathers) [2001] 1 FLR
646 and Re M (adoption: rights of natural father) [2001] 1 FLR 745.
51 Re O (Adoption: withholding agreement) [1999] 1 FLR 451.
52 Pursuant to art. 1:253t DCC.
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right to a ‘family life’ had been violated because he had not been heard in the
adoption procedure. From this case it can be concluded that a biological father
with ‘family life’ may under certain circumstances have a role to play in the
adoption procedure of his child. 
Recent English case law confirms that the biological father without parental
responsibility may play a part in the adoption proceedings of his biological
child.50 The biological father cannot veto the adoption, but he may need to be
notified of the proceedings. Such a father may still apply for parental responsibil-
ity while the adoption procedure is pending and thus acquire a more influential
position in the adoption proceedings. It has to be noted that most of these cases
do not concern partner adoptions but adoption by unrelated adopters. For
instance Re O (Adoption: withholding agreement)51 where the biological father
was completely unaware of the existence of his child until he was notified of the
foster carers’ intention to adopt. Furthermore, as of the introduction of the ACA
2002 the courts are obliged to apply the welfare check-list embodied in s.1(4) of
the ACA 2002 during adoption proceedings. In particular s. 1 (4)(f) of the ACA
2002 requires the court to take into account: 
‘the relationship which the child has with relatives, and with any other
person in relation to whom the court or agency considers the relationship
to be relevant including – (i) the likelihood of any such relationship
continuing and the value to the child of its doing so, (ii) the ability and
willingness of any of the child’s relatives, or of any such persons, to
provide the child with a secure environment in which the child can
develop, or otherwise meet the child’s needs, (iii) the wishes and feelings
of any of the child’s relatives, or of any such persons regarding the child.’
Section 1(8) ACA 2002 provides that ‘references to a relative, in relation to a
child, include the child’s mother and father.’ Which means the courts will have
to consider the effect of adoption on the child’s relationship with his or her
biological father.
Under Dutch law the partner of a parent who has sole parental responsibility or
joint parental responsibility with the new partner52 may in principle apply to
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53 Art. 1:228(2) DCC: the exceptions are the following: if the child and his or her parent did not
or hardly ever lived together as a family; or if the parent has abused his parental responsibility
over the child or has grossly neglected the care and upbringing of the child; or if the parent has
been irrevocably convicted of any of the criminal offences against the minor described in Titles
XIII to XV, inclusive, of Book 2 of the Dutch Penal Code. Such offences include sexual assault,
rape, deserting a child under 7 and other serious offences against the child or its personal
status.
54 See Hoge Raad 21 February 2003, NJ 2003/214. For a recent case see Hof ’s Gravenhage 20
April 2005 LJN: AT4621.
55 Hoge Raad 27 October 2000, LJN: AA7909. For a recent case see Hof ’s Gravenhage 20 April
2005, LJN: AT4621 in which the appeal court stated that judges must be very reticent in
concluding that a father abuses his right to refuse to consent to the adoption of his child by the
mother’s new partner. 
56 Dutch Second Chamber, 1995-1996, 24 649, no. 3, p. 15.
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adopt the child, provided the other legal parent consents to the adoption and all
the other criteria for adoption have been met. 
There are only a limited number of situations in which the court can disregard
parental opposition, one of which is that the court may disregard the other
parent’s objections if he or she did not live together with the child as a family.53
This exception in particular may give the court some discretion. Apart from
these exceptions, the court may also disregard parental opposition if it finds that
a parent is misusing his right to veto the adoption. This may be the case where
the court finds that the parent only uses this right to damage the other parent,
where the opposing parent has no interest deserving any respect or where the
court finds that, considering the discrepancy between the opposing parent’s
interests and the child’s interests in being adopted he could not reasonably
oppose the adoption. The court has established that in using the right to veto an
adoption the parent should let the child’s interests in being adopted play a very
important role.54 Under certain circumstances the court may judge that a parent
is withholding consent unreasonably.55
However, at present the policy in The Netherlands is to discourage second
parent adoption in cases where there is a legal parent with whom a legal affilia-
tion link will be severed as a consequence of the adoption.56
C. The child has a biological parent who is not a legal parent
In The Netherlands the courts may only make an adoption order if the adoption
is manifestly in the best interests of the child and if it is established at the time
of the application for adoption and it is reasonably foreseeable that, in the future,
the child has nothing further to expect from his or her parent or parents in the
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58 Dutch Second Chamber 1998-1999, 26 673, no. 3, p. 4.
59 Dutch Second Chamber 1998-1999, 26 673, no. 3, p. 6.
108 Intersentia
capacity of a parent.57 This provision was introduced into the DCC in 2001 with
the introduction of adoption by same-sex couples. It is therefore in principle
aimed at known donors but obviously is also applicable to other biological
fathers with a family life. According to the parliamentary history the term
parent in this provision includes the known biological father with a family life.
The Explanatory Memorandum to the Act states: ‘In order to obtain clarity about
the intentions of the known donor with regard to his parentage, it is appropriate
that this donor may be summoned by the judge to be heard in the adoption
proceedings. On the basis of his statement and other circumstances of the case,
it will have to be ascertained whether the child really has nothing more to
expect from this donor as a parent.’58
From this it can be deduced that the biological father with a ‘family life’ may be
summoned as if he were a parent within the meaning of art. 1:227(3) DCC.
However, this does not mean that he is given a legal parent’s right to veto the
adoption pursuant to art. 1:228(1)(d) DCC. Nor does the fact that he does not
object to the adoption mean that the adoption can take place. In the parliamen-
tary debates the following was said on this subject: ‘The mere fact that the
original parent indicates that he has no interest in maintaining legal family ties
with the child, is an important indication that the child has nothing to expect
from him in that respect, but does not necessarily warrant that conclusion. Other
facts and circumstances may force the judge to conclude that in reality that
parent is, or will be, able to give (even more) substance to the legal family ties.’59
The only case centred on this issue that reached the Dutch Supreme Court
concerned a known sperm donor and a female same-sex couple; this case is
discussed in detail section 6.2.5.1. Despite the fact that the case concerned a
partially genetic primary family, the outcome is also relevant for biological
fathers outside a partially genetic secondary family, where the new parent is
applying to adopt. In this case the known biological father objected to the
adoption on the basis of art. 1:227(3) DCC because he claimed that he had a
family life with the child and that the child had something to expect from him
in the future. The Supreme Court confirmed the conclusion of the Amsterdam
Court of Appeal that there was indeed a family life between the biological father
and the child, and that the biological father was willing and able to give sub-
stance to his role as a parent in the future. As a consequence the adoption
request by the co-mother was denied.
Machteld Vonk, 'Children and their parents'
Partially genetic secondary families
60 BRIDGE & SWINDELLS (2003) p. 147 (item 8.16): ‘‘Parent’ is not defined in either the CA 1989
or the ACA 2002. Under the former law ‘parent’ did not include a step-parent. Although the
status of step-parents has been enhanced under the new Act, there is nothing to suggest a
major shift in the interpretation of ‘parent’ in s. 52(6) so as to embrace a ‘step-parent’. The
safeguard for step-parents with parental responsibility is to be found in s 1(4)(f), under which
the court would have to consider their views about adoption if they had a significant relation-
ship with the child.’  
61 S. 46(2)(a) ACA 2002. 
62 [2005] UKHL 33 on appeal (Re R (IVF) (Paternity of Child) [2003] 1 FLR 1183) contains a good
overview of the legislative history in this field; most useful is the case on appeal and the
judgment by Hale J. whose reasoning was accepted by the HL from which I have cited.
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D. The child has a social parent with parental responsibility
With regard to the consent of the other parent which is required for the adop-
tion, it is relevant to look at the situation where the previous partner of the
woman was also a female partner and the women had joint parental responsibil-
ity together. Is the consent of this female ex-partner who is not a legal parent
also required? 
Under English law the consent of a social parent with parental responsibility is
not required for the adoption.60 However, as has already been explained in
section 4.3.2.1.B, the welfare checklist of section 1(4) of the ACA 2002 requires
the court to take into consideration the relationship of the child with relatives
and other persons in relation to whom the child has a significant relationship.
If an adoption order is granted, the parental responsibility of the social parent
will be terminated.61 
It is interesting to note that in the case of Re D (a child appearing by her guard-
ing ad litem)62 the consent of the co-mother who was given parental responsibil-
ity after separation and who plays a substantial role in the child’s life would not
be required, whereas the consent of the known father with parental responsibil-
ity who plays a much less significant role in the child’s life is required. However,
given the increasing recognition of social parenthood, it seems very unlikely that
a court would terminate the former co-mother’s parental responsibility in order
to allow the birth mother’s new partner to adopt the child. In general, given the
increased recognition of social parenthood it does not seem likely that a court
will terminate a social parent’s parental responsibility lightly. In particular since
the new parent may also apply for a residence or a parental responsibility order
or make a parental responsibility agreement with the parent (depending on the
status of their relationship). However, where there are already three holders of
parental responsibility, for instance both the mother in the partially genetic
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can be severed through adoption. This is illustrated by Hof ’s Gravenhage, 22 October 2003,
LJN: AN7583, which concerned the adoption of an English child by a Dutch couple after the
death of the child’s mother. The mother had appointed the prospective adopters as guardians
in her will. The child’s parents had divorced before the mother’s death, but the father still had
parental responsibility. At the time of the adoption request the child had been living with the
guardians in The Netherlands for a number of years. The father gave his consent to the
adoption of the child by the guardians. However, under Dutch law adoption could not take
place since the father still had parental responsibility. The Dutch Court solved this deadlock
by assuming that an instant before the Dutch adoption was granted the parental responsibility
of the father had been terminated.
64 See for detailed information sections 3.6.1 to 3.6.4.  
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primary family and the known father, it may become very complicated if the
new parent also acquires parental responsibility.
Under Dutch law, adoption cannot take place if the other legal parent still has
parental responsibility over the child (even where the parent concerned consents
to the adoption).63 In the case of partner adoption the parent whose partner
wants to adopt the child needs to either have sole parental responsibility over
the child, or shared parental responsibility together with the new partner. Since
adoption is not a means to terminate the parental responsibility of a parent, the
other parent will have to apply to the court to be attributed with sole parental
responsibility. The case law on this issue indicates that such a request will only
be granted if the continuation of joint parental responsibility may cause serious
harm to the child.64 
In principle the term parent in the DCC is reserved for persons who have
become legal parents. One exception has been made with regard to art. 1:227(3)
DCC where the term parent may, under certain circumstances, include the
biological father with family life. It is however unclear whether this interpreta-
tion extends to art. 1:228(1)(d) DCC on parental consent and art. 1:228(1)(g).
This last subsection contains the requirement that adoption cannot take place if
the other parent still has parental responsibility with regard to the child. It seems
very likely that the term parent in this subsection includes the social parent with
parental responsibility by way of art. 1:245(5) DCC which places the joint
parental responsibility of a parent and a person other than a parent on an equal
footing with the joint parental responsibility of two parents unless the law
explicitly states otherwise. Therefore, it is not very likely that a new parent will
succeed in adopting his new partner’s child where there is a social parent outside
the relationship with parental responsibility. The social parent without parental
responsibility does not have the right to veto the adoption. However, if there is
family life, he/she might have to be involved in the adoption proceedings.
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65 Under Dutch law no mention is made of the relational status itself, there is only a requirement
with regard to the time the couple must have cohabited. In the ACA 2002 the fact that a couple
is married or living in a civil partnership itself, is enough to satisfy the stability requirement.
Couples in a non-formalised relationship need to be living as partners in an enduring family
relationship.
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Table 4.1: Consent to adoption of the parent outside the relationship 
4.3.2.2.  Adoption: other requirements
In both England and The Netherlands the adoption of a child by his or her
parent’s partner (whether different-sex or same-sex) has become possible in the
last few decades. The legal status of the relationship between the parent and the
partner is not relevant in either jurisdiction.65 Therefore, in the discussion of
adoption by the new parent no distinction is made on the basis of the legal status
of the relationship. In this section a number of requirements that are important
for partner adoption will be discussed, namely the stability of the relationship
of the partners, whether the child needs to have lived with the partner(s) for a
certain period of time, and whether parental consent to the adoption is required.
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66 Dutch Second Chamber 2005-2006. 30 551 nos. 1-5. As of the Act of 15 May 2000 spouses and
registered partners no longer have a duty to live together in The Netherlands, in England this
duty was abolished in 1890. CURRY-SUMNER (2005) p. 227 and p. 131.
67 If the partner is habitually resident but not domiciled in a part of the British Isles, the parent
and the new partner may apply to adopt the child as a couple pursuant to s. 50(2) and s.49(2)
and (3) ACA 2002 which requires only one of the couple to be domiciled in a part of the British
Isles. See BRIDGE & SWINDELLS (2003) p. 198-205 for an in-depth discussion of domicile and
habitual residence in the context of adoption.
68 BRIDGE & SWINDELLS (2003) p. 115-117. 
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Stability in the relationship 
In both jurisdictions there are requirements with regard to the stability of the
relationship between the partners. In England this requirement is formulated in
the following terms: a person is a partner of a child’s parent if the person and the
parent are a couple but the person is not the child’s parent. A couple is defined
in s. 144(4) ACA 2002 as (a) a married couple; (aa) two people who are civil
partners of each other; or (b) two people (whether of different sexes or the same
sex) living as partners in an enduring family relationship.
In The Netherlands the stability requirement with regard to the relationship
between the parent and the partner is formulated in art. 1:227(2) DCC which
states that prior to filing the adoption request the spouse, registered partner or
other life companion of the parent needs to have cohabited with the parent for
three consecutive years immediately prior to the filing of the request.66 
Living with the child
Both jurisdictions also have requirements with regard to the time the child must
have lived with the partner and the parent before an adoption request may be
filed. In England the child must have had its home with the partner and the
parent at all times for the period of six months preceding the filing of the adop-
tion application (s. 42(3) ACA 2002). The partner must be domiciled and habitu-
ally resident in a part of the British Isles (s. 49 (2) and (3) ACA 2002).67
In The Netherlands partner adoption can only take place if the child has had his
or her home with the partner and the parent for a year preceding the adoption
request. Furthermore, the partner and the parent need to have lived together for
three years prior to filing the adoption request. 
Consent of the child to adoption
Under English law the consent of the child is not explicitly required for adop-
tion. However, the welfare checklist of s. 1(4)(a) ACA 2002 requires the court
to have regard to the ascertainable wishes and feelings of the child with regard
to the decision.68 Under Dutch law an adoption order can in principle not be
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69 BLANKESPOOR (1997) p. 43-44.
70 England: s. 47 (9) ACA 2002 and s. 49(4) ACA 2002, furthermore section 47(8) also excludes
from adoption minors who are or have been married. The Netherlands: art. 1:228(1)(a) DCC;
minors who have been married are also excluded from adoption pursuant to art. 1:233 DCC.
71 S. 50(1) ACA 2002.
72 S. 51(1) ACA 2002.
73 Art. 1:228(1)(c) DCC.
74 Hoge Raad 30 June 2000, NJ 2001/103.
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made if a child who has reached the age of twelve objects to the adoption. The
objection of a child who has not yet reached the age of twelve, but may be
considered able to reasonably assess his or her own interests in the matter, may
also cause an application to be denied. However, research carried out in one of
the Dutch courts on partner adoptions in the mid 1990s showed that in a sub-
stantial number of cases children over 12 were not being heard by the court
about their views on the adoption.69
Age of the adopter and the adoptee
Only minor children may be adopted in both jurisdictions.70 Under English law
adopters have to be 21 years or older, except where one of the adopting couple
is a natural parent of the child, in which case the adopting partner has to be 18
years of age or older.71 In the case of partner adoption, the adopting partner must
have reached the age of 21.72 
In The Netherlands adopters have to be 18 years older than the child they want
to adopt, both in the case of adoption by a couple and adoption by one person.73
The Dutch Supreme Court tends to be very strict about this age difference, even
in cases where all the parties (including the children) agree to the adoption.74 
Neither of the jurisdictions has a maximum age limit where national adoptions
are concerned, but since adoption has to be in the child’s interests age may play
a role.
4.3.3. OVERALL VIEW ON THE NEW PARENT AND LEGAL
PARENTHOOD
It is only when looking at (re-)registration, on the one hand, and recognition, on
the other, in the context of secondary families that the difference between these
concepts and thus the link between biology and legal parenthood truly becomes
clear. In the case of traditional genetic families, the differences are not that
obvious, because there the recognising/registering father is the biological father
of the child. However, in the case of re-registration or recognition by a non-
biological parent in a secondary family, the following differences emerge. First
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75 In the case of primary partially genetic families, there is another category of fathers whose
legal parenthood cannot be rebutted by any party, namely that of so-called HFEA fathers.
Their position will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6.
76 This points to a different attitude towards legal parenthood and parental responsibility in the
two jurisdictions, which will be further explored in the chapters to come.
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of all, in The Netherlands recognition is also open to the non-biological father
in secondary families, as has been affirmed by the legislator, provided that the
rights of the biological father are not infringed. In England, on the other hand,
re-registration on the child’s birth certificate is a means to add the name of the
child’s father on the birth certificate at a later date and not as a means to give a
new father in a secondary family the status of a legal parent. 
In the second place, when recognition or re-registration has taken place, there
are differences with regard to the possibility to challenge the established pater-
nity. Under Dutch law the child may, within strict time-limits, apply for the
nullification of recognition by a non-biological father. The other interested
parties, the mother and the recogniser, may only challenge the paternity estab-
lished by recognition under strict conditions. In short, recognition does not
create a presumption, but a legal fact. However, under English law, (re)registra-
tion creates a presumption of paternity which may be rebutted by any interested
party at any time, subject to the child’s interest, if the registered man is not the
child’s biological father.75 From this one may conclude that biology plays a more
important role where paternity is concerned in English law than it does in The
Netherlands. It is, however, relevant to question whether this difference really
matters is practice: how often is the paternity of a non-biological father chal-
lenged by a person other than the child? It may turn out that in practice the new
father who re-registers is regarded as the child’s father for the rest of his life, just
like the Dutch new parent who has recognised his partner’s child. Research data
on these issues are unfortunately not available.
With regard to partner adoption the main differences between the two jurisdic-
tions may be found in the issue of consent. Where in The Netherlands the
consent of the legal parent is required, in England only the consent of the legal
parent with parental responsibility is required. In England the right not to
consent to an adoption is tied to being a parent with parental responsibility and
not to either being a parent or having parental responsibility. In The Nether-
lands consent to an adoption is tied to being a legal parent, not to parental
responsibility. On the other hand, having parental responsibility without being
a parent makes it impossible for another person to adopt the child, since adop-
tion as such does not terminate parental responsibility.76 Moreover, develop-
ments in case law, partly influenced by judgments of the ECHR, have, in both
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jurisdictions, created more room in the adoption process for other kinds of
parents. However, the consent of these other kinds of parents is not required,
and disregarding their opposition is likely to require less stringent grounds. 
Another important difference is the role of the child in the adoption process. If
one looks at the law in the books, Dutch law requires the consent of the 12-year
old child to the adoption, whereas English law does not require the child’s
consent nor does it require the court to have regard to the child’s ascertainable
wishes and feelings. However, it may well be that in practice the attitudes of the
courts with regard to the child’s position in the adoption process is not all that
different. This is to be considered as an interesting subject for further compara-
tive socio-legal research.
Furthermore, it is worth noting that in neither jurisdiction the legal status of the
relationship or the sex of the parents plays a significant role in the adoption
legislation. In The Netherlands references to relationship status have been
replaced by a mandatory period of cohabitation; in England the statuses are
mentioned where the term couple is defined, but a couple living in an enduring
family relationship is also eligible to adopt. 
4.4. PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY 
In order to assess the legal position of the new parent with regard to the possibil-
ities for obtaining parental responsibility, a distinction has to be made between
the situation where the new parent has become a legal parent by means of one
of the options described in the previous section and the situation where the new
parent has not become a legal parent. The position of the new parent who has
become a legal parent will be discussed in section 4.4.1; the position of the new
parent who is not a legal parent will be discussed in section 4.4.2. The majority
of new parents are likely to find themselves in this latter category.
4.4.1.  THE NEW PARENT HAS BECOME A LEGAL PARENT
4.4.1.1.  Through recognition or re-registration
Under English law, a (new) parent who is not the child’s biological father and
may not be treated as such pursuant to s. 28 HFEA 1990, may in principle not re-
register on the child’s birth certificate. However, if the new parent does re-
register on the birth certificate as the child’s father with the mother’s consent,
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77 S. 4(1A) CA 1989 and s. 10A(1) BDRA 1953. 
78 It is presumed that where the mother and the new partner had joint parental responsibility
with regard to the child as a result of a court order pursuant to art. 1:253t DCC, this joint
parental responsibility will continue to exist after recognition as joint parental responsibility
of two parents. There are differences between parental responsibility based on 1:253t DCC and
the parental responsibility of two parents under art. 1:245(5) DCC. One of the differences may
be found in the regulations with regard to contact where a person who is not a parent will
have to base his or her application on art. 1:377f DCC, which has much stricter criteria than
the article reserved for parents, art. 1:377a DCC.
79 Art. 1:251(1) DCC.
80 Art. 1: 253aa(2) DCC reads that art. 1:251 DCC does not apply to joint parental responsibility
in a registered partnership; with the exception of the first sub-article of art 1:251 DCC which
reads that parents have joint parental responsibility over their children during their marriage
(read registered partnership). If one accepts that recognition confers parental responsibility on
a father during marriage, one may also have to accept the same for recognition during a
registered partnership (VONK (2006a)). In contrast, KOK (2006), p. 209 assumes that registered
partners can only acquire shared parental responsibility by operation of law over children born
during their relationship. Recently, a proposal to clarify the law on this point has been
introduced in the Dutch parliament, which would automatically confer joint parental responsi-
bility on the legal parents of a child who enter into a registered partnership. Dutch Second
Chamber 2006-2007, 29 353, no. 21.
81 Art. 1:252(1) DCC.
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he will acquire parental responsibility.77 Such re-registration on the birth
certificate creates a presumption of paternity. The biological father, or any
interested party, may challenge the registration of the new parent on the birth
certificate on the ground that he is not the biological father. In that case, the
name of the biological father will replace that of the non-biological father on the
birth certificate.
In The Netherlands the new male partner who has become the child’s legal
parent through recognition with the mother’s consent will not in all cases
automatically have acquired parental responsibility.78 If the mother and the new
male partner are married at the time of the recognition, he will automatically
acquire parental responsibility unless there is already a second holder of parental
responsibility.79 If the mother and the male partner are in a registered partner-
ship, opinions differ as to whether recognition will confer parental responsibility
on the legal father.80 If the mother and the new legal parent are not in a forma-
lised relationship they will have to register their joint parental responsibility in
the parental responsibility register.81 
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84 Art. 1:252(1) DCC.
85 The adoptive mother would acquire it on the basis of art. 1:253b(1) DCC.
86 DOEK (2006) considers it to be contrary to the principle of non-discrimination embodied in art.
1 of the Dutch Constitution to make a distinction on the basis of relational status for the
attribution of joint parental responsibility to adoptive parents. He concludes that all parents
should acquire parental responsibility as a result of adoption (Title 14, note. 2A on art. 1:251
DCC.). See also KOK (2006), p. 209.
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4.4.1.2.  Through adoption
Under English law an adoptive parent will automatically acquire parental
responsibility pursuant to s. 46(1) ACA 2002 regardless of the relational status
of the couple. 
Under Dutch law, the new parent who has become a legal parent through
adoption will in most cases automatically be attributed with parental responsibil-
ity over the child. However, there is some ambiguity in the law where the new
parent and his or her partner are not in a formalised relationship. The provisions
on adoption in the DCC make no mention of the attribution of parental responsi-
bility. Adoptive parents acquire parental responsibility on the basis of their
having become legal parents and on the basis of the status of their relationship.
In short, the system of the law as it is applied to original parents who are or have
become legal parents, also applies to adoptive parents. This means that adoptive
parents (like other parents) are attributed with shared parental responsibility by
operation of law if they are married82 or in a registered partnership;83 the same
applies in the case of partner-adoption where the partner is either married to or
registered with the parent. 
However, if one continues to follow the system of the law where adoption by a
cohabiting couple is concerned, the result is very unsatisfactory. Original parents
who are cohabiting may acquire joint parental responsibility by registering in the
parental responsibility register, provided that the male partner has become a
legal parent through recognition.84 It would be rather awkward if only the
female partner of the adoptive cohabiting couple would acquire parental respon-
sibility by operation of law, whereas the man would have to register.85 However,
where the result of this approach for a different-sex cohabiting couple may, as
DOEK argues, be unsatisfactory or even discriminatory,86 the situation becomes
truly incoherent if the system of the law is followed where cohabiting same-sex
adopters or single male adopters are concerned. A jointly adopting cohabiting
female same-sex couple might acquire joint parental responsibility on the basis
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89 As yet, there are not many cases in which parental responsibility has been granted to a third
party where there were already two holders of parental responsibility. See for an example in
a partially genetic primary family Re D (Contact and PR: Lesbian mothers and known father)
No. 2 [2006] EWHC 2 Fam. This case will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.
90 Both the new partner of the resident partner and the new partner of the non-resident parent
may acquire parental responsibility.
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of their legal motherhood87 and their being unmarried.88 However, an unmarried
man, who is either adopting alone or with his unmarried male partner, would
not acquire parental responsibility by operation of law (and neither would his
male partner), since unmarried legal fathers are under no circumstances attrib-
uted with parental responsibility by operation of law in The Netherlands. 
4.4.2.  THE NEW PARENT HAS NOT BECOME A LEGAL PARENT 
Both jurisdictions offer new parents who have not become legal parents the
possibility to acquire parental responsibility. Whether the new parent may
actually acquire it depends in part on the existence and status of another parent
outside the secondary family. As has become clear from Chapter 3, one of the
major differences in the field of parental responsibility law between the two
jurisdictions is the fact that under Dutch law only two persons may have paren-
tal responsibility with regard to a child whereas under English law there is no
such limit with regard to the number of persons who may have parental respon-
sibility over a particular child.89 
Under English law there are a number of ways in which a new parent may
acquire parental responsibility depending on the legal status of his or relation-
ship with the child’s parent.90 Where formerly new parents could only acquire
parental responsibility by means of a residence order, the recently introduced
ACA 2002 and the CPA 2004 have substantially amended the CA 1989 in this
field. They have introduced new possibilities for new parents to acquire parental
responsibility over their spouses’ or civil partners’ children. In the process they
have also introduced a distinction between new parents who are in a formalised
relationship with the child’s parent and those who are not. The first group, those
who are either married to or in a civil partnership with the child’s parent, are
referred to in s. 4A(1) CA 1989 as step-parents.
There are, at present, three ways in which step-parents can acquire parental res-
ponsibility, the last of which is also open to other kinds of new parents or carers.
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91 See also BAINHAM (2005) p. 235-237 who among others questions whether the fact that the
consent to such an agreement by the unmarried father without parental responsibility is not
required is consistent with the ECHR. It is worth noting that the agreement with a step-parent
does not preclude such an unmarried father from acquiring parental responsibility by a court
order. See also CRETNEY, MASSON & BAILEY-HARRIS (2002) p. 562.
92 S. 4A CA 1989. If there is another holder who is not a legal parent it appears as though his or
her consent to the agreement is not required. This may for instance be the case where both
parents have found a new partner and jointly take care of the child. 
93 S. 10 CA 1989.
94 S. 12(5) CA 1989. 
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1. A step-parent may acquire parental responsibility by making a parental
responsibility agreement with the child’s parent;91 if both the child’s parents
have parental responsibility, the agreement needs to be made with both of
them.
2. If agreement cannot be reached, the step-parent can apply for a parental
responsibility order from the court. It is immaterial for the application
whether the marriage or civil partnership is still subsisting or not.92 For such
an application the consent of the parent is not required; however, he or she
will be a party to the proceedings.
3. A step-parent may acquire parental responsibility by means of a residence
order. He or she may apply for a residence order without the leave of the
court either with the consent of all the holders of parental responsibility or
if the child has been living with him or her for three out of the past five
years.93 Prior to the ACA 2002 a residence order and the accompanying
parental responsibility ended once the child had reached, the age of 16.
However, at present the person in whose favour the order is made may
request that the order should continue until the child reaches the age of 18.94
Parental responsibility pursuant to a residence order will cease with the
order.
With regard to option 1 the following is of importance: only the agreement of
the child’s parent who is also a holder of parental responsibility is required. Legal
parents who are not holders of parental responsibility and holders of parental
responsibility who are not legal parents need not be party to such an agreement.
This last exception may be of particular importance in secondary same-sex
families where the parent’s former partner has acquired parental responsibility
during the relationship, but has not become a legal parent. 
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95 MASSON (2000) is critical of the necessity of the agreement of the other parent, since this may
be used as a bargaining chip. This may lead to a preference to apply for a court order instead
of becoming ‘involved in the wrangling or bargaining with the other parent’. LOWE & DOUGLAS
(2007) p. 422-425, doubt that many agreements will be made if the other parent also has
parental responsibility.
96 MASSON (2003) p. 582.
97 LOWE & DOUGLAS (2007) p. 424-425, question whether it is compliant with a child’s human
rights that it has no say in this matter. It only has a role to play where applying for the
termination of such a parental responsibility order is concerned.
98 See section 3.5.2 for the attribution of parental responsibility to unmarried fathers by a court
order.
99 LOWE & DOUGLAS (2007) p. 424.
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c   + c c
Ms. A Ms. B Ms. C
bio-mother new parent former partner with parental responsibility who is
not a legal parent
parental responsibility agreement agreement not required
Since the first two options have only recently been introduced, it is difficult to
say what the consequences will be, how often agreements95 will actually be made
or on what grounds applications will be granted. As to the chances of success of
an application for parental responsibility by a new parent, MASSON says the
following: 
‘The courts may be expected to grant most (if not all) applications that are
supported by the parent who is married to [or in a civil partnership with]
the stepparent; a stepparent’s commitment, shown by making the applica-
tion, is likely to be regarded as positive, even in the face of opposition
from the other parent.’96 
The child’s welfare is the court’s paramount consideration but the welfare
checklist embodied in s. 1(3) CA 1989 need not be applied, which means that the
child’s wishes and feelings need not be taken into account.97 It seems likely that
the existing criteria developed for the attribution of parental responsibility to
unmarried fathers may play a role,98 however ‘the analogy is not exact since in
most cases the application will be made with the mother’s consent and the
opposition will come from the non-resident parent.’99 Furthermore, the status
argument used for granting parental responsibility to unmarried biological
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100 See for instance Re S (Parental Responsibility) [1995] 2 FLR 648; Re H (Parental responsibility)
[1998] 1 FLR 855 and Re C and V (parental responsibility) [1998] 1 FLR 392, CA.
101 S. 4 CA 1989.
102 BAINHAM (2005) p. 236.
103 S. 10(5)(a) and (aa) CA 1989.
104 S. 10(5)(b) and s. 10(5)(c)(iii) Ca 1989. If a residence order with regard to the child is already
in force, the new parent will only need the consent of each of the persons in whose favour the
order was made.
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fathers may carry somewhat less weight where an application by a step-parent
is concerned. 100
Notwithstanding these comments and uncertainties, one should not lose sight of
the fact that the introduction of options 1 and 2 by means of s. 4A in the CA
1989 has given new parents who have entered into a formalised relationship
with one of the child’s parents rights with regard to the acquisition of parental
responsibility equal to those of an unmarried father.
The fact that a new parent has acquired joint parental responsibility does not
stop the ‘legal’ parent outside the secondary family from acquiring parental
responsibility, either through a responsibility agreement with the child’s mother
or by a court order.101 If the mother and the father enter into a parental responsi-
bility agreement after the new parent has acquired parental responsibility by
agreement or court order, it does not seem necessary for the new parent to agree.
Despite the fact that all holders of parental responsibility may act independently
and the attribution of parental responsibility to a step-parent does not, in
principle, lessen the parental responsibility of the non-resident parent, ‘to share
decision-making for a child between three rather than two adults is equally
clearly a weakening of the position of the parent who is not in the household.’102
For the new parent who is not in a formalised relationship with the child’s
parent, option 3, applying for a residence order continues to be the only means
of acquiring parental responsibility. The new parent may apply for a residence
order with or without the resident parent’s cooperation. Again there is an
important difference between new parents who are married to or living in a civil
partnership with the child’s parent and those who have not entered into a
formalised relationship. The first group of parents (step-parents) may apply for
a residence order if the child concerned is considered to be a child of the
family.103 The second group, however, will either need the consent of each of the
holders of parental responsibility to the application or need to have lived with
the child for three out of the preceding five years.104 If neither of these two
criteria is met, the new parent will have to seek the leave of the court to apply
for a residence order. The most likely problem for new parents who are not step-
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105 S. 12(5)(6) CA 1989.
106 For extensive information on the effects of a residence order see LOWE & DOUGLAS (2007) p.
550- 559.
107 Either the legal parent already had parental responsibility prior to the making of the residence
order or in case the legal parent is an unmarried father the court is required when making a
residence order with regard to such a legal parent, to make a separate parental responsibility
order for the non-legal parent s. 12(1) ACA 2002.
108 Unless the non-legal parent has acquired parental responsibility by means of a parental
responsibility agreement with the child’s legal parent(s) or by means of a parental responsibil-
ity order (s. 12(2) ACA 2002.
109 S. 12(3) CA 1989. This also applies to new parents, who are not legal parents, who have
acquired parental responsibility pursuant to s. 4A CA 1989; pursuant to s.5(3) or (4) only
parents with parental responsibility and guardians may appoint a guardian for the child,
pursuant to s. 52 (6) ACA 2006 only the consent of a parent with parental responsibility is
required for adoption. 
110 This means that it is also not possible to acquire joint parental responsibility pursuant to art.
1:253t DCC if the sole holder is not a legal parent. This situation may occur where two women
had joint parental responsibility and the birth mother is the only legal parent and dies. The
parental responsibility of the other woman is then transformed into guardianship. On the basis
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parents may be the refusal of the non-resident parent to consent to the applica-
tion. 
There are a number of differences between parental responsibility pursuant to
s. 4A and parental responsibility pursuant to a residence order: parental responsi-
bility as such will continue until the child reaches the age of 18, a residence
order and the accompanying parental responsibility continue until the child
reaches the age of 16; unless the person in whose favour the residence order is
made requests the order to continue until 18.105 
Moreover, there are also a number of differences between the position of a legal
parent with a residence order and that of a non-legal parent with a residence
order.106 First of all, if the residence order is revoked by a court, the legal parent
will continue to hold parental responsibility107 whereas the non-legal parent will
lose it.108 Another important difference concerns the parental responsibility as
such: the non-parent with parental responsibility on the basis of a residence
order does not have the right to agree or refuse to agree to the making of an
adoption order, or to appoint a guardian for the child.109 
Under Dutch law the parent with parental responsibility and the new parent
may apply together for joint parental responsibility pursuant to art. 1:253t DCC.
Whether the partner will be vested with parental responsibility depends on a
number of issues. First and foremost, the person other than a parent can only
obtain parental responsibility if the parent with whom he has requested joint
parental responsibility is the only holder of parental responsibility.110 Where
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of art 1:282 DCC this holder may apply to the court to be attributed with joint guardianship
together with her new partner. 
111 Art. 1:253t(2) DCC.
112 Art. 1:253t(3) DCC.
113 Hof Arnhem 8 June 2004, LJN: AQ5059.
114 Hof Arnhem 8 June 2004, LJN: AQ5059.
115 Hof ’s Gravenhage 27 August 2003, LJN: AI1828.
116 Rechtbank Groningen 20 June 2006, LJN: AY8301 and 17 October 2006, LJN: AZ0755. The
mother and her new female partner applied for joint parental responsibility, subsequently the
mother’s female ex-partner also applied for joint parental responsibility. On the basis of the ex-
partner’s rights pursuant to arts 6 and 8 ECHR she was granted joint parental responsibility
with the child’s mother.
117 See also VONK (2005a) p. 34-39.
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there are already two holders of parental responsibility, the new parents cannot
acquire it as well. Furthermore, the person who is not a parent has to be in a
close personal relationship with the child. The consent of the child is not re-
quired for the attribution of parental responsibility to the new parent.
If the child has legal familial ties with a parent outside the relationship, there are
a number of other criteria to be met. On the date of the application the parent
must have had sole parental responsibility for at least three years and the appli-
cants need to have cared for the child together for at least one year.111 Moreover,
the court will have to reject the application if‚ also in the light of the interests of
the other parent, there is a well-founded fear that the best interests of the child
would be neglected if it were granted.112 The consent of the other parent is not
required; however, given the fact that he may apply for the (re-)establishment
of joint parental responsibility, his objections may carry some weight.113 Recent
case law is not clear on the course to be followed, some courts prefer to leave the
existing status quo intact and leave sole parental responsibility with the person
who has it and attribute neither of the conflicting parties (the other parent and
the new parent) with parental responsibility,114 others attribute joint parental
responsibility to the resident parent and the new parent115 and still others
attribute joint parental responsibility to the mother and her former partner.116
As long as the Dutch Supreme Court has not formulated criteria in order to
determine which application should prevail and on what grounds, this issue will
remain rather unclear. 
Nevertheless, this problem may not be as important as it seems, since the num-
ber of parents who acquire sole parental responsibility after the breakdown of
their relationship will continue to decrease, since as of 1998 joint parental
responsibility continues after separation, unless the child may suffer serious
harm.117 However, problems will continue to exist with regard to the position of
the unmarried legal father without parental responsibility. Unmarried legal
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118 Hof ‘s Gravenhage 21 June 2006, LJN: AY3804 for a case where a legal father without parental
responsibility objected to the attribution of joint parental responsibility to the mother and her
partner.
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fathers may as of recently apply for joint parental responsibility against the
mother’s wishes. In case of conflicting applications for joint parental responsibil-
ity by an unmarried legal father on the one hand and a new parent on the other
it is as yet unclear which application should take precedence.118 
4.4.3  SOME PROBLEMS HIGHLIGHTED
It is interesting at this point to take a closer look at the consequences of two
potentially conflicting developments in the Dutch and English law on parental
responsibility. On the one hand increased recognition of the legal position of the
unmarried farther and on the other hand increased legal recognition for the new
parent in the secondary family. However, these developments create more
problems under Dutch law because there may be only two holders of parental
responsibility and parental responsibility may be attributed to non-legal parents
by operation of law. A number of the resulting problems with regard to conflict-
ing applications on the one hand, and attribution of parental responsibility
where there are already two holders on the other hand, will be discussed in this
section
• Scenario 1: Conflicting applications for joint parental responsibility
• Scenario 2: Attribution of parental responsibility by operation of law where
there are already two holders of parental responsibility 
• Scenario 3: Joint application for parental responsibility by parents where one
of the parents already holds parental responsibility with a person other than
a parent
The discussion will concentrate on Dutch law, because under English law there
may be more than two holders of parental responsibility. However, where
relevant or illuminating English law will be discussed as well. 
Scenario 1: Conflicting applications for joint parental responsibility 
c + b de b
A: legal mother B: new parent   Children C: legal/biological father
The child’s legal father C has been in a relationship with the child’s mother A
but has never acquired parental responsibility. Due to recent developments in
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119 Hoge Raad, 27 May 2005, LJN: AS7054 recently confirmed in Hoge Raad 28 April 2006, LJN:
AV0656 and Hoge Raad 28 April 2006, NJ 2006/284. Also Hof ’s Gravenhage 13 December
2006, LJN: AZ6514.
120 S, 1(4)(a) CCA 1989. See for more information on the welfare checklist section 3.5.
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Dutch law C now has the possibility to apply for parental responsibility without
the cooperation of A. However, meanwhile, A has started a relationship with B,
who wants to acquire parental responsibility with regard to A’s children. Both
men apply to the court to be attributed with joint parental responsibility, C on
the basis of a recent decision by the Dutch Supreme Court119 and B jointly with
A on the basis of art. 1:253t DCC. The law gives no indication which application
should take precedence and according to which grounds.
Under English law such situations may also occur. However, the court may grant
both the application by C (the biological father) and by B (the new parent). In
case of such conflicting applications the welfare of the child will be the courts
paramount consideration, however, as already was mentioned in section 4.4.2
the welfare checklist need not be applied unless the application by B or C
concern the application of a residence order, the making of the order is opposed
by the other party. 120
Scenario 2: Attribution of parental responsibility by operation of law where
there are already two holders of parental responsibility 
c + b d b
A: legal mother B: legal father   Child C: biological father
Another problem that may occur under Dutch law is again best illustrated with
an example. Ms A and Mr C have entered into a registered partnership. During
their partnership a child is born; by virtue of their partnership they acquire joint
parental responsibility by operation of law. Shortly after the birth of the child
the partnership is dissolved; at that time Mr C has not recognised the child and
is therefore not the child’s legal parent. Some time later Ms A enters into a
relationship with Mr B, who eventually recognises Ms A’s child. When Ms A
and Mr B marry a couple of months later, they assume that they will be attrib-
uted with joint parental responsibility pursuant to art. 1:251(1) DCC. Is this
indeed the case? In principle, Mr B would be attributed with parental responsi-
bility over the child by virtue of his marriage according to Dutch law; however,
there already is a second party besides the child’s mother with parental responsi-
bility over the child, namely the biological father Mr C. It is unclear what
happens in such a case.
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122 See section 4.2.2.
123 See scenario 1.
124 See for instance Re D (Contact and PR: Lesbian mothers and known father) [2006] EWHC 2
Fam.
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Under English law such a case is not likely to occur because the biological father
Mr. C will not be attributed with parental responsibility automatically outside
marriage. If he acquires parental responsibility by means of an agreement with
the mother, he may register as the child’s father121 and if he has been attributed
with parental responsibility by court order, this will have been granted in the
basis that he is the child’s biological father. In short, there is no possibility for
the new parent Mr B to acquire the status of a legal parent. He may however,
acquire parental responsibility.122 
Scenario 3: Joint application for parental responsibility by parents where one of
the parents already holds parental responsibility with a person other than a
parent
c + c    d b
A: legal mother B: non-bio mother       Child        C: legal father
This scenario concerns a case where the status of legal parenthood has been
separated from the attribution of parental responsibility. Two women (A and B)
and one man (C) raise a child together. The man is the legal father of the child,
and the two women have joint parental responsibility. The women separate and
the legal mother (A) conspires with the father (C) to remove the other woman
(B) from the children’s life. The man applies for joint parental responsibility with
the legal mother over their child. What happens? This is as yet unclear. 
In principle, a legal father who has never had parental responsibility has been
given the right pursuant to arts 6 and 8 ECHR to apply for parental responsibility
(without maternal cooperation).123 But what happens if there are already two
people with parental responsibility? Will such a case be heard by the court? If
it is heard, will the court simply conclude that there are already two holders,
which means the father’s application cannot be granted? Or will the court
consider the matter and decide on the issue in accordance with the child’s best
interests in that particular case? Under English law the situation would be
different simply because the child’s father may acquire parental responsibility
in addition to the two female holders.124
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Most of these conflicts in Dutch law are caused by the fact that legal parenthood
and parental responsibility are no longer necessarily attributed to the same
person on the one hand, and on the other hand that the law has not expanded
the number of persons that may acquire parental responsibility. However small
the incidence of such conflicts may seem, the system of the law has been broken
by the fact that haphazard changes have been made without considering the
effects of such changes in the wider context of the law.
Under English law, there has been a so-called more inclusive approach towards
new parents, and in a number of the conflicts described under Dutch law, the
various parties involved would all be attributed with parental responsibility.
However, concern has been expressed about the consequences of the recently
introduced possibilities for new parent in a formalised relationship to acquire
parental responsibility by means of an agreement with the parent(s). These new
provisions do on the one hand substantiate promises to give new parents the
possibility to establish a legal link with their partner’s child, on the other hand
one must bear in mind that ‘while a triangular sharing of parental responsibility
may work well where all parties have an interest in the child and wish to enter
into a co-operative arrangement, it could be a recipe for conflict where this is
not the case.’125 
4.4.4.  OVERALL VIEW ON PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY
There are two important differences between the two jurisdictions with regard
to the new parent’s position in the context of parental responsibility: on the one
hand there is the difference relating to the number of persons who may hold
parental responsibility with regard to a particular child, and on the other hand
there is the legal position granted to the new parent himself or herself in the law.
For instance, Dutch law has made it possible for new parents to acquire parental
responsibility upon a joint application with the child’s parent, but only if the
parent is at that time the sole holder of parental responsibility. If there are
already two holders, the new parent cannot acquire parental responsibility,
regardless of his or her relationship with the child. Since in England there is no
limit to the number of holders of parental responsibility with regard to a particu-
lar child, it will in principle be easier for a new parent to acquire parental
responsibility, subject to the interests of the child. 
However, the difference between the number of persons who may hold parental
responsibility with regard to one child, easily leads one to overlook what may be
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an even more important difference, namely the status of the new parent in the
law of the two jurisdictions: this difference is substantial. Under English law the
introduction of the ACA 2002 which inserted section 4A into the Children Act
1989, has given new parents who have entered into a formalised relationship
with one of the child’s parents the same position with regard to the acquisition
of parental responsibility as an unmarried biological father. He or she may,
among other things, apply to the court to be vested with parental responsibility
over a child, without the cooperation of the child’s parent(s), regardless of
whether the formalised relationship with the child’s parent is still intact. The
question whether such requests will be granted and on what grounds is still open
to discussion as was described above. Nevertheless, this position is very strong
if one compares it to the position of a new parent under Dutch law. He or she
has no independent standing to apply for parental responsibility. Even the new
parent in a non-formalised relationship under English law has a stronger posi-
tion than a new parent in a formalised relationship under Dutch law.
However, this is not the most essential difference where the legal position of
new parents is concerned. Step-parents have recently been given a much stron-
ger position in English law, with the introduction of section 4A in the CA 1989.
Step-parents may apply for parental responsibility without the cooperation of
the child’s parents whether or not the formalised relationship with the child’s
parent is still in existence. This means that the step-parent has acquired a
position akin to that of an unmarried father. The position of new parents in The
Netherlands is radically different, a new parent may only apply for parental
responsibility if the other parent has been the holder of sole parental responsibil-
ity for three years, and, moreover, the new parent must apply for joint parental
responsibility together with the child’s resident parent. 
Whether the developments in England are favourable and should be seen as an
example for Dutch law, is an interesting question for further research. On the
one hand, the fact that new parents may acquire parental responsibility over
their partner’s children even where there are already two holders of parental
responsibility, recognises their importance in the lives of the children concerned.
On the other hand, this development may be a recipe for conflict and a further
fragmentation of the parent/child relationship.126 
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Table 4.2.: Attribution of parental responsibility to the new parent
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In her recent publication on Principles for Parental Responsibility the Commis-
sion on European Family Law proposes in principle 3:18 that the parent’s partner
living with the child may take part in decisions with respect to daily matters
unless the other parent having parental responsibility objects.127 This may be a
start towards increased recognition of the legal position of secondary families.
Nevertheless, a balance needs to be found between the interests of the child in
maintaining a relationship with the original parent and on the other hand the
legal protection of the child’s relationship with the new parent. How this
balance is to be struck, may for a large part depend on the factual situation.
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CHAPTER 5
SURROGATE GENETIC FAMILIES
5.1. INTRODUCTION
When considering the surrogate genetic family it is important to bear in mind
that, contrary to the other kinds of genetic families described in Chapter 3, the
couple in the resident family have made use of a third procreational party to
have a child genetically related to both of them. Furthermore, this kind of
surrogacy, also referred to as gestational surrogacy or high-technological surro-
gacy, which has only become possible after the introduction of IVF in the late
1970s, is essentially different from other forms of surrogacy in that the surrogate
mother does not give birth to a genetic child of her own. Instead she acts for
nine months as a kind of incubator in order to gestate and give birth to the
commissioning parents’ child. These two factors set the surrogate genetic family
apart from the traditional genetic family, on the one hand, and from the other
kinds of surrogate families, some of which will be discussed in Chapter 6, on the
other hand.
c + b     f    c
Genetic mother Bio father Child Gestational mother
Surrogacy can occur with the genetic material of both the commissioning
parents (genetic families), with the genetic material of one of the commissioning
parents (partially genetic primary families), and without the genetic material of
either of the commissioning parents (non-genetic families). In this last case the
surrogate mother may be the child’s genetic parent or use may have been made
of a donor egg. This makes surrogacy in all its forms an interesting means to
study the weight attached to genetics, biology and social reality in the law
relating to parents and children.1
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2 Re C (A Minor) (Ward Surrogacy) [1985] FLR 846. 
3 For more extensive information on surrogacy in England see for instance COOK (1999) p. 121-
141; JOHNSON (2003) p. 93-92; BRINSDEN (2003a) p. 99- 112, DODD (2003) p. 113-120 Lane
(2003) p. 121-139; BRINSDEN (2003b) 483-491.
4 WARNOCK (1984).
5 COTS: Childlessness overcome through surrogacy. For more information see http://www.
surrogacy.org.uk/. See also DODD (2003) p. 113-120.
6 BRAZIER, CAMPBEL, GOLOMBOK (1998).
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The surrogate families discussed in this chapter are those families where both the
commissioning parents are genetically related to the child concerned. First, the
legal position of these families in England will be discussed and compared and
subsequently the legal position of such families in The Netherlands. In the last
part of the chapter the English and the Dutch situation will be compared.
5.2. ENGLAND
Since the first controversial ‘natural’ surrogacy case in England in 19852 there
has been almost continuous discussion on the subject of the permissibility of
surrogacy in England.3 A number of enquiries have been carried out on this
subject. The first Committee to investigate surrogacy was the Warnock Commit-
tee4 which reported in 1984 on human fertilisation and embryology. The major-
ity of this committee were against the introduction of any regulation of surro-
gacy as this might encourage the use of surrogacy. The committee was concerned
that surrogacy might lead to the exploitation of surrogate mothers. Shortly after
the Committee reported its findings the Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985 was
enacted, which bans commercial surrogacy agencies but does not ban non-profit
agencies (such as COTS).5 Despite the Warnock Committee’s recommendations,
the HFEA 1990 contains a provision which facilitates the transfer of parental
rights from the surrogate mother (and her partner) to the commissioning
parents, namely the parental order of s. 30.
Subsequently, in 1997 the Brazier Committee was asked to look into a number
of issues concerning surrogacy arrangements, namely whether payments to
surrogate mothers should be continued to be allowed; whether there is a case for
the regulation of surrogacy through a recognized body or bodies; and whether
changes are needed in the SAA 1985 or s. 30 of the HFEA 1990 relating to the
parental order. In 1998, this committee6 reported its finding to the UK Parlia-
ment. The committee concluded, among other things, that payments should only
cover genuine expenses, that a Code of Practice should be drawn up and that all
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9 JOHNSON (2003), p. 93-98.
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11 S. 1(2) SAA 1985.
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the agencies involved in surrogacy should be registered and act in accordance
with the Code of Practice; that a new Surrogacy Act should replace the SAA
1985 and s. 30 of the HFEA 1990; that judges should be given the possibility to
order DNA testing in the case of a parental order to ascertain, if there is doubt
on this issue, that the child is indeed genetically related to one of the commis-
sioning parents.7 These recommendations have as yet not been acted upon by the
government. In the recent consultation launched by the Department of Health
on the review of the HFE Act, surrogacy and the recommendation made on this
topic by the Brazier Committee are also a topic of discussion.8
At present regulations relating to surrogacy can be found in the SAA 1985, and
others, such as the possibility to transfer parental rights from the surrogate
mother (and her husband if she has one) to the commissioning parents are
regulated in the HFEA 1990 (parental order). Moreover, the CA 1989 and the
ACA 2002 are of importance for commissioning parents who are not eligible for
a parental order.9
A transfer of parental rights in surrogacy cases may not occur against the will of
any of the parties involved (s. 1A SAA 1985). This means that the surrogate
mother is not under an obligation to give up the child nor are the commissioning
parents under an obligation to accept the child. Moreover, under the ACA 2002
s. 92(2)(e)(f) the parties involved in the surrogacy arrangement are not allowed
to place or accept the child for adoption without an order from the High Court
or the intervention of an adoption agency.10
The SAA 1985 defines a surrogate mother as a woman who carries a child in
pursuance of an agreement (a) made before she began to carry the child, and (b)
made with a view to any child carried in pursuance of it being handed over to,
and parental responsibility being met (so far as practicable) by another person,
or persons.11 The surrogate mother will be the child’s legal parent by operation
of law and she will have parental responsibility over the child.12 If the surrogate
mother is married, her husband will be the child’s legal father by virtue of the
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marriage and share parental responsibility with the child’s mother.13 If the
surrogate mother is unmarried, she is the child’s only legal parent and the only
person to have parental responsibility by operation of law.
In the following sections the possibilities for transferring full parental status
from the surrogate mother (and her husband if she is married) to the commis-
sioning parents will be discussed; first, for married commissioning parents who
may apply for a parental order and subsequently for commissioning parents who
are not eligible for a parental order.
5.2.1. COMMISSIONING PARENTS ARE MARRIED: 
THE PARENTAL ORDER
If the commissioning parents are married they may apply for a parental order14
within 6 months of the child’s birth pursuant to s. 30 of the HFEA 1990. A
parental order will transfer parental responsibility and legal parenthood from the
surrogate mother (and her husband) to the commissioning parents. A number of
conditions have to be met before a parental order can be made:
" the pregnancy has come about by placing an embryo, or sperm and eggs in
the surrogate mother or by her artificial insemination;
" the commissioning parents are married to each other and both are at least 18
years old;15
" the gametes of one of the parties to the marriage or of them both were used
to bring about the creation of the embryo;
" the commissioning parents must apply for a parental order within 6 months
of the child’s birth;
" at the time of the application or the making of the order the child must live
with the commissioning parents;
" the court must be convinced that the mother and the father of the child agree
unconditionally to the making of the order;
" at least one of the commissioning parents must be domiciled in the UK
(including the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man);
" the gestational mother must give full and unconditional consent at least 6
weeks after the birth of the child;
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" the court must be satisfied that no money or other benefit (other than for
expenses reasonably incurred) has been given or received by the commission-
ing parents.16
If the court is satisfied that all the conditions have been met, it may make an
order ‘providing for a child to be treated in law as the child of the parties to a
marriage’.17 The Brazier Committee proposed that the court should be given the
possibility to order DNA tests in case there are doubts whether one of the
commissioning parents is indeed genetically related to the child.18
The recently published Tissue Bill19 proposes to expand the eligibility to apply
for a parental order to unmarried couples who are in an enduring family rela-
tionship and to civil partners. This would dramatically reduce the number of
commissioning parents who need to apply for adoption because they do not meet
the criteria set out at present in s. 30 HFEA 1990. Since one of the requirements
is that one of the commissioning parents must be genetically related to the child,
commissioning parents of whom neither partner is genetically related to the
child will have to continue to make use of adoption for the transfer of parental
rights.
5.2.2. COMMISSIONING PARENTS ARE NOT ELIGIBLE FOR A
PARENTAL ORDER: ADOPTION
Parents who are not eligible for a parental order because they do not fulfil the
requirements set out in s. 30 HFEA 1990, will have to adopt the child to acquire
full parental status. Whether the commissioning parents both need to adopt or
whether the father can acquire legal parenthood and parental responsibility by
registering on the child’s birth certificate, depends on the surrogate mother’s
relational status in combination with the legal status of the surrogate mother’s
male partner in relation to the child.
The surrogate mother will be treated as the child’s legal mother pursuant to s.
27 HFEA 1990, even where she is not the child’s genetic mother. If the surrogate
mother has a male partner who is to be treated as the legal father of the child
pursuant to s. 28 HFEA, the commissioning couple may only both acquire full
parental status with regard to the child by joint adoption. Since under the ACA
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(2005).
21 S. 47(4)(b) ACA 2002.
22 Before they make an adoption application they have to notify the appropriate local authority
of their intention to adopt at least three months before the application for an adoption order
is made in order to give the local authority the possibility to carry out an investigation into the
suitability of the applicants as adopters (s. 44 ACA 2002).
23 S. 47(2) ACA 2002.
24 S. 52(1)(b) ACA 2002.
25 The prohibition of s. 92(2)(e)(f) ACA 2002 does not apply to parents (s. 92 (4)(a) ACA 2002).
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2002 s. 92(2)(e)(f) parties are not allowed to place or accept a child for adoption
without an order from the High Court or the intervention of an adoption
agency,20 they will have to notify the appropriate local authority about their
intention to take the child into their home.
Before the commissioning parents can jointly adopt the child, it must have lived
with them for at least 10 weeks. In order to have the child live with them, the
commissioning parents may apply for a residence order pursuant to s. 8 and s.
10(5)(iii) CA 1989 without leave, if they have the consent of the other holders
of parental responsibility. Once the child has been living with the commission-
ing parents for at least 10 weeks (these weeks are counted from the moment the
child is 6 weeks old)21 they may apply for an adoption order to be made in their
favour.22 The consent of the surrogate mother and her husband (provided the
latter has parental responsibility) is required for the adoption.23 The court may
dispense with parental consent if the adoption is in the best interests of the
child.24
If the surrogate mother has no partner or if her male partner is not to be treated
as the child’s legal father pursuant to s. 28 HFEA 1990, the commissioning father
may establish his paternity on the basis of his genetic connection with the child
by registration on the birth certificate with the birth mother’s consent or during
court proceedings. The same applies if the surrogate mother is not in a forma-
lised relationship or has entered into a civil partnership with another woman.
In those circumstances the child will not have a legal father by operation of law,
which means that the commissioning father may register on the child’s birth
certificate with the surrogate mother’s consent, regardless of whether he himself
is married. Registration will give the commissioning father joint parental respon-
sibility with the surrogate mother, which will allow him to take the child
home.25 The commissioning father and mother may apply for a residence order
without leave, which will also attribute the commissioning mother with parental
Machteld Vonk, 'Children and their parents'
Surrogate genetic families
26 S. 42(3) ACA 2004.
27 BOELE & ODERKERK (1999) p. 25-44. VLAARDINGERBROEK (2003) p. 171-178.
28 ROSCAM ABBING H. (1999) p. 26.
Intersentia 137
responsibility. After the required term of six months has elapsed the commis-
sioning mother may apply to adopt her partner’s child.26
The status of the relationship of the commissioning couple is not relevant as long
as they fall within the definition of a couple in s. 144(4) of the ACA, according
to which a couple is either:
a) a married couple, or
b) two people (whether of different sexes or the same sex) living as partners in
an enduring family relationship.
5.2.3. INTERNAL COMPARISON
The legal position of married and unmarried commissioning parents in relation
to their genetic child borne by the surrogate mother is far from similar. How-
ever, this may change in the near future if the proposals in the Tissue Bill to
make unmarried parents eligible for a parental order are accepted. At present,
only married commissioning parents may apply for a parental order within six
weeks of the child’s birth, provided all the criteria summed up in s. 30 HFEA
1990 have been met. Unmarried commissioning parents and married commis-
sioning parents who are not eligible for a parental order will have to adopt the
child in order to acquire full parental status. Whether both commissioning
parents have to adopt or whether only the commissioning mother has to adopt
depends on the legal status of the surrogate mother’s male partner in relation to
the child.
5.3. THE NETHERLANDS
Dutch law has no special procedure geared towards transferring parental rights
and duties from the surrogate mother (and her husband) to the commissioning
parents.27 The Dutch government has adopted a very reticent attitude with
regard to surrogacy.28 In particular, after the introduction of IVF in the late
1970s, a discussion arose as to whether or not surrogacy should be allowed. On
the whole, the answer to this question was in the negative, which resulted in the
introduction of art. 151b in the Dutch Criminal Code, making commercial
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32 Planningsbesluit in-vitrofertilisatie, Staatscourant 1998/95, p. 14-18.
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surrogacy a criminal offence.29 It has become clear from subsequent parliamen-
tary debates30 that it is not the intention of this provision to convict doctors co-
operating with half- or low technological surrogacy, but to avoid the situation
where women offer themselves as surrogate mothers for payment as this might
lead to a form of trade in children.
High-technological surrogacy is very strictly regulated in The Netherlands. In
1989 the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport determined in its IVF regulation
statement that surrogacy in combination with IVF was not allowed. After active
lobbying by interest groups31 in combination with the fact that the passing of
time had proven that there appeared to be less interest than expected in high
technological surrogacy, the IVF regulation statement issued in 199732 allowed
for surrogacy in combination with IVF under very strict conditions. When this
regulation statement was discussed in the Second Chamber, the minister stated
that is was not his intention to adapt Dutch family law to accommodate surro-
gacy in combination with IVF. No special regulation for the transfer of full
parental rights from the surrogate mother to the commissioning parents was
envisioned. In the words of the minister: ‘Transfer from one set of parents to
another set of parents must take place by means of the voluntary divestment of
parental responsibility of one set of parents, after which the intended parents
can be vested with parental responsibilities and will eventually have to adopt the
child.’33
Moreover, the IVF regulation statement determines that IVF in combination
with surrogacy must take place in accordance with the guidelines on high-
technological surrogacy34 of the Dutch Society for Obstetrics and Gynaecology.
These guidelines require IVF clinics to draw up their own protocol regarding
IVF surrogacy. Such a protocol must at least ensure that the following conditions
are met: there must be medical grounds for the procedure (specified in the
regulation statement); the surrogate mother must have one or more living
children whom she gestated and gave birth to without complications;35 there
must be adequate information provision to the surrogate mother and the in-
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Intersentia 139
tended parents; and preceding the treatment the responsible doctor will draw up
a statement to the effect that the above conditions have been met and that he
deems the treatment to be justified.36
In the early 1990s a trial was started to study whether or not surrogacy should
be allowed as a means to help a certain group of infertile couples to have a child
of their own.37 The intake centre that was established as a result of this trial was
forced to close in July 2004, as Dutch IVF clinics turned out to be unwilling to
participate in gestational surrogacy.38 However, in April 2006 one of the Dutch
licensed IVF clinics announced that it will make gestational surrogacy services
available to married couples (VUMC, 6 April 2006).39 At least one of the other
IVF centres will make use of the screening facilities of this surrogacy centre and
subsequently carry out the medical component in their own clinic.40
The transfer of full parental rights in surrogacy arrangements will not occur
against the will of any of the parties involved. This means that the surrogate
mother has no legal duty to hand over the child, nor are the commissioning
parents under a legal duty to accept the child. If the child is not yet 6 months old
the commissioning parents may only take the child into their home with the
consent of the Child Care and Protection Board (art. 1:241(3) DCC and art. 1
Foster Children Act).
There are a number of ways (all of which are uncertain) in which parental rights
may be transferred from the surrogate parent(s) to the commissioning parents.
The option available for a particular couple depends on whether the surrogate
mother is in a formalised relationship or not. The status of the relationship of the
commissioning parents is also relevant for the transfer of parental rights, but
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would be the child’s legal father. 
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only in relation to the status of the relationship of the surrogate mother.41 There
are basically three routes to full parental status for the commissioning parents:
1) divestment of parental responsibility followed by adoption (surrogate mother
is married); 2) recognition by the commissioning father followed by divestment
of parental responsibility and partner adoption (surrogate mother is in a regis-
tered partnership); 3) recognition followed by transfer of sole parental responsi-
bility from the surrogate mother to the commissioning father followed by
partner adoption (surrogate mother is not in a formalised relationship).
Whether or not the commissioning parents are married is only relevant for the
issue of recognition by the commissioning father. The married commissioning
father may under certain circumstances recognise the unmarried surrogate
mother’s child with her consent. This is only possible if there is no other legal
parent than the surrogate mother since a child can only have two legal parents
(art. 1:204(1)(f) DCC). Moreover, there needs to be a close personal relationship
between the married commissioning father and the child (art. 1:204(1)(e) DCC).
This may for instance be the case if the child has been living with the commis-
sioning parents for some time after its birth.42 For the subsequent course of
action to be taken by the commissioning parents see the relevant sections below.
Recently one of the Dutch district courts43 decided on an application by a
married man who was the biological father of the child carried by his wife’s
sister to find as a matter of fact that there is a close personal relationship be-
tween him and the child his sister in law was carrying so that he might recognise
the child after his or her birth.44 However, the court stated that there was no
close personal relationship between the man and the unborn child, since such
a close personal relationship can only come into existence after the child’s
birth.45
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In the following sections the possibilities for transferring full parental status
from the surrogate mother (and her husband) to the commissioning parents will
be discussed. First, the possibility of divestment of parental responsibility
followed by adoption (surrogate mother is married) will be discussed, subse-
quently the possibility of recognition by the commissioning father followed by
divestment of parental responsibility and partner adoption (surrogate mother is
in a registered partnership) and finally the possibility of recognition followed by
the transfer of sole parental responsibility from the surrogate mother to the
commissioning father followed by partner adoption (surrogate mother is not in
a formalised relationship).
5.3.1. DIVESTMENT OF PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY
FOLLOWED BY JOINT ADOPTION
The surrogate mother will be the child’s legal mother and if she is married her
husband will be the child’s legal father;46 both will have parental responsibility
over the child by operation of law.47 In the very unlikely situation that the
surrogate mother’s husband did not consent to the act that led to the conception
of the child, he may deny his paternity.48 However, given the complexity and
invasiveness of gestational surrogacy it his highly unlikely that he will succeed.
Moreover, in cases of surrogacy in combination with IVF the requirements are
such that the surrogate mother’s husband’s consent is required.49 In the rare case
that the surrogate mother’s husband successfully denies his paternity, it is
unclear whether the commissioning father may recognise the child. There is no
provision in the DCC which prevents this, but it does not seem to be in line with
the system of the law.
All this means that full parental status can only be transferred to the commis-
sioning parents through joint adoption. However, before the child can be
adopted by the commissioning parents, the surrogate parent(s) will first have to
be divested of their parental responsibility.50 Divestment of parental responsibil-
ity is essentially a measure of child protection used in cases where parents are
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unable or unfit to look after their child.51 Parents cannot apply to the court to be
divested, only the Child Care and Protection Board and the Public Prosecution
Service can apply to the court to have the surrogate parents divested of their
responsibility.52 The outcome of such a procedure is uncertain as the Dutch
Supreme Court has not yet had the opportunity to decide on such a matter.53
However, decisions by various courts of appeal allow for the divestment of the
surrogate parents on the ground that they are unable or unfit to care for this
particular child since they did not intend to have it for themselves.54
If the divestment procedure is successful, the commissioning parents may be
attributed with joint guardianship. Normally, when parents are divested of
parental responsibility, parental responsibility will be transferred to an institu-
tion for family guardianship.55 However, in IVF surrogacy cases that have been
published, guardianship was attributed to the commissioning parents if the court
considered this to be the best possible solution for the child concerned. If the
commissioning parents have taken care of the child together for a year they may
instigate adoption proceedings, provided they have been living together for three
years on the day the adoption request is filed. The normal criteria for adoption
apply in such cases, which means that the legal parents of the child need to
consent to the adoption. Only in a very limited number of circumstances may
the court disregard a parent’s refusal to consent to adoption.56
5.3.2. RECOGNITION FOLLOWED BY DIVESTMENT OF
PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY AND PARTNER ADOPTION
If the surrogate mother is in a registered partnership, she will be the child’s legal
mother and have parental responsibility over the child. Her male or female
partner will automatically have joint parental responsibility over the surrogate
mother’s child, unless the child at the moment of its birth has another legal
parent outside the relationship.57 However, the registered partnership in itself
has no consequences with regard to the child’s parentage as would be the case
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in a different-sex marriage.58 This means that the unmarried commissioning
father may recognize the child with the surrogate mother’s consent. If he does
so before the birth of the child, only the surrogate mother will be attributed
with parental responsibility; if he recognises the child after its birth both the
surrogate mother and her partner will be attributed with parental responsibility.
The first situation will be described in the following section. In the second
situation, where both registered partners have parental responsibility, a divest-
ment procedure before a court is required, despite the fact that the commission-
ing father is a legal parent. If the divestment procedure is successful and the
commissioning father (who is already the child’s legal parent) is attributed with
parental responsibility, the commissioning mother may adopt the child after she
has taken care of that child together with the commissioning father for one
year,59 provided they have been living together for three years on the day the
application is made and all the other criteria for adoption have been met. The
commissioning mother will be attributed with parental responsibility as a
consequence of the adoption.60
If, however, the surrogate mother refuses to consent to the recognition of the
child by the commissioning father, he has no recourse to the court to apply for
the surrogate mother’s consent to be replaced. The surrogate mother may even
have her male partner recognise the child with her consent, if she is determined
not to give up the child.
5.3.3. RECOGNITION FOLLOWED BY THE TRANSFER OF
PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY AND PARTNER ADOPTION
If the surrogate mother is not in a formalised relationship, the child will only
have one legal parent by operation of law. Moreover, the surrogate mother will
be the only holder of parental responsibility. The commissioning father may
recognise the child with the surrogate mother’s consent. Once the commission-
ing father has acquired the status of legal parent through recognition, he may
apply for sole parental responsibility, to the exclusion of the surrogate mother.61
The commissioning father can only file such an application if the surrogate
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mother is the sole holder of parental responsibility. The commissioning mother
may subsequently adopt the child after she has been taking care of that child
with the commissioning father for a year and all the other criteria for adoption
are met. This latter procedure is also possible where the surrogate mother is in
a registered partnership and has sole parental responsibility because the commis-
sioning father has recognised the child before its birth.
It is unclear whether the unmarried commissioning mother will be attributed
with parental responsibility by operation of law through partner adoption. If one
follows the system of the law regarding parental responsibility, joint parental
responsibility does not come about by operation of law for cohabiting couples as
a result of adoption. However, in particular in the case of joint adoption it would
be rather awkward to attribute parental responsibility to only one of the adop-
tive parents, while the other can only obtain it through registration in the
parental responsibility register (as is normally the case for cohabiting parents).
In the case of partner-adoption it might be more defensible not to attribute
parental responsibility to the adopting partner by operation of law, although it
might well be contrary to the adopter’s expectations.62
Just like a surrogate mother in a registered partnership, a surrogate mother who
is not in a formalised relationship may have her partner recognise the child if she
is unwilling to give the child to the commissioning parents.
5.3.4. INTERNAL COMPARISON
The status of the relationship of the surrogate mother in combination with the
status of the relationship of the commissioning parents determines in what way
(one of) the commissioning parents may acquire a legal relationship with the
child. It is not easier for married commissioning parents to acquire a legal
relationship with the child, on the contrary. From the internal comparison one
may conclude that an unmarried commissioning couple engaging an unmarried
surrogate mother has several options where the acquisition of full parental status
is concerned. They may adopt jointly but the commissioning father may also
recognise the child concerned with the surrogate mother’s consent, and thus
become the child’s legal father without adoption. This gives him rights with
regard to the child: he may, for instance, apply to the court to be attributed with
sole parental responsibility over the child (art. 1:253c DCC), unless there are
already two holders of parental responsibility. Once he has acquired sole paren-
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tal responsibility and the child has been living with him and the commissioning
mother for more than one year, the commissioning mother may acquire full
parental status through adoption and the attribution of parental responsibility.
However, it is as yet unclear whether IVF clinics are willing to provide gesta-
tional surrogacy services for unmarried couples.
Whatever route is taken, more than one separate court procedure is required:
one with regard to the termination of the surrogate mother’s (and her possible
partner’s) parental responsibility either through divestment or through the
transfer of sole parental responsibility to the commissioning father; and a second
procedure concerning the adoption of the child, either by both commissioning
parents jointly or by the commissioning mother alone. The outcome of all the
procedures described above is uncertain; moreover, these procedures are lengthy
and stressful for all the parties involved.
5.4. EXTERNAL COMPARISON
The most striking difference between Dutch and English law with regard to
gestational surrogacy, is the fact that under English law there is a specific court
order - the parental order of s. 30 HFEA 1990 - for the transfer of full parental
rights from the surrogate mother (and her partner) to the commissioning parents
provided that the latter are married and one of the commissioning couple is
genetically related to the child. Under Dutch law the transfer of full parental
status from the surrogate mother to the commissioning parents is not accommo-
dated in any way, regardless of whether one or both of the commissioning
parents are genetically related to the child. The options available to the commis-
sioning couple for acquiring full parental status over their child depend for a
large part on the status of the commissioning mother’s relationship. The fact that
the legal position of a commissioning father with regard to a child depends for
a large part on the question of whether or not he is married to the child’s
mother, in combination with the prohibition on the recognition of a child by a
man who is married to a woman other than the child’s mother, lead to the
strange conclusion that under Dutch law it is easier for an unmarried couple
engaging an unmarried surrogate mother to acquire a legal relationship with the
child than it is for a married couple.
Apart from the parental order there are similarities between the possibilities for
commissioning parents to acquire full parental status with regard to their child.
In both jurisdictions both or one of the commissioning parents have to adopt the
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child. If the commissioning father can register on the child’s birth certificate or
recognise the child, only the commissioning mother has to adopt. If registration
or recognition is not possible they will have to adopt jointly. The advantage of
registration/recognition lies in the fact that once the commissioning father is the
child’s legal father there is a legal relationship with the child. In England, the
legal status of the commissioning father is similar to that of the surrogate mother
after registration on the child’s birth certificate, since he also has parental
responsibility as of that moment. After registration or recognition the commis-
sioning father can apply for a residence order63 in England or sole parental
responsibility64 in The Netherlands in order to have the child live with him and
the commissioning mother, if the surrogate mother is unwilling to give up the
child.
Table 5.1: Genetic commissioning family
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1 The Honourable Justice Black in Re D (Contact and PR: Lesbian mothers and known father)
No. 2 [2006] EWHC 2 Fam, para. 65.
2 Useful introduction in CRETNEY (2003) p. 540-544; also DEECH (2000) p. 165-186.
3 TAKES (2006) p. 170-174 and FREEMAN (1996) p. 273-297.
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CHAPTER 6 
PARTIALLY GENETIC PRIMARY FAMILIES
6.1. INTRODUCTION
One of the things that struck me most forcefully in this case was how,
notwithstanding that they were all highly intelligent and self-possessed
individuals, biology had ambushed all of the adults in one way or another,
whether it be in the unexpected impact of the arrangements for D’s
conception or the unanticipated strength of emotions once D was born.1
There are a number of different kinds of primary partially genetic families, some
of which are more obvious than others. First of all, there is the distinction
between different-sex and same-sex primary partially genetic families. Further-
more, there is the distinction between families that come into being with the
help of donor sperm, donor eggs or partial surrogacy with the genetic material
of one of the parties.2 The involvement of a third procreational party poses a
number of socio-legal questions; such as: who are the child’s legal parents, does
a child have a right to be told that he or she was conceived with donor material
and does the third procreational party have any rights with regard to the child?
The question whether a child has a right to know how it was conceived, is in fact
a two-step question. It starts with the question whether a child has a right to be
told that his or her mother and/or father is not his or her genetic parent?3 And
once a child is aware that there is a genetic parent outside the family unit, does
it have the right to be told the identity of the person who supplied the genetic
material? The last question has been answered positively in both jurisdictions,
both of whom have recently introduced legislation that gives a donor conceived
person of 18 years or older the right to discover the identity of his or her sperm
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4 England: The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (Disclosure of Donor Informa-
tion) Regulations 2004, Statutory Instrument  2004 no. 1511; The Netherlands: Wet donor-
gegevens kunstmatige bevruchting of 25 April 2002 Staatsblad 2002 no. 240.
5 For more specific information for England see RICHARDS (2006) p. 59-63. and the Explanatory
Note attached to the Regulation itself; for The Netherlands see JANSSENS, SIMONS, VAN KOOIJ,
BLOKZIJL & DUNSELMAN (2006) p. 852-856.
6 See for instance the story about a 15-year old boy who did just this: BBC News 2 November
2005; article also available on the website of UK DonorLink http://www.ukdonorlink.org.uk/.
7 HFEA (2005A) p. 13 ‘In the context of donor conception, giving information about the
implications of treatment should be understood to include preparation for donor-conception
parenthood, including the importance of sharing information with the child about their donor
origins at an early stage.’ See also TAKES (2006) p. 151-174.
8 See for instance GOLOMBOK, MURRAY, JADVA, LYCETT MACCALLUM & RUST (2006) p. 1922
(Table III) and LYCETT, DANIELS, CURSON & GOLOMBOK (2005) in particular p. 813-814 and VAN
BERKEL, VAN DE VEEN, KIMMEL & TE VELDE (1999) p. 229. See also VAN DEN AKKER (2006) p. 91-
101.
9 ALMACK (2006) p. 1-22.
10 See HENDERSON (2006b) and JANSSENS, SIMONS, VAN KOOIJ, BLOKZIJL & DUNSELMAN (2006
p. 852.
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or egg donor.4 Before that age non-identifying information and medical informa-
tion may be made available.5 However, it turns out that it may even be difficult
for donors who donated before these laws came into force to have their anonym-
ity guaranteed. Children or adults who know they are donor conceived and have
some information about the place and date of birth of their donor may, with the
help of DNA databanks, trace their anonymous sperm donor.6
With respect to the first question there is more ambiguity. Both in The Nether-
lands and in England the state seeks to encourage parents to tell children the
truth about their genetic origins.7 However, research shows that a large number
of children born into different-sex relationships with donor gametes are never
told that their legal mother or father is not their biological parent.8 
The case for children of same-sex parents is obviously very different, as it will
be clear that a third party’s genetic material was necessary for the child to be
conceived. However, the fact that it is obvious that third party genetic material
was used, does not necessarily mean that a child will discover who his or her
genetic parent is. Lesbian couples will not necessarily use donor sperm from a
clinic to conceive a child, and may thus circumvent the recent legislation.9
Moreover, the end of donor anonymity has led to a substantial decrease in
available donor sperm in both England and The Netherlands.10 This development
may force couples to go abroad to acquire gametes or to order fresh sperm on the
internet.
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11 England: PATEL & JOHNSON (1998) pp 766-770 and SUMNER (2003) p. 112. The Netherlands:
EQUAL TREATMENT COMMISSION, 2000-4 p. 16.
12 S. 13(5) HFEA 1990: (5) A woman shall not be provided with treatment services unless account
has been taken of the welfare of any child who may be born as a result of the treatment
(including the need of that child for a father), and of any other child who may be affected by
the birth. In its response to the consultation of the DoH, the HFEA replied that the welfare of
the child is an important consideration when offering treatment, but that there was no
evidence that children face a risk of serious harm if they grow up in a non-traditional family
environment without a father (questions 13-17). The Health minister recently stated that the
section on the need for a father will be deleted, see HENDERSON (2006a).
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Neither of the two jurisdictions excludes unmarried different-sex couples or
female same-sex couples from fertility treatment. This, however, does not mean
that all clinics are willing to provide fertility treatment for these groups.11 In
particular where there are limited public funds available, it may be more difficult
for these groups to access treatment services. Both in England and The Nether-
lands treatment centres have to draw up their own protocols. In England,
however, in judging whether treatment for a couple or a single woman would
be in the best interest of the child to be conceived or the children already living
with the person(s) concerned, the child’s need to have a father has to be taken
into account.12
The structure of the chapter 
In this chapter the following issues will be discussed: gamete donation and legal
parenthood (section 6.2), gamete donation and parental responsibility (section
6.3) and partially genetic surrogacy (section 6.5). Section 6.4 concerns a compari-
son between some English and Dutch case law in order to take a closer look at
some of the differences between the two jurisdictions. 
In the section on legal parenthood a distinction will be made between the
situation where the birth mother’s partner is a man and where the birth
mother’s partner is a woman. The legal position of the male partner will be dis-
cussed with reference to the couple’s relationship status (section 6.2.2 to 6.2.4).
Depending on the relationship status of the birth mother and her male parent,
a number or all of the issues listed below will be discussed:
• establishment of paternity by operation of law
• voluntary establishment with maternal cooperation
• voluntary establishment without maternal cooperation
• Involuntary establishment 
• paternity and assisted conception
• denial/rebuttal of paternity 
• post-mortal procreation.
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13 Cl. 53 of the recently published Tissue Bill makes explicit that a woman is not to be treated as
a child’s parent simply because she has donated an egg. However, it may be that she is to be
regarded as the child’s mother because of cl. 48, 49 or 52 of the Tissue Bill or because she has
adopted the child.
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The discussion of the legal position of the birth mother’s female partner with
regard to legal parenthood is not discussed with reference to their relationship
status. The female partner may only acquire the status of legal parent through
adoption, for which the couple’s relationship status is hardly relevant.
The section on parental responsibility will also distinguish between the situation
where the birth mother’s partner is male (6.3.2) or female (section 6.3.3) on the
basis of the couples relationship status. In the section on partial genetic surro-
gacy the legal position of the surrogate parent(s) and the commissioning parents
will be discussed per jurisdiction (section 6.5.1. England and section 6.5.2 The
Netherlands) and will subsequently be compared (section 6.5.3). The chapter
will close with some concluding observations in section 6.6.
6.2. GAMETE DONATION AND LEGAL PARENTHOOD
Both English and Dutch law contain special regulations with regard to the rights
and duties of gamete donors concerning children conceived with their gametes.
In both jurisdictions egg donation has no consequences for the legal status of the
birth mother: the mater semper certa est rule that takes as its starting point that
the birth mother is the child’s legal mother is adhered to in both jurisdictions.13
In contrast, there are a number of differences between England and The Nether-
lands with regard to sperm donors and their legal status. Below follows a short
introduction on the status of sperm donors in both jurisdictions for a better
understanding of the subsequent sections.
Under English law one might say that there are two categories of sperm donors.
First of all, those donors who donate through a treatment centre and have
consented to their genetic material being used for third parties in accordance
with s. 28(6) HFEA 1990 and paragraph 5 of Schedule 3 of the HFEA 1990
(hereafter referred to as HFEA donors). Secondly, there are donors who do not
donate through a treatment centre (so-called do-it-yourself donors: DIY donors).
The first group of donors have no rights and duties with regard to the child: their
status is regulated by the HFEA 1990. The second group have the same rights
and duties with regard to the resulting child as any other man who begets a child
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14 This issue has been extensively discussed in Chapter 4 sections 4.3.2-4.3.4.
15 ‘The begetter of a child is the man who has caused the child to be conceived together with the
mother in a natural way. The term begetter is not equivalent to the term ‘biological father’.
A donor is not a begetter, but he is the biological father of the child. It is not possible to file a
request for the judicial establishment of paternity of a donor. [..] Nor is it possible to file a
request for a maintenance assessment against a donor.’ Dutch Second Chamber 1995-1996,
24 649, no. 3, p. 8.
16 This issue will be discussed in section 6.4.
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with a woman who is single or in a relationship with a third person. Their status
is regulated by common law, which means that the paternity of a DIY donor
may be established by a court at his own request or against his will. As a result
he may also be liable for child support. 
In The Netherlands the term sperm donor covers a wider spectrum and not only
includes men who donate their sperm for use by a third party. It also includes
men who ‘donate’ their sperm to their registered partner or life partner because
they have to resort to assisted conception with their own sperm to conceive a
child with the child’s mother.14 This anomaly is the result of a division of
biological fathers into ‘begetters’ who beget their child in a natural way (through
sexual intercourse) and ‘sperm donors’ as biological fathers of children who were
not conceived in a natural way.15 With regard to the legal consequences of
donating sperm the law makes no distinction between donors who donate
through a clinic (unknown donors), donors who donate without the intervention
of a clinic (known donors) and ‘donors’ who are in a relationship with the child’s
mother. In principle a donor has no rights and duties with regard to the child.
In the sections on gamete donation and legal parenthood the position of all three
parties concerned will be discussed: the legal position of the birth mother and
her partner (male or female) and the position of the sperm donor. The discussion
will start with the legal position of the birth mother in section 6.2.1 Subse-
quently, the position of the male partner of the birth mother will be discussed
in sections 6.2.2, 6.2.3 and 6.2.4 in the context of the legal status of his relation-
ship with the birth mother. In section 6.2.5 the legal position of the birth
mother’s female partner will be addressed. This part on gamete donation and
legal parenthood will conclude with an overall comparison in section 6.2.6. The
position of male same-sex couples will not be discussed in these sections, since
such a couple will always need to engage a surrogate mother to have a child.16
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17 England: s. 27 HFEA 1990 and The Netherlands: art. 1:198 DCC.
18 England: s. 28(2) HFEA 1990 and The Netherlands: arts 1:199(a) and 1:200(3) DCC.
19 S. 28(2) HFEA 1990. This provision was preceded in 1988 by s. 27 of the Family Law Reform
Act 1987 which provided that husband who consent to the artificial insemination of his wife
with donated sperm is the child’s legal father. S. 27 FLRA 1987 was repealed on 1 Augustus
1991 when ss 27 to 29 of the HFEA 1990 came into force (SI 1991/1400 s. 2(2)). For a case
dealing with the common law situation prior to the introduction of s. 27 FLRA 1987 see Re M
(Child Support Act: Parentage) [1997] 2 FLR 90. The children concerned where born in 1981
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6.2.1.  BIRTH MOTHER
Sperm donation: different-sex couple
c + b f b
Bio mother Non-bio father Child Bio father
Egg donation: different-sex couple
b + c f c
Bio father Gestational mother Child Genetic mother
In both jurisdictions the woman who gives birth to the child is his/her mother.17
It makes no difference whether the child was conceived with the use of a donor
egg or with the use of the woman’s own egg. In neither of the jurisdictions is it
possible for the child to deny the maternity of his or her biological mother who
is not his or her genetic mother.
6.2.2.  THE FATHER IS MARRIED TO THE BIRTH MOTHER
6.2.2.1.  Establishment of paternity
Sperm donation
In both jurisdictions a child born into a marriage is regarded as the legal child of
the mother’s husband.18 In principle this presumption is rebuttable if the man
concerned is not the child’s biological father. However, both jurisdictions, make
an exception to this rule in the case of fertility treatment with donated sperm.
There are basically two ways of donating sperm: through a clinic or sperm bank
(formal donation) or directly to a person or a couple looking for donor sperm,
without the intervention of a clinic or a sperm bank (informal donation). 
In English law the legal position of the husband of a married couple who make
use of fertility treatment with donor sperm is regulated by s. 28(2) HFEA 1990.19
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and 1986 respectively. The court decided that the man in question (who had been married to
the mother at the time of the conception and birth of the children) could not be regarded as
a parent of the children despite his consent to the treatment and was therefore not liable for
child maintenance under the Child Support Act 1991.
20 S.28(2) If –
(a) at the time of the placing in her of the embryo or the sperm and eggs or of her insemination
the woman was party to a marriage, and
(b) the creation of the embryo carried by her was not brought about with the sperm of the
other party to the marriage,
then, subject to subsection (5) below, the other party to the marriage shall be treated as the
father of the child unless it is shown that he did not consent to the placing in her of the
embryo or the sperm and eggs or to her insemination (as the case may be).
21 28(6) Where 
(a) the sperm of a man who had given such consent as is required by paragraph 5 of Schedule
3 of this Act was used for a purpose for which such consent was required, 
(b) […]
he is not, […], to be treated as the father of the child.
22 Treatment centres ‘should take all practicable steps to ascertain whether the husband consents
to the treatment ant to obtain a written record of the husband’s consent.’ HFEA CODE OF
PRACTICE (2007) s. G.6.9.3.
23 S. 28(2) and 28(5). See STEINER (2006) p. 4. and  LOWE (2007) p. 312.
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If the spouses make use of fertility treatment with sperm donated in accordance
with the provisions of the HFEA 1990, the husband will be treated as the child’s
legal father, unless it is shown that the husband did not consent to the treat-
ment.20 The sperm donor whose sperm was used in the treatment, will not be
regarded as the child’s father and has no possibility to acquire any of the rights
with regard to the resulting child that a biological father would normally have,
provided his sperm was used in accordance with his consent.21 The donor’s
consent needs to be given in accordance with s. 28(6) HFEA 1990 and paragraph
5 of Schedule 3 of the same Act. In contrast to the consent of the donor, which
must be provided in writing, the consent of the husband is presumed and need
not be formalised.22 However, if it is shown that the husband did not consent
and that he is not the child’s biological father, the husband’s status as the child’s
legal father may be challenged, for instance by the husband himself.23 Further-
more s. 28(4) provides that where a husband is to be treated as the child’s legal
father pursuant to s. 28(2), no other man will be treated as the child’s father. 
It is obvious that these provisions apply to all treatment where both the husband
and the donor have given their consent. As has already been mentioned, the
donor’s consent needs to be given in accordance with s. 28(6) HFEA 1990 and
paragraph 5 of Schedule 3 of the same Act. Questions with regard to the applica-
bility of the HFEA 1990 and therefore the legal parentage of the parties involved
may arise if a married couple enter into an informal arrangement with a third
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24 Most legal authors do not address this question specifically. Many describe who may be
regarded as a legal father and who may not be regarded as a legal father. S. 28(2) HFEA 1990
is described, but the question as to whether s. 28(2) HFEA 1990 applies to such informal
arrangement is rarely answered. This author presumes that most authors either presume that
the HFEA 1990 does or that the HFEA 1990 does not apply to third party sperm donated
outside the ambit of the Act without making this explicit. To the knowledge of this author, this
issue has not yet been raised in court proceedings.
25 S. 26 Family Law Reform Act 1969: ‘Any presumption of law as to the legitimacy of any person
may in any civil proceedings be rebutted by evidence which shows that it is more probable
than not that that person is illegitimate or legitimate, as the case may be, and it shall not be
necessary to prove that fact beyond reasonable doubt in order to rebut the presumption.’
26 See for instance Re H (Paternity: Blood tests) [1996] 2 FLR 65;  Re T (Paternity: Ordering
Blood Tests) [2001] 2 FLR 1190 and Re H and A (Paternity : Blood Tests) [2002] 1 FLR 1145.
27 The HFEA 1990 was amended with effect from 5th July 2007 to bring UK law in line with the
EU Tissues and Cells Directive (EUTCD). As a result, the provision of donor sperm via the
internet falls under the HFEA 1990. Providers of such sperm must have a licence or a third
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party sperm donor. This third party donor may be a family member, a friend or
a person previously unknown to the married couple. The consequences of such
an informal arrangement for the legal position of the parties involved, is not
crystal clear.24 There are at least three possible approaches. It is important to
note that in all these approaches the husband of the birth mother is presumed
to be the child’s legal father by virtue of his marriage. However, the basis of his
legal parentage differs and therefore the basis on which it can be challenged also
varies. 
Approach 1: HFEA 1990 does not apply 
If a married couple use third party sperm donated outside the ambit of the HFEA
1990, s. 28(2) HFEA 1990 does not apply to the husband. This means that the
husband is not to be treated as the legal father on the basis of the status provi-
sions in the HFEA 1990, but will be regarded as the child’s legal father under
rules of common law. As the birth mother’s husband, he is presumed to be the
child’s biological father.25 This is a rebuttable presumption. If the donor decides
to challenge the husband’s paternity, he may very well succeed, given the
tendency in England to consider the establishment of the truth with regard to
a child’s biological paternity in the best interests of the child.26 Moreover, any
party, in particular the child, can apply to the court for a declaration that the
sperm donor is the child’s biological father. This means that no meaning would
be attached to the husband’s consent. The husband would at any time be able to
challenge his legal status as the child’s father, as would the child, the mother and
any other interested party. This may in particular be problematic if the couple
made use of a donor whose identity is not known (for instance through the
internet).27 However, if the child has lived with the husband as a ‘child of the
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party agreement with a licensed centre. As of this date clinics providing artificial insemination
services also need a licence.  
28 LAW COMMISSION REPORT NO. 118 (1982) p. 171 and Re CH (Contact: Parentage) [1996] 1 FLR
569.
29 See section 6.1.
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family’, the husband will, even where he succeeds, be liable to pay child mainte-
nance.28 The position of the child is less clear. Where the husband is to be
treated as the child’s legal father pursuant to s. 28(2) HFEA 1990, the child
cannot challenge the legal parenthood of the husband. However, where the
donor is known to the child and is not protected by s. 28(6) HFEA 1990, does the
child have the possibility to apply for a declaration of parentage that the donor
is his or her father?
Approach 2: HFEA 1990 does apply 
If a married couple use third party sperm donated outside the ambit of the HFEA
1990, s. 28(2) HFEA 1990 does, nevertheless, apply to the husband of the birth-
mother. This means that in all cases of insemination for the benefit of a married
couple carried out with donor sperm, regardless whether this is done in a
treatment centre, the husband of the mother is regarded as the legal father. This
legal fatherhood may only be challenged if it is shown that the husband did not
consent to the treatment. The lack of consent by the sperm donor in terms of s.
28(6) and Schedule 3 paragraph 5 HFEA 1990 is irrelevant in this approach.
Moreover, in contrast to the child conceived with sperm from an HFEA donor,
a child conceived in such an informal arrangement does not have the guarantee
that he or she may obtain information about the donor.29 
Approach 3: HFEA 1990 only applies to the husband and not to the donor 
In this approach, where a married couple make use of third party sperm donated
outside the ambit of the HFEA 1990, the husband will be treated as the child’s
legal father pursuant to s. 28(2) HFEA 1990, in the sense that he cannot rebut his
legal parenthood because he consented to the insemination with donor sperm.
The legal position of the sperm donor in this approach is not covered by s. 28(6)
HFEA 1990. This means that the donor who donated outside the ambit of the
HFEA 1990 will in effect be able to rebut the legal parenthood of the husband.
However, this approach causes conflict within s. 28 HFEA 1990 because s. 28(4)
HFEA 1990 provides that if a man is regarded as the child’s father pursuant to
s. 28(2) or (3) no other man will be regarded as the child’s father.
All the above approaches have problematic aspects. Although large-scale practi-
cal problems appear not to be present, given the lack of case law on this point,
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30 See, for instance, Re CH (Contact:Parentage) [1996] 1 FLR 569. This case concerned a couple
who had received fertility treatment with donated sperm within the meaning of the HFEA
1990. After separation, the mother sought to stop contact between the father and the child on
the ground that he was not the child’s biological father. The mother’s application failed,
because the former husband was to be treated as a legal father pursuant to s. 28(2) HFEA 1990.
Although Re CH (Contact:Parentage) did not deal with the situation sketched above, it is
indicative of some of the complex issues that arise in this field.
31 The position of unmarried non-biological fathers will be discussed in section 6.2.4.
32 When the case of a married couple and the third party sperm donor who falls outside the ambit
of the HFEA 1990 was submitted to the HFE Authority, the Authority replied that ‘if a married
couple used fresh sperm from a family friend outside of a licensed treatment centre, then this
would fall outside the remit of the HFEA 1990.’ This view has been confirmed by a number
of legal scholars in the UK. However, there are also legal scholars who consider Approach 2
to be the most likely approach. See, for instance, HERRING (2004) p. 293.
33 This section has benefited from email correspondence with a number of English legal scholars:
Rebecca Probert, Leanne Smith, Ian Curry-Sumner, Professor Andrew Bainham and Professor
Jonathan Herring.
34 Arts 1:199(a) and 1:200(3) DCC.
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it is, nonetheless, important that this issue be addressed.30 How this issue is to be
addressed depends in part on whether all the conditions for the attribution of
legal parenthood need to be satisfied (Approach 1) or whether only some of
these elements need to be present (Approaches 2 and 3). In general English law
tends only to assign and/or uphold the status of legal parenthood in cases where
all the conditions have been met. This view is supported by the importance
attached to the establishment of biological reality and the care taken in assigning
legal parenthood to unmarried non-biological fathers pursuant to s. 28(3) HFEA
1990.31 However, in the end it will be for the courts to decide whether s. 28(2)
HFEA 1990 is applicable to informal arrangements made by married couples.
The answer to this question may ultimately depend on who raises the issue, i.e.
the husband, the donor or the child.
In this book a choice has been made, among others based on information sup-
plied by the HFE Authority,32 to apply Approach 1. According to Approach 1
both the consent of the husband and the consent of the sperm donor are re-
quired in order to be able to attribute legal paternity to the husband of the birth
mother. Only if this approach is adopted, the HFEA 1990 can be explained
consistently.33 
If married parents in The Netherlands make use of donor sperm, the birth
mother’s husband will be the child’s legal father by operation of law.34 The
husband’s paternity cannot be denied by the mother or the father; however, if
he can prove that he did not consent to an act that may have resulted in the
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35 Art. 1:200 (6) DCC.
36 England under rules of the common law (see section 3.2.1); The Netherlands art. 1:199a (see
section 3.3.1).
37 England: s. 28(5A) and s. 28(5C) HFEA 1990 (see section 3.2.1); The Netherlands: art 1:207
DCC (see section 3.3.1).
38 S. 28(5A)(e) and  s. (5C)(e) HFEA 1990.
39 For more information on the legal consequences of establishment of paternity in the case of
post-mortal procreation see sections 3.2.1, 3.2.2 and 3.2.3. 
40 Since the registration only has symbolic meaning, this does not deprive the child of any
substantial legal rights. 
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birth of the child (and he is not the child’s genetic father), he may deny his
paternity. The child, however, can deny the husband’s paternity within a certain
time frame: three years after he or she has become familiar with the fact that the
man is not his or her biological father or, if he or she has at that time not yet
reached majority, three years after he or she has reached majority.35 It makes no
difference whether the sperm donor is a family friend or an unknown donor
from a clinic.
Egg donation
The use of a donated egg to conceive a child has no consequences for the pater-
nity of the married biological father. The standard rule applies in both jurisdic-
tions that a child born into a marriage is the legal child of the birth mother’s
husband. Since the father is also the biological father his paternity cannot be de-
nied/rebutted under English and Dutch law. 36
6.2.2.2.  Post-mortal procreation
Both jurisdictions allow for the registration/establishment of a deceased hus-
band’s legal parenthood where his own sperm or donor sperm was used by his
female spouse to conceive a child after his death. The husband must have
consented before his death to the use of his sperm or donor sperm in this manner
after his death.37 Moreover, in England the husband’s consent is also required
with regard to his registration on the child’s birth certificate.38 As has been
explained in Chapter 3, the consequences of registration/establishment of the
deceased husband’s paternity differ considerably.39 It is worth mentioning that
under English law, if the mother does not register her deceased husband as the
child’s father on the birth certificate, the child cannot of his or her own volition
later establish the paternity of the mother’s deceased husband (whether or not
he was the child’s biological father).40
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41 BOELE-WOELKI et al. (2007a) p. 271.
42 Art. 1:207(1) DCC.
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6.2.3.  THE FATHER IS IN A REGISTERED PARTNERSHIP WITH
THE BIRTH MOTHER
Since different-sex couples are not eligible to enter into a civil partnership in
England, this section will only discuss the legal position of different-sex couples
who have entered into a non-marital registered relationship under Dutch law.
6.2.3.1.  Voluntary establishment of paternity with(out) maternal consent
If the partners are in a non-marital registered relationship, the male registered
partner will not be the child’s legal father by operation of law. The legal position
of a biological father (egg donation) is similar to that of a non-biological father
(sperm donation) who has made use of assisted conception services in the sense
that both may become the child’s legal parent by recognition with the mother’s
consent (for recognition with the mother’s consent the man need not be the
child’s biological father). Recent research has shown that not all registered
partners are aware of the fact that paternity is not established by operation of
law in a registered partnership. The consequence of this is that a number of
children do not acquire two legal parents as a result of a misapprehension on the
part of the parents.41
Furthermore, neither the non-biological father nor the biological father who did
not beget his child in a natural way, has the right under Dutch law to ask the
court to replace the mother’s consent to recognition. However, where the
biological father might have recourse to art. 8 ECHR to establish his paternity,
the non-biological father will not. The consequence of this is that the mother
– who is not the child’s genetic parent – has a legal relationship with the child
by operation of law, whereas the biological father who has a genetic link with
the child does not.
6.2.3.2.  Involuntary establishment of paternity
If the father is unwilling to establish his legal parenthood the mother and the
child may have his legal fatherhood established by a court if he can be regarded
as the mother’s consenting life companion.42 It makes no difference whether the
man consented to the use of donor sperm or whether he consented to the use of
his own sperm. The relevant issue is that he consented to an act that may have
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resulted in the conception of the child and that he may be regarded as the
mother’s life partner.43
6.2.3.3.  Paternity and post-mortal procreation
Under Dutch law the paternity of a deceased registered partner may be estab-
lished after his death where his sperm or donor sperm was used to enable his
female registered partner to conceive a child (with her own genetic material or
with the help of a donor egg) provided that he consented to the act that resulted
in the conception of the child and can be qualified as having been the mother’s
life partner.44
6.2.4.  THE FATHER IS NOT IN A FORMALISED RELATIONSHIP
WITH THE BIRTH MOTHER
6.2.4.1.  Establishment of paternity
Sperm donation
In England an unmarried, non-biological father will be a child’s legal parent by
operation of law if he and the child’s mother received fertility treatment to-
gether with donor sperm in a licensed clinic.45 Since the terminology used in the
legislation on this issue is rather vague, there is important case law on the
explanation of the terms ‘licensed clinic’ and receiving treatment ‘together.’46 In
this section attention will only be paid to the concept of receiving treatment
‘together’. 
In U v W (Attorney-General Intervening)47 an unmarried couple had received
fertility treatment abroad. Despite the fact that the court concluded that the
HFEA 1990 was not applicable, as the treatment had not taken place in a li-
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censed clinic, it contained a useful definition of ‘treatment together’ in the obiter
dictum.48 Treatment together did not require any active physical involvement
of the man in question. If a doctor had been ‘responding to a request for that
form of treatment [IVF with donor sperm] by the woman and the man as a
couple, notwithstanding the absence in the man of any physical role in such
treatment,’ the couple must be considered to have received treatment together.
In later case law this was confirmed49 and expanded. 
There has also been discussion whether there has to be treatment together at a
certain point in time or whether this ‘treatment together’ has to exist from
beginning to end. As fertility treatment is often a long and distressing process,
partners may reconsider their commitment to this joint enterprise or their
relationship may end during the course of the treatment. In Re D (a child
appearing by her guarding ad litem)50 an unmarried couple had been receiving
fertility treatment with donor sperm. The couple’s relationship broke down after
the first IVF-cycle was unsuccessful. The woman underwent a second implanta-
tion of embryos with donor sperm, without notifying the clinic of the fact that
she no longer had a relationship with her ex-partner. Her new partner accompa-
nied her to the implantation of the embryos. Her former partner applied for
parental responsibility, since he considered himself to be the child’s father
pursuant to s. 28(3) HFEA 1990. At first instance the court held in his favour, but
on appeal by the birth mother the former partner’s application was denied. The
court considered that: 
‘There must be a point in time when the question has to be judged. The
simple answer is that the embryo must be placed in the mother at a time
when treatment services are being provided for the man and the woman.’
This means that s. 28(3) HFEA 1990 will only be triggered if the woman and her
unmarried partner are receiving treatment together at the time of the implanta-
tion of the embryos in the woman. Furthermore, the court considered that: 
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‘s. 28(3) is an unusual provision, conferring the relationship of parent and
child on people who are related neither by blood nor by marriage. Con-
ferring such relationships is a serious matter, involving as it does not only
the relationship between father and child but also between the whole of
the father’s family and the child. The rule should only apply to those
cases which clearly fall within the footprint of the statutory language.’
In short, there has to be treatment together in the sense that there is a joint
request/enterprise, and this joint enterprise has to continue to exist until the
moment the sperm, or the sperm and eggs, or the embryo are placed in the
woman. If these and the other requirements are met, the unmarried father will
be the child’s legal parent by operation of law.
However, if the couple use a DIY donor the situation is different; the rules of
common law and not the provisions of the HFEA 1990 are applicable. This
means that, since the male partner is not the child’s biological father, he can
only become a legal parent by registration on the child’s birth certificate with
maternal consent. Such (false) registration makes the non-biological father liable
to prosecution. However, if the registration remains unchallenged, the non-
biological father will be regarded as the child’s legal father.51 The non-biological
father cannot establish his legal parenthood without maternal cooperation,
whatever his and her intentions were, nor can his legal parenthood be estab-
lished against his will. In contrast, the paternity of the DIY donor may be
established by means of a declaration of paternity, voluntarily or against his will.
The Tissue Bill clarifies the position of unmarried couples who make use of
assisted conception services by introducing so-called ‘agreed fatherhood condi-
tions’. These conditions require both the man and woman to have notified the
‘person responsible’52 in writing of their consent to the male partner being
treated as the child’s legal father. Furthermore the conditions require that
neither party has withdrawn consent at the time the embryo, the sperm and
eggs, or sperm are placed in the woman, nor has the woman indicated that she
wishes another person (male or female) to be regarded as the child’s legal
Machteld Vonk, 'Children and their parents'
Chapter 6
53 Cl. 43 Tissue Bill.
54 Cl. 64(2) defines the meaning of ‘prohibited degrees of relationship’ for the part of the Tissue
Bill relating to the status provisions. 
55 Explanatory notes to cl. 42-43 of the Tissue Bill. 
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parent.53 The man and woman may not be within the prohibited degrees of
relationship in relation to each other.54 Instead of having to rely on factual
information based on the notion of ‘receiving treatment together’ the consent of
the parties involved becomes the pivotal factor. If either of the parties withdraws
consent, the other party must be informed. Withdrawal of consent, either by the
woman or the man, may not prevent the woman from continuing the
treatment.55
In The Netherlands an unmarried non-biological father will not under any
circumstances become the child’s father by operation of law. He may become the
child’s legal parent by recognition with the mother’s consent. Should she refuse
consent, he cannot ask the court to replace the mother’s consent since he is not
the child’s begetter. In contrast, if the man is unwilling to establish his legal
parenthood the mother and the child may have his legal fatherhood established
by a court if he can be regarded as the mother’s consenting life companion
pursuant to art. 1:207(1) DCC. 
Egg donation 
Since the HFEA 1990 does not cover the legal position of the living biological
father who made use of assisted conception techniques with his own sperm, his
legal position is determined in accordance with the rules of common law in
England. Contrary to the birth mother who, by dint of giving birth, acquires the
status of legal parent by operation of law over her non-genetic child, the biologi-
cal father is not a legal parent by operation of law. However, he may become a
legal parent with or without maternal cooperation and even against his will.
In The Netherlands the biological father in a non-formalised relationship does
not acquire the status of legal parent by operation of law. He may, however,
acquire it with the cooperation of the birth mother. If she does not cooperate,
matters may be complicated by the fact that the couple made use of assisted
conception techniques. The biological father who did not conceive his child in
a natural way has a status akin to that of a donor and can only acquire the status
of a legal parent with maternal cooperation. If the mother does not consent, it
is uncertain whether he even has standing to apply to the court for the mother’s
consent to be replaced. This means that the child’s birth mother, who has no
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genetic link with the child, can prevent the biological father, who has a genetic
link with the child, from establishing a legal relationship with the child.
6.2.4.2.  Post-mortal procreation
Both jurisdictions allow for the registration/establishment of the paternity of the
mother’s deceased male partner where his own sperm or donor sperm was used
to conceive a child after his death. The male partner must have consented before
his death to the use of his sperm or donor sperm in this manner after his death.56
In England the male partner’s consent is also required with regard to his registra-
tion on the child’s birth certificate.57 Furthermore, the mother and her male
partner must have been receiving treatment services together before his death
either by a person to whom a licence applies or outside the United Kingdom.58
In The Netherlands the deceased father’s consent to the act that led to the
conception of the child is required to establish his paternity. Moreover, the court
needs to establish that the deceased male partner was the mother’s life compan-
ion.59 
As explained in Chapter 4 the consequences of the establishment/registration of
the deceased husband’s paternity differ considerably.60 Note that under English
law, if the mother does not register her deceased husband as the child’s father
in the birth register, the child cannot of his or her own volition later establish
the paternity of this man (whether or not he was the child’s biological father).61
6.2.5.  CO-MOTHER IN A FEMALE SAME-SEX RELATIONSHIP
Sperm donation 
c  + c f b
Bio mother Non-bio mother Child Bio father
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Egg and sperm donation
c + c f b
Gestational mother  Genetic mother Child Bio father
This section is concerned with the possibilities for the female partner of the birth
mother to acquire the status of a legal parent with regard to a child born during
their relationship. Since a female same-sex couple will always need a sperm
donor to conceive a child, there is always a third person outside their relation-
ship who has a genetic link with their child. The spectrum of sperm donors and
their intentions is very wide, with at one end the donor who wants substantial
involvement in the child’s life and at the other end the completely anonymous
donor from a sperm bank. Therefore, when discussing the legal position of
female same-sex couples with regard to their children there are at least three
issues that need to be discussed. 
First of all, the possibilities for the co-mother to acquire some form of legal
recognition of her parenting relationship with the child need to be explored. The
acquisition of some form of parental status by the co-mother may have effect
during her relationship with the mother, but may also have effect in case the
mother and the co-mother separate. Secondly, the position of the biological
father/sperm donor needs to be considered. Does he have any legal rights and
duties with regard to his biological child, and if so, under what circumstances?
The third issue that deserves attention is the legal position of the child. Does the
child have any rights with regard to the co-mother or the sperm donor? Is there
a genuine possibility that the child will have only one parent if both the co-
mother and the donor are unwilling to take the place of the child’s second legal
parent?
Recent case law on the first two of these issues in both jurisdictions will be
discussed and compared to see if and why the solutions chosen to these problems
are similar or different. Furthermore, attention will be paid to the question
whether the rights and duties of the co-mother and the sperm donor are comple-
mentary or whether the acquisition of rights and duties by one of them with
regard to the child prevents the other from acquiring the same or complemen-
tary rights and duties. 
The legal status of the birth mother has been discussed earlier in this chapter.
Like in a different-sex relationship the birth mother need not be the child’s
genetic mother. In a partially genetic primary female same-sex family it is
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possible that one of the women donates an egg to the other woman to conceive
and give birth to the child with the help of donor sperm. This means that both
women have a relationship with the child, either genetic or biological. However,
since the birth mother is the child’s legal mother, the genetic link has no conse-
quences.
In both jurisdictions the only way in which a co-mother can acquire the status
of a legal parent is by means of adoption. Neither of the jurisdictions has intro-
duced regulations for the parental status of the co-mother akin to that of the
non-biological father. In The Netherlands the marital presumption of paternity
has not been extended to female same-sex marriages, nor has the possibility to
recognise her partner’s child been extended to a woman.62 During the parliamen-
tary debates on the Adoption by Same-Sex Couples Bill, there was discussion as
to whether lesbian co-mothers should acquire legal parenthood by operation of
law. However, the legislature decided not to introduce a law to that effect,
because that would mean relinquishing the central principle of Dutch affiliation
law, namely that a child always has a mother and may have a father.63 Therefore,
a child born into a female same-sex marriage only has one legal parent by
operation of law, namely the woman who gives birth to him or her. The
mother’s female partner will not acquire the status of a legal parent by operation
of law. Recently, the government has established a commission which is to
investigate the possibilities for introducing legal parenthood for the co-mother
by operation of law.64
In England, the HFEA 1990 has not yet been amended in such a way that the
female partner of a mother will acquire the status of legal parent by virtue of
receiving treatment together as the mother’s male partner may. However, both
in England and The Netherlands these issues are at present subject to legislative
activities.65 In England these legislative activities are in a very advanced state.
The Tissue Bill published mentioned earlier contains provision that would grant
the mother’s female partner the status of legal parent by operation of law given
that a number of requirements be met. If the female couple has entered into a
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civil partnership, the female partner will be attributed with the status of legal
parent by operation of law if use has been made of assisted conception services.66
Civil partners will have the same legal position with regard to their donor
conceived children as married couples, with the exception that there is no
common law presumption as to the legitimacy of children born into a civil
partnership.
Before discussing the position of female couples who have not formalised their
relationship, it is relevant to return to the discussion on the applicability of the
HFEA 1990 to a married different-sex couple that make use of third party sperm
donated outside the ambit of the HFEA 1990.67 Given the fact that in the clause
relating to civil partners more or less the same terminology is used, the question
is also relevant in this context and the answer may have serious consequences.
If the status provisions in the HFEA 1990 concerning married couples (s.28(2))
and the provisions concerning civil partners in the Tissue Bill also apply to
informal sperm donor arrangements, this means that third parties who donate
in outside the ambit of the HFEA 1990 to female couples who have entered into
a civil partnership, lose the possibility to acquire the status of legal parent,
without consenting to this in the manner as required by the HFEA 1990. This
would be a radical change in the legal position of informal donors, who at
present may acquire the status of legal father with regard to a child conceived
with their sperm. However, if the status provisions do not apply, only female
couples who make use of an HFEA donor (which can be a friend or family
member who has registered with a treatment centre as a donor for the specific
purpose of supplying sperm to this particular female couple) are covered by c. 48
of the Tissue Bill. 
Furthermore, the Tissue Bill proposes to grant female partners who have not
entered into a civil partnership the same position as different-sex partners in a
non-formalised relationship who make use of assisted conception services, by
introducing so-called ‘agreed female parenthood conditions’. These conditions
require both the prospective mother and her female partner to notify the ‘person
responsible’68 in writing of their consent to the female partner being treated as
the child’s legal parent. Furthermore the conditions require that neither party
has withdrawn consent at the time the embryo, the sperm and eggs, or sperm are
placed in the woman, nor has the woman indicated that she wishes another
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person (male or female) to be regarded as the child’s legal parent.69 The woman
and the female partner may not be within the prohibited degrees of relationship
in relation to each other. If either of the parties withdraws consent, the other
party must be informed. Withdrawal of consent, either by the woman or the
female partner, will not prevent the woman from continuing the treatment.
6.2.5.1.  Adoption by the co-mother 
In both England and The Netherlands the adoption of a child by his or her
parent’s partner (whether different-sex or same-sex) has become possible in the
last decade. The legal status of the relationship between the parent and the
partner is not relevant in either jurisdiction. Therefore, in the discussion of
adoption by the co-mother, no distinction is made on the basis of the legal status
of their relationship. A number of requirements which are important with
respect to partner adoption will be discussed below, such as the stability of the
relationship of the partner, whether the child needs to have lived with the
partner for a certain period of time, and whether parental consent to the adop-
tion is required. 
Stability in the relationship 
Where step-parent adoption was formerly reserved for married couples only, in
recent years the status of the relationship of the partners is no longer an impedi-
ment to adoption. However, in the interest of the child, both jurisdictions have
set standards to test the stability of the relationship between the parent and the
parent’s new partner. In England, this requirement is formulated in the follow-
ing terms: a person is a partner of a child’s parent if the person and the parent
are a couple but the person is not the child’s parent. A couple is defined in s.
144(4) ACA 2002 as ‘(a) a married couple; (aa) two people who are civil partners
of each other; or (b) two people (whether of different sexes or the same sex)
living as partners in an enduring family relationship.’ In short, where a couple
are married or have entered into a civil partnership, the stability of their rela-
tionship is assumed. In the case of a couple in a non-formalised relationship, it
has to be established that they are living as partners in an enduring family
relationship. 
In The Netherlands the stability requirement with regard to the relationship
between the parent and the partner is formulated in s. 227(2) DCC which states
that prior to filing the adoption request the spouse, registered partner or other
life companion of the parent needs to have cohabited with the parent for three
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consecutive years immediately prior to the filing of the request.70 There has been
discussion on this state of affairs for some time. At present there is a proposal
before the Dutch Second Chamber to facilitate adoption for the mother’s female
partner if the child is born into their relationship.71 If this proposal becomes law,
the female couple no longer need to have cohabited for three years preceding the
application to adopt; moreover, the adoption order, if an application was filed
within six months of the child’s birth, will be deemed to have effect as of the
moment of the child’s birth.72 In both jurisdictions there is case law with regard
to the joint adoption of a child from abroad, that were the couple separates at
some point during the process, this need not necessarily mean that the couple
can no longer jointly adopt.73 If joint adoption is in the child’s best interest, an
order may nevertheless be made. 
Living with the child
Both jurisdictions also have requirements with regard to the time the child must
have lived with the partner and the parent before an adoption request may be
filed. In England the child must have had his or her home with the partner and
the parent at all times for the period of six months preceding the filing of the
adoption application (s. 42(3) ACA 2002). The co-mother must be domiciled and
habitually resident in a part of the British Isles (s. 49 (2) and (3) ACA 2002).74 If
the co-mother is habitually resident but not domiciled in a part of the British
Isles the co-mother and the mother may apply to adopt the child as a couple
pursuant to s. 50(2) and s. 49(2) and (3) ACA 2002 which requires only one of
the partners to be domiciled in a part of the British Isles. 75
In The Netherlands there are provisions that require that a child has had his or
her home with the partner and the parent for a year in cases of partner adoption;
however, an exception is made where the child is born into a relationship
between the mother and a person of the same-sex. In that case the co-mother
may file an adoption application immediately after the child’s birth (art.
1:228(1)(f) DCC). A recent Bill has been proposed to allow the co-mother to start
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adoption proceedings before the child is born, so that he or she will have two
legal parents as of the moment of his or her birth. If the adoption order is made
within six months of the child’s birth, the child will be regarded as the couple’s
child as of the moment of his or her birth. The Council of State has criticised the
Bill, arguing that adoption is not the appropriate instrument to regulate the legal
parenthood of a co-mother.
‘If recognition by the mother’s female partner is not considered as an
option, but a regulation akin to recognition is deemed to be desirable, the
Council advises not to amend the adoption provisions any further, but to
formulate a regulation equal to recognition, taking into account the
position of the biological parent, if he is known, and the limited recogni-
tion such legal familial ties will receive abroad.’76
At present, it probably depends on the report of the commission’s report
whether the legislature will consider a regulation equal to recognition.77 In the
Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the Bill on adoption, three reasons
were given for not extending the option of recognition to the birth mother’s
same-sex partner: the recognising party is presumed to be the child’s biological
parent; recognition by a female party may not be recognised in other countries;
the interests of the third party need to be safeguarded.78 
Parental consent and the position of the biological father
In both jurisdictions partner adoption does not affect the parental responsibility
of the parent whose partner adopts the child.79 Partner adoption does, however,
require the consent of the parent whose parental rights and duties with regard
to the child will be terminated.80 This may not appear particularly relevant in
primary lesbian families since it is very unlikely that there is a person outside the
relationship who qualifies as a ‘parent’. However, both in England and The
Netherlands the child’s biological father may come to play a part in the adoption
proceedings of the child by the co-mother. 
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In England a parent within the meaning of s. 52 ACA 2002, which concerns
parental consent to adoption, is a parent with parental responsibility.81 It does
not seem likely that a biological father will have parental responsibility over a
child born into a female same-sex relationship, and this may even become more
unlikely now that adoption by the co-mother has become possible; nevertheless,
these situations do exist. For instance, in Re D (lesbian mothers and known
father)82 where two women raised a child conceived with the sperm of a known
biological father. The biological father was involved in the child’s life and
applied for parental responsibility. The Judge considered obiter: 
‘Perhaps most important of all, I am considerably influenced by the
reality that Mr B is D’s father. Whatever new designs human beings have
for the structure of their families, that aspect of nature cannot be over-
come. It is to be hoped that as society accepts alternative arrangements
more readily, as it seems likely will happen over the next few years, the
impulse to hide or to marginalise a child’s father so as not to call attention
to an anomalous family will decline, although accommodating the emo-
tional consequences of untraditional fatherhood and motherhood and of
the sort of de facto, non-biological parenthood that is experienced by a
step-parent or same-sex partner will inevitably remain discomfiting.’
The consequence of this decision is that the father’s consent would be required
for the adoption of the child by the co-mother.
However, not only the father with parental responsibility needs to be involved
in the adoption procedure, case law also shows that the biological father without
parental responsibility may play a part in the adoption proceedings relating to
his biological child.83 He may not veto the adoption, but he needs to be notified
of the proceedings. Furthermore, during the adoption proceedings the court is,
as of recently, obliged to apply the welfare check list embodied in s.1 of the ACA
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2002. In particular s. 1 under (4)(f) of the ACA 2002 requires the court to take
into account: ‘the relationship which the child has with relatives, and with any
other person in relation to whom the court or agency considers the relationship
to be relevant including – (i) the likelihood of any such relationship continuing
and the value to the child of its doing so, (ii) the ability and willingness of any
of the child’s relatives, or of any such persons, to provide the child with a secure
environment in which the child can develop, or otherwise meet the child’s
needs, (iii) the wishes and feelings of any of the child’s relatives, or of any such
persons regarding the child.’ Furthermore s. 1(8) provides that ‘references to a
relative, in relation to a child, include the child’s mother and father.’ These
provisions may be relevant when the female couple have made use of a DIY
donor whose paternity is not regulated by the HFEA 1990 but by the rules of
common law under which he is to be regarded as the child’s natural father.
Furthermore, the ACA 2002 states that ‘the paramount consideration of the
court or adoption agency must be the child’s welfare, throughout his life.’84 
The child’s welfare may be a reason to dispense with parental consent to adop-
tion,85 the question is whether it may also be used to protect the relationship
between the child and his or her (DIY donor) biological father. A court may also
make a less far-reaching order where an adoption order is sought. It may, for
instance, make a residence order in favour of the co-mother where an adoption
order was sought, if this is in the best interest of the child.86 
In The Netherlands there are two articles with regard to parental consent and
the position of the biological father that are of importance. First of all, art.
1:228(1)(d) DCC provides that an adoption order cannot be made if one of the
parents object to the order being made. It is important to note that parents in
this article are legal parents with or without parental responsibility. The same
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article contains a list with a limited number of circumstances under which a
court may disregard parental opposition:87
• if the child and his or her parent did not or hardly ever lived together as a
family; or
• if the parent has abused his parental authority over the child or has grossly
neglected the care and upbringing of the child; or
• if the parent has been irrevocably convicted of any of the criminal offences
against the minor described in Titles XIII to XV, inclusive, of Book 2 of the
Dutch Penal Code. Such offences include sexual assault, rape, abandoning a
child under 7 and other serious offences against the child or his or her per-
sonal status.
In particular the first exception may give the court some discretion. Apart from
these exceptions the court may also disregard parental opposition if it finds that
a parent is misusing his right to veto the adoption either because he only uses
this right to damage the other parent, or because the opposing parent has no
interest which deserves any respect or if, considering the discrepancy between
his interests and the child’s interest in being adopted, he could not reasonably
oppose the adoption. The court has established that in using the right to veto an
adoption the parent should permit the child’s interest in being adopted to play
a very important role.88 
The second article that is of importance is art. 1:227(3) DCC which provides that
an adoption order may only be granted if it is established [by the court] that the
child has nothing further to expect from his parent in his capacity as a parent.
In the DCC the term parent is reserved for persons who are legal parents pursu-
ant to arts 1:198 and 1:199 DCC. It does not cover biological parents who have
not become legal parents. However, since the introduction of the Adoption by
Same-Sex Couples Act the term parent in this specific article also covers the
biological father/donor with ‘family life’. The court may summon the known
donor to be heard in the adoption proceedings. ‘On the basis of his statement and
other circumstances of the case, it will have to be ascertained whether the child
really has nothing more to expect from this donor as a parent.’89
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Despite the fact that a sperm donor with family life can prevent an adoption
order from being made, he has as yet no right to have his paternity established,
nor does the child have the right to have such a donor’s paternity established.90
The Dutch Supreme Court ruled in a recent case that the donor with family life
is an interested party in the adoption proceedings of his biological child and may
prevent the adoption from taking place if the child has something to expect from
him in his capacity as a parent.91 Such cases will no doubt reach the courts in the
near future. 
The donor in this case claimed that the birth mother agreed before the concep-
tion of the child that she would consent to his recognition of the child after
birth. However, when that time came, she refused to give her consent. The
donor applied to the court to replace the mother’s consent. In first instance his
request was granted,92 but on appeal this decision was reversed by the Appeal
Court93 and the Dutch Supreme Court94 because the donor did not have family
life with the child. Subsequently, the birth mother’s female partner applied to
adopt her partner’s child. This request was granted in first instance,95 but later
reversed by the Appeal Court96 and the Dutch Supreme Court, because the donor
had established family life with his biological child. Whether this last decision
will make it possible for the biological father to establish his paternity because
he has family life with the child, remains to be seen. 
The Bill on adoption referred to earlier intends to introduce a slight distinction
between the unknown donor and the known donor where an adoption request
by the co-mother is concerned. If the birth mother and the co-mother submit a
declaration issued by the Donor data artificial procreation foundation (Stichting
donor gegevens kunstmatige bevruchting) that the child was conceived by means
of assisted procreation services as described under art. 1(c) of the Artificial In-
semination (Donor Information) Act (Wet donorgegevens kunstmatige bevruch-
ting) the adoption request will be granted unless this is not in the best interest
of the child.97 This means that it will in principle be easier for a co-mother to
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adopt her partner’s child if it was conceived through assisted conception services
in a fertility clinic.
6.2.5.2.  Establishing a co-mother’s legal parenthood without her cooperation
In neither jurisdiction is it possible to force the status of legal parent on an
unwilling co-mother, even where she is the child’s genetic parent. In The
Netherlands it is not even possible to assess the co-mother for child maintenance
if she never established any legal ties with the child (legal parenthood through
adoption or parental responsibility).98 In England the concept of ‘child of the
family’99 is important in the case of child maintenance if the couple have entered
into a civil partnership.
6.2.5.3.  Post-mortal procreation 
It is, at present, not possible to establish the maternity of the co-mother after her
death. Not even where she is the child’s genetic mother, as is the case in egg
donation between female same-sex couples. The recently published Tissue Bill
contains proposals with regard to the registration of the co-mother on the child’s
birth certificate akin to the provisions that apply to registration deceased male
partners.100 For registration on the birth certificate it is required that the de-
ceased female partner had given consent to the treatment and the registration
before her death. 101 However, the possibility to register the deceased female
partner on the birth certificate only applies to cases of embryo transfer and
apparently not to artificial insemination with donor sperm after the female
partner’s death.
6.2.6.  COMPARISON LEGAL PARENTHOOD
6.2.6.1.  Legal parenthood of the birth mother’s partner
By operation of law 
In both jurisdictions the legal parenthood of the mother’s husband is established
by operation of law, both in the case of egg donation and sperm donation. 
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102 The HFEA stated the following in its reply to Q 53 of the consultation: ‘Legal parentage can
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Intersentia 175
There is, however, a very important difference between the two jurisdictions
where the paternity of an unmarried non-biological father is concerned. Under
English law the legal parenthood of a non-biological father is established by
operation of law pursuant to s, 28(3) HFEA 1990 if he and the child’s mother
were together receiving fertility treatment with donor sperm.102 There is no such
provision in The Netherlands.
Voluntary establishment (with maternal consent)
In both jurisdictions the legal parenthood of the biological and the non-biologi-
cal father may be established by means of registration on the birth certificate/
recognition with the mother’s consent, unless the child already has a legal father
by operation of law.103 Under English law a non-biological father may only
register on the birth certificate if he is to be treated as the child’s father pursuant
to s. 28 HFEA 1990.
In contrast, co-mothers have not been given the options open to unmarried non-
biological fathers to voluntarily establish their legal parenthood in either juris-
diction. However, as was explained earlier, there are more or less advanced
legislative activities in this field in both jurisdictions. At present, the only option
available for a co-mother to become a legal parent is through adoption. In both
jurisdictions it is possible for a same-sex partner to adopt the partner’s child,
provided a number of conditions have been met. There are some differences with
regard to the eligibility for the co-mother to adopt her partner’s child. The most
important difference for female same-sex couples is the fact that under Dutch
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law the co-mother need not have lived with the child for a certain period of time
before she may file an adoption application, provided the child is born into their
relationship, whereas under English law such an application may only be filed
after the child has lived with the mother and her partner for six months (no
exceptions have been made for female same-sex couples). 
A complicating factor in the adoption procedure might be the fact that the DIY
donor who did not donate through a sperm bank or a licensed clinic may play
a role in the adoption procedure. He does not have a right to veto the adoption,
unless he is a legal parent (The Netherlands) or has parental responsibility
(England) but the court might under certain circumstances have to asses the role
which the DIY donor may play in the child’s future life. Under Dutch law, it has
become very difficult for the known donor to build up the necessary family life
with the child in order to attempt to establish legal familial ties with the child,
because the co-mother can file an adoption application immediately after the
child’s birth. The proposed prenatal adoption will make this even more difficult,
if not impossible.104
Establishment without maternal consent
With regard to the options of the unmarried biological father who made use of
assisted conception services with his female partner to establish his paternity
there are substantial differences between the two jurisdictions. Under English
law he may file for a declaration of paternity. In The Netherlands the situation
is entirely different. Under the DCC the unmarried biological father who has
resorted to assisted conception with his female partner is unable to establish his
paternity without maternal cooperation. Only a father who has begotten a child
in a natural way with the child’s mother has standing to apply to the court to
replace the mother’s consent if she refuses to give it. However, from recent case
law it appears that a sperm donor/biological father with family life might also be
heard by the court on the basis of his rights under Article 8 ECHR. 
The unmarried non-biological father, who has not become a legal parent by
operation of law, as well as the co-mother, have at present no way of establishing
their legal parenthood in either jurisdiction without the mother’s consent. 
Involuntary establishment 
In both jurisdictions the paternity of an unmarried biological father may be
established without his consent: in England by means of a declaration of pater-
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the child’s birth certificate under certain conditions. 
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nity, in The Netherlands if he may be regarded as the mother’s consenting life
partner.105 However, with regard to the establishment of the legal parenthood
of the non-biological father, there are differences between the jurisdictions. In
England, only the legal parenthood of a HFEA father may be established against
his will, this means that if a couple make use of a DIY donor the legal parent-
hood of the male partner cannot be established. The fact that he consented to the
DIY insemination and had the intention to become the child’s legal parent is of
no consequence. In contrast, in The Netherlands the legal parenthood of the
unmarried non-biological father may be established if as the mother’s life
partner, he consented to an act that may have resulted in the conception of the
child.
With regard to the involuntary establishment of the legal parenthood of the co-
mother who co-authored the pregnancy of her female partner, the two jurisdic-
tions do not differ. It is, at present, not possible in either England or The Nether-
lands to force legal parenthood on an unwilling co-mother whatever the status
of her relationship with the child or the birth mother.106 
Post-mortal procreation
In both jurisdictions the legal parenthood of the mother’s male partner may be
established if the pregnancy came about after his death provided the necessary
requirements have been met. This is not the case for co-mothers. It is, at present,
not possible in either jurisdiction to establish the legal parenthood of a co-
mother if pregnancy came about after her death. It makes no difference whether
she is the child’s genetic mother.107
Denial by the child of the legal parenthood of the co-mother or non-biological
father
There are substantial differences between the two jurisdictions with regard to
the child’s options to deny the legal parenthood of a non-biological father or a
co-mother.
In The Netherlands the child may deny the paternity of his or her non-biological
father even where the father consented to the conception of the child with
donor sperm. However, the child does not have this option if the paternity of his
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non-biological father was judicially established pursuant to art. 1:207.108 In
contrast, a child in England cannot deny the paternity of a non-biological father
who is a legal parent pursuant to the status provisions of s. 28 HFEA 1990. He or
she may, however, rebut the paternity of a non-biological father who falls
outside the status provisions of the HFEA 1990. It is not possible in either
jurisdiction to deny or revoke the legal parenthood of a non-biological parent,
such as a co-mother, established through adoption.
6.2.6.2.  Status of the sperm donor
Dutch law with relation to the legal status of the sperm donor in all his guises is
very unclear. This is due to the fact that a sperm donor is qualified as a biological
father who does not conceive a child in a natural way and is not married to the
child’s mother. No distinction has been made on the basis of the donor’s inten-
tion and his relationship with the child’s birth mother. This will in particular
create problems where the voluntary establishment of his paternity is concerned.
It has been suggested by the Dutch Supreme Court that a known donor with
family life might have standing to apply to the court to replace the mother’s
consent to recognition.109 No such problems occur concerning the involuntary
establishment of a known sperm donor. Where the known donor consented to
the act that led to the conception of the child and may be considered to be the
birth mother’s life partner his paternity may be judicially established. 
In contrast, the clear division made in English law between HFEA donors and
DIY donors has prevented problems that occur in the Dutch position with regard
to the legal status of the known and unknown sperm donor.110 This provides
more clarity to all the parties concerned in the assisted conception with donor
sperm triangle. Couples using an HFEA donor know that they will in principle
both become legal parents by operation of law, whereas couples using a DIY
donor know that the donor may claim parenting rights. Of course the situation
in practice is less clear-cut. Both in The Netherlands and England there is, or
there is expected to be, a shortage of unknown donors as a consequence of
legislation that enables a child to discover the identity of his genetic father once
he or she has reached the age of 18. This may prevent prospective donors from
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donating, but it may also deter couples from using such donors. Since couples
have the options to go abroad for fertility treatment or may even order sperm on
the internet to circumvent such legislation, the actual effect of the HFEA 1990
with regard to the status provisions may be less promising.111
Table 6.1.a: Status of the sperm donor
sperm donors and their
legal status 
England The Netherlands
unmarried biological
father who ‘donates’ his
sperm to his female
partner to conceive a
child with the intention
to become a parent
-same status as biological
father who conceives his
child in a natural way,
provided he consented to
the use of his sperm for
that purpose; 
-his paternity may be
established with or with-
out his cooperation;
- he may acquire parental
responsibility
-may acquire status of
legal parent with mater-
nal cooperation; 
-if there is family life,
legal parenthood might
be established by a court
at his request; 
-paternity can be estab-
lished against his will
known donor who do-
nates sperm to a (female
same-sex) couple with
the intention to become
a parent
- a DIY donor may estab-
lish his paternity by a
declaration of parentage
and acquire parental re-
sponsibility without ma-
ternal cooperation
- paternity may be estab-
lished against his will
-may acquire status with
maternal consent; 
- very slight possibility if
there is family life and
paternity is established at
his request; 
- no establishment
against his will without
natural conception
the known donor who
donates sperm to a (fe-
male same-sex) couple
without the intention
to become a parent
- the paternity of a DIY
donor may be established
against his will
- the paternity of such a
donor cannot be estab-
lished: he is not the
mother's life partner
the donor from a sperm
bank/treatment centre
such a donor has no
rights and duties with
regard to the child
such a donor has no
rights and duties with
regard to the child
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6.2.6.3.  Concluding remarks
Most of the differences between English and Dutch law on the issue of legal
parenthood in cases of egg or sperm donation are to be found in the legal posi-
tion of the father who is not married to the child’s mother. The most striking of
these differences is the fact that under English law an unmarried non-biological
father will be the child’s legal father by operation of law if he and his female
partner are regarded as having received assisted conception treatment together.
On the issue of the attribution of the status of legal parenthood to co-mothers
there are no differences between the jurisdictions. The provisions for establish-
ing the legal parenthood of non-biological fathers, either voluntarily or involun-
tarily, have as yet not been extended to co-mothers. If one looks at the sort of
family most comparable to a female-sex family, namely a different-sex family
using donor sperm, it becomes clear that there are enormous differences in the
possibilities accorded to non-biological fathers and co-mothers. From Table 6.1.a,
it can be easily concluded that where consent to fertility treatment and maternal
consent are sufficient to establish (voluntarily or involuntarily) the legal parent-
hood of the non-biological father, these same criteria, at present, do not apply
in the case of female same-sex couples. The only option for the co-mother to
acquire the status of a legal parent with regard to her female partner’s child is
adoption.
One of the serious disadvantages of selecting adoption as the only option for
establishing the legal parenthood of a co-mother is that it is voluntary. In the
Dutch context this means that there will be cases where a child will have only
one legal parent, and despite the fact that a child has been given the right to
discover the identity of the other genetic parent, it will not have the possibility
to establish the legal parenthood of either the other genetic parent or the parent
who co-authored his or her conception (the intentional parent). In the English
context, where the female same-sex couple have made use of a DIY donor the
paternity of the donor may be established. In contrast, if the couple have made
use of a HFEA donor neither the paternity of the donor may be established nor
the legal parenthood of the co-mother. So where the HFEA 1990 protects
children born to different-sex couples who received treatment together in
accordance with the HFEA 1990, it does not do so for children of same-sex
parents.
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Table 6.1. Legal parenthood for the birth mother’s partner
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6.3. GAMETE DONATION AND PARENTAL
RESPONSIBILIY
6.3.1.  BIRTH MOTHER
In England regardless of the relationship status of the birth mother, whether she
is married, in a civil partnership, in a non-formalised relationship or not in a
relationship, she will acquire parental responsibility over her children by
operation of law pursuant to s. 2(2)(a) CA 1989. Whether the mother herself has
reached the age of majority is not relevant for the attribution of parental respon-
sibility, underage mothers will also acquire parental responsibility by operation
of law as well. 
In The Netherlands, regardless of her relationship status, the child’s birth mother
will have parental responsibility as of the moment of the child’s birth unless she
lacks the capacity for parental responsibility at the time she gives birth (arts
1:253b(1) and 1:246 DCC). The mother will, for instance, lack the capacity for
parental responsibility if she has not reached the age of 18. If she is between 16
and 18 years of age she may apply to the court to be attributed with parental
responsibility (art. 1:253ha DCC). The court will only grant the request if it
seems to the court to be in the best interests of both the mother and the child.
Once she has reached the age of 18 she will automatically be vested with paren-
tal responsibility, unless someone else at that time is attributed with parental
responsibility, or the mother lacks the capacity for parental responsibility on
other grounds (art. 1:253b DCC).
 
6.3.2.  FATHER
6.3.2.1.  Marriage 
Both in England and The Netherlands the attribution of joint parental responsi-
bility is based on the fact that the couple is married. In principle it makes no
difference whether the parents are both genetic parents or whether donor sperm
or donor eggs were used to establish pregnancy. The relevant issue is that they
are both legal parents by virtue of the marriage and are thus both attributed with
parental responsibility.
6.3.2.2. Non-martial registered relationship (The Netherlands only)
In The Netherlands registered partners will have joint parental responsibility
with regard to the children born into their registered partnership by operation
of law, unless the child concerned already has legal familial ties with a parent
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outside the registered partnership.112 Whether the male registered partner is the
biological father of the child is of no importance, it is the legal status of the
relationship that gives the registered partners parental responsibility by opera-
tion of law. There is, however, a minor technical difference depending on the
legal status of the male registered partner. If he has recognised the child his
parental responsibility will be based on art. 1:253aa DCC, and if he has not
recognised the child it will be based on art. 1:253sa DCC.113 There is no differ-
ence in the content of these two forms of parental responsibility.114
6.3.2.3.  Non-formalised relationship
In both jurisdictions a birth mother in a non-formalised relationship will have
sole parental responsibility by operation of law.115 A father in a non-formalised
relationship may acquire parental responsibility under certain circumstances. 
In England a man in a non-formalised relationship may acquire parental respon-
sibility, if he is the child’s biological father or if he is to be treated as the child’s
legal father pursuant to s. 28(3) HFEA 1990, by registration on the child’s birth
certificate with the mother’s consent, by entering into a parental responsibility
agreement with the mother or by applying to the court for a parental responsi-
bility order.116
However, if he is not the child’s biological and legal father, he will be unable to
acquire parental responsibility with regard to the child on the ground that he
intended to be the child’s social father and/or legal father. 117 He may, however,
apply for a residence order under the following circumstances: the child has
been living with him for three years or more (s. 10(5b) CA 1989; all the other
holders of parental responsibility consent (10(5)(c)(iii) CA 1989); he has leave of
the court to apply for a residence order (s. 10(8) and (9) CA 1989). A residence
order will automatically confer parental responsibility upon him (s. 12(2) CA
1989). Whether such an application will be granted is subject to the child’s
welfare.
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In The Netherlands a father in a non-formalised relationship will not have
parental responsibility by operation of law. If he has become a legal parent, he
may acquire joint parental responsibility through joint registration in the
parental responsibility register with the child’s mother.118 If the mother refuses
to cooperate, he may apply to the court to be vested with joint parental responsi-
bility with the mother.119 If he has not become a legal parent, he may apply to
the court together with the mother to be vested with joint parental responsibil-
ity, provided the mother is the sole holder of parental responsibility.120 For such
an application to be granted the man must be in a close personal relationship
with the child.
If the man has not become a legal parent and the mother is unwilling to apply
for joint parental responsibility, he will not acquire parental responsibility.
However, he may be liable for child support during the child’s minority and
young majority pursuant to art. 1:394 DCC.
6.3.2.4.  Termination of parental responsibility
In England parental responsibility acquired either by registration on the child’s
birth certificate, by agreement or by a court order can be terminated by a court
order at the request of one of the holders of parental responsibility, or by the
child.121 The parental responsibility of the mother and the parental responsibility
acquired by the father by virtue of his marriage to the child’s mother may only
be terminated by an adoption order or a parental order.122
In The Netherlands joint parental responsibility may be terminated after the
relationship has broken down or as a measure of child protection.123 After the
relationship has broken down, joint parental responsibility may be terminated
and sole parental responsibility be attributed to one of the separated partners if
the continuance of joint parental responsibility creates an unacceptable risk that
the child may suffer harm.124 Whether joint parental responsibility was estab-
lished voluntarily or by operation of law or whether one of the partners is not
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126 Art. 1:253sa DCC.
127 Art. 1:203 DCC.
128 See for instance Rechtbank Zutphen 13 July 2005 LJN: AT9822 and Hof Arnhem 31 January
2006 LJN: AV3008. The children in this case were born before the introduction of the regis-
tered partnership. The mothers acquired joint parental responsibility in 1998 pursuant to a
court order on the basis of art 1:253t DCC; shortly thereafter, the respective fathers were given
consent to recognise the children by the mother.
129 See for instance Re C (A Minor) (Residence Order: Lesbian co-parent) [1994] Fam Law 468 and
Re M (Sperm donor) [2001] Fam Law 94 (this case concerns the same child as in [2006] EWHC
2 Fam discussed later on).
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a biological parent, has no influence on the grounds on which it may be termi-
nated.125
6.3.3.  CO-MOTHER
6.3.3.1.  Marriage
In The Netherlands a married female same-sex couple will have parental respon-
sibility over a child born into their marriage by operation of law, unless the child
already has legal familial ties with a parent outside the marriage.126 This is the
case where a man (who may be, but need not be, the child’s biological father) has
recognised the child with the mother’s consent before the birth.127 If there is
already a legal parent outside the registered partnership, the mother and her
female partner can apply jointly for parental responsibility for a parent and a
person other than a parent pursuant to art. 1:253t DCC. A discussion of the
conditions to be met before such an application may be granted can be found in
the section below on non-formalised relationships (section 6.3.3.3). In practice
it is more likely where couples want to share parenthood with the biological
father to have the father recognise the child after the birth. The known father
will then be a legal parent and the female couple will have joint parental respon-
sibility.128
6.3.3.2.  Non-marital registered relationship
In England the introduction of the Civil Partnership Act 2004 made it possible
for same-sex couples to enter into a formalised relationship. However, the
recognition of the social parenthood of same-sex partners predates the CPA
2004. Same-sex partners already had the possibility to acquire parental responsi-
bility by means of a residence order.129 But since the introduction of the Civil
Partnership Act 2004 on 5 December 2005 the civil partner may acquire parental
responsibility by means of a parental responsibility agreement with the child’s
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132 The degree of commitment which the father has shown to the child, the degree of attachment
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(Minors)(Parental Responsibility: Parental Rights)(no. 3) [1991] Fam 151. See also Re G
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133 [1994] 1 FLR 504.
134 MALLENDER & RAYSON (2005) p. 46.
135 Re G (Children), [2005] EWCA 462, para 22.
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mother.130 If the child’s mother refuses to cooperate the civil partner may apply
to the court for a parental responsibility order. Furthermore, a civil partner of
a parent may apply for any section 8 order without the leave of the court with
regard to the parent’s child.131 At present the same-sex civil partner has the same
options with regard to the acquisition of parental responsibility as the married
step-parent. 
Where a civil partner applies for a parental responsibility order, usually where
the relationship has ceased to exist, it is assumed that the same conditions will
be applied as in the case of an unmarried father who applies for parental respon-
sibility.132
‘In the case of application by unmarried fathers for a parental responsibil-
ity order, the court has taken into account, in particular, the degree of
commitment shown by the father to the child, the degree of attachment
between him and the child and his reasons for applying for the order (see,
for example Re G (A minor) (Parental Responsibility Order).133 There
seems no good reason for the court’s departing from that approach when
dealing with an application by a civil partner.’134 
In a recent judgement on the issue where the co-mother was indeed granted
responsibility after the termination of the relationship,135 Lord Justice Thorpe
stated that the following words by Lord Justice Ward in Re C and V [1998],136
which concerned an application for parental responsibility by an unmarried
father, also apply to same-sex partners: ‘Wherever possible, the law should
confer on a concerned father that stamp of approval because he has shown
himself willing and anxious to pick up the responsibility of fatherhood and not
to deny or avoid it’.
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The Tissue Bill which seeks to amend the status provisions of the HFEA 1990 to
provide for legal parenthood for the mother’s female partner by operation of law,
also includes amendments to the parental responsibility provisions in the CA
1989. The mother’s (female) civil partner will acquire parental responsibility if
the civil partner is to be treated as a parent by virtue of c. 48 of the Tissue Bill.137
Furthermore, where the child was born before the couple entered into a civil
partnership and the mother’s female partner was at that time regarded as the
child’s parent pursuant to c. 49 of the Tissue Bill, the female partner will be
attributed with parental responsibility upon entering into a civil partnership
with the mother.138 
In The Netherlands, the position of a female same-sex couple in a registered
partnership with regard to parental responsibility is the same as for a married
female same-sex couple.139
6.3.3.3.  Non-formalised relationship
In England, a co-mother in a non-formalised relationship can only acquire
parental responsibility by means of a residence order. She may apply for such an
order in the following situations: she has the consent of all holders of parental
responsibility to apply for a residence order; the child has been living with her
for three years in the past five years; or with the leave of the court. 
It is not required for an application for a residence order to be successful that the
relationship still exists; such an application may be made after the relationship
has ended. In Re G,140 the former partner of the child’s biological mother (CG)
applied for a residence order. Her application was refused at first instance. The
court of appeal, however, granted the application for a residence order (and
parental responsibility) in order to protect the relationship between the former
partner and the children concerned. The court ordered that the mother must not
move away without her former partner’s consent and regulated contact between
the children and the former partner (the primary co-mother).141
This, however, was not the end of the story. A few months later the mother
moved to Cornwall with the children and her new partner without notifying her
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biological mother when the relationship subsists, it becomes more difficult if the relationship
is terminated. But what about the mother’s new partner who is the homemaker, or even more
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former partner, and neither did she inform the children beforehand that they
were moving. Upon an application by the mother’s former partner, the court
decided that the former partner would be the children’s primary carer and drew
up a contact order for the children with their mother. This decision was upheld
by the Court of Appeal. The House of Lords, however, reversed the Court of
Appeal judgment and reinstated the mother as the children’s primary carer.142
‘My Lords, I am driven to the conclusion that the courts below have
allowed the unusual context of this case to distract them from principles
which are of universal application. First, the fact that CG is the natural
mother of these children in every sense of that term [genetic, gestational
and social], while raising no presumption in her favour, this is undoubt-
edly an important and significant factor in determining what will be best
for them now and in the future. Yet nowhere is that factor explored in
the judgement below. Secondly, while it may well be in the interest of
children to change their living arrangements if one of the parents is
frustrating their relationship with the other parent who is able to offer
them a good and loving home, this is unlikely to be in their best interest
while that relationship is in fact being maintained in accordance with the
court’s order.’
Even though it is maintained in the decision that the fact that CG is in all senses
the children’s natural mother raises no presumption in her favour, it is in the
end the biological connection plus the fact that changing living arrangements
would not be in the children’s interest that determines where the children
should live, despite the mother’s behaviour. One cannot help but wonder
whether the House of Lords would have reached the same conclusion if the
children had been living with the co-mother instead of the mother, or if the co-
mother had been the children’s genetic parent. There is no doubt that such cases
will come before the courts in the future.143
The Tissue Bill contains provisions with regard to the attribution of parental
responsibility to female couples who have not entered into a formalised relation-
ship. The female partner who is to be treated as a parent pursuant to c. 49 of the
Tissue Bill will be granted the same possibilities with regard to the acquisition
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of parental responsibility as an unmarried father: i.e. automatic parental respon-
sibility upon registration on the birth certificate; entering into a parental respon-
sibility agreement with the birth mother or applying for a court order.144 Fur-
thermore, where a residence order is made in favour of such a female partner,
the court will also make a parental responsibility order pursuant to proposed
section 4ZA if the female partner does not already have parental responsibil-
ity.145 
In The Netherlands a female same-sex couple in a non-formalised relationship
can only acquire joint parental responsibility by filing an application with the
court for joint parental responsibility for a parent and a person other than a
parent pursuant to art. 1:253t DCC or by partner adoption and subsequent
registration of parental responsibility pursuant to art. 1:252 DCC. 
To be eligible for a joint parental responsibility order pursuant to art. 1:253t
DCC, the mother needs to have sole parental responsibility and her partner
needs to have a close personal relationship with the child. If the child has
another legal parent, the mother and her female partner need to have taken care
of the child for at least one year together. The court may reject the application
if, also in the light of the interests of another parent, there is a well-founded fear
that the best interests of the child would be neglected if the application were
granted.146
It is not entirely clear whether a co-mother can file an application for parental
responsibility without the mother’s cooperation. Art. 1:253t DCC requires the
mother and the co-mother to file a joint application. However, one might argue
that in accordance with developments in this field concerning the unmarried
father, who has been given the opportunity by the courts to file an application
for joint parental responsibility against the mother’s wishes on the basis of arts
6 and 8 ECHR, the same should be true for the co-mother. The courts are not in
agreement on this issue, however. On 18 October 2005 the Arnhem Court of
Appeal147 decided that an application for parental responsibility pursuant to art
1:253t DCC without the cooperation of the child’s legal mother could not be
heard. In contrast, the Groningen District Court decided on 20 June 2006148 that
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the fact that art. 1:253t DCC only allows for a joint application for joint parental
responsibility is in breach of arts 6(1) and 8(1) ECHR. It remains to be seen
whether it will indeed become possible for the co-mother with family life to
apply for joint parental responsibility without the legal mother’s cooperation. On
17 October 2006 the same Groningen District Court conferred parental responsi-
bility on the mother’s former registered partner in the best interest of the child
against the mother’s wishes.149
6.3.3.4.  Termination of parental responsibility
In England parental responsibility acquired by agreement or by court order can
only be terminated by the court at the request of one of the holders of parental
responsibility or the child him/herself if the court considers this to be in the best
interest of the child.150 
In The Netherlands joint parental responsibility may be terminated after the
relationship has broken down or as a measure of child protection such as divest-
ment.151 After the relationship has broken down, joint parental responsibility
may be terminated and sole parental responsibility may be attributed to one of
the separated partners if the continuance of joint parental responsibility creates
an unacceptable risk that the child may suffer harm.152 Whether joint parental
responsibility was established voluntarily or by operation of law, or whether one
of the partners is not a biological parent, has no influence on the grounds on
which it may be terminated.153
Recently The Hague Court of Appeal ruled in a dispute between a separated
female same-sex couple that the mere fact that art. 1:253n DCC uses the word
‘parent’ does not mean that this only applies to legal parents, among other things
because contemporary Dutch family law legislation aims to give same-sex
couples as far as this is possible the same position as different-sex couples.154 The
fact that the ex-partner was not the child’s legal parent was not sufficient in the
eyes of the Court of Appeal to deviate from the standards developed in the case
law with regard to the termination of joint parental responsibility. 
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6.3.4. PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE BIOLOGICAL
FATHER/DONOR
Under English law it is possible for more than two persons to have parental
responsibility with regard to a child. Taken together with the fact that a biologi-
cal father may apply for a parental responsibility order pursuant to s. 4 CA 1989
(unless he is to be regarded as a sperm donor pursuant to the HFEA 1990) this
means that it is possible for the DIY donor to acquire parental responsibility with
regard to the child. In a recent case on this issue, Re D (lesbian mothers and
known father),155 the Court of Appeal granted parental responsibility to the
father.156 As a consequence of this decision the known biological father with
parental responsibility needs to consent to the adoption of the child by the
mother female partner. 
In The Netherlands only two people may hold parental responsibility with
regard to a child. Since female couples in a marriage and a registered partnership
are attributed with parental responsibility by operation of law (unless the child
has a legal parent outside the relationship) over children born into their relation-
ship, it is very difficult for a known donor to acquire parental responsibility with
regard to a child. This is even more so, since he may only apply for parental
responsibility if he has managed to become the child’s legal parent.
6.3.5.  COMPARISON: PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY
In both jurisdictions married different-sex couples will have joint parental
responsibility over children born into their marriage also when these children
are not genetically related to both of them.157 However, with regard to the
attribution of parental responsibility to unmarried couples and to same-sex
couples, the jurisdictions diverge.
6.3.5.1.  Unmarried fathers and co-mothers
In England an unmarried father will have joint parental responsibility with the
child’s mother if he registers as the father on the birth certificate with the
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mother’s consent. In The Netherlands recognition of a child does not automati-
cally confer parental responsibility on the father. In order to acquire parental
responsibility he needs to register jointly with the child’s mother in the parental
responsibility register. 
However, in The Netherlands parents in a non-marital registered relationship
(whether of the same sex or of different sex) will have joint parental responsibil-
ity over children born into their relationship by operation of law. In England no
such provision has been made for couples in a civil partnership. They may only
acquire joint parental responsibility by agreement or court order.
6.3.5.2.  Without maternal cooperation
With regard to the acquisition of parental responsibility by the mother’s partner
without her cooperation, both jurisdictions offer such a possibility though not
always for the same groups of people. In England, a father, a civil partner or a
person with whom the child has been living for at least three years, may file an
application for a parental responsibility order/residence order. In The Nether-
lands, the case law has only recently established that a legal father should have
the right to file an application for joint parental responsibility against the
mother’s wishes. Whether this option should also be open to the co-mother has
not yet been decided by the Dutch Supreme Court. At present, a biological father
who is not a legal parent and a co-mother who does not have parental responsi-
bility by operation of law, cannot apply for parental responsibility in The
Netherlands without maternal cooperation. In contrast, in England such a father
can apply for parental responsibility and, as such, a co-mother may apply for a
residence order if the child has been living with her for three out of the past five
years.
6.3.5.3.  The biological father 
A known DIY donor may acquire parental responsibility under English law as
was the case in Re D, where both mothers were already vested with parental
responsibility. In The Netherlands it is possible in theory for a known DIY donor
to acquire parental responsibility, provided he has become the child’s legal father
and there is only one holder of parental responsibility. However, in practice, it
is very unlikely.
6.3.5.4.  Termination of parental responsibility
With regard to the termination of parental responsibility, in both jurisdictions
the underlying principle is that parental responsibility is not influenced by the
relationship breaking down. However, there are differences between the juris-
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dictions on this issue. The main difference is the fact that in England the paren-
tal responsibility of a married father cannot be terminated by a court at the
request of any holder of parental responsibility whereas the parental responsibil-
ity of an unmarried father or a co-mother may be terminated by a court in the
best interest of the child at the request of any other holder of parental responsi-
bility or the child him/herself. In The Netherlands, the parental responsibility
of any holder may be terminated at the request of any other holder after the
relationship has broken down or a change of circumstances by a court order on
the ground that if joint parental responsibility should continue, the child is likely
to suffer serious harm.
6.3.5.5.  Some concluding remarks
In England unmarried biological fathers have a stronger position where the
acquisition of parental responsibility is concerned than unmarried biological
fathers in The Netherlands. On the other hand, under Dutch law partners in a
non-marital registered relationship acquire parental responsibility by operation
of law.
In The Netherlands all couples in a formalised relationship are attributed with
joint parental responsibility over children born into their relationship, unless the
child already has a legal parent outside the relationship. Under English law only
different-sex couples in a formalised relationship are attributed with joint
parental responsibility by operation of law. However, as has already been
mentioned, this may change in the near future.
Under English law unmarried non-biological fathers who are to be treated as
legal fathers pursuant to s. 28(3) HFEA 1990 may acquire parental responsibility
in the same way as unmarried biological fathers. Unmarried non-biological
fathers who are not to be treated as legal fathers pursuant to s. 28(3) HFEA 1990
at present have the same options with regard to the acquisition of parental
responsibility as co-mothers. Such non-biological fathers and co-mothers may
apply to the court for a residence order, which will attribute them with parental
responsibility. They can file such an application either with maternal consent or
without maternal consent if the child has lived with them for 3 years out of the
past five years.
In The Netherlands both different-sex couples and same-sex couples can jointly
apply to the court for parental responsibility. The position of the non-biological
father and co-mother who seek to acquire parental responsibility without
maternal cooperation is less clear. If the non-biological father is a legal  parent,
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Table 6.2. Parental responsibility for the birth mother’s partner
he may apply for joint parental responsibility without maternal cooperation. If
the non-biological parent has not become a legal parent it currently seems
impossible to acquire parental responsibility without maternal cooperation, even
where the child has lived with this parent for a substantial amount of time.
6.4. GAMETE DONATION: ENGLISH AND DUTCH
CASES COMPARED
In this section similar cases from English and Dutch law will be discussed and
compared in order to gain more insight into the relationship between legal
parenthood and parental responsibility in the two jurisdictions. 
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Table 6.2. Parental responsibility for the birth mother’s partner
6.4.1.  PARENTHOOD IN LESBIAN FAMILIES
Against the background of the question whether and how known donors have
been given the possibility to acquire a kind of legal link with their biological
child, it is interesting to look more closely at two cases mentioned in the com-
parisons above. This concerns Re D (lesbian mothers and known father)158 from
England and the decision of the Dutch Supreme Court of 21 April 2006159 from
The Netherlands. Both cases concern more or less the same constellation of
events. Two women had engaged a sperm donor to help them conceive a child.
The sperm donor indicated that he wanted limited involvement in the child’s
life. However, once the child was born the female couple and the sperm donor
disagreed about his position in the child’s life. 
The Dutch known donor has, in principle, no option to acquire a legal link with
his biological child. However, the known donor in this case filed an application
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161 Hof Amsterdam, 22 November 2001, case no. 370/2001 (unpublished) and Hoge Raad 24
January 2003, NJ 2003, 386.
162 Hof Amsterdam 23 December 2004, LJN: AR7915. 
163 A parental responsibility order was granted with the following restrictions: i) that Mr B will
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164 Both in this case and in the earlier mentioned case concerning the separated co-mothers the
courts give the other parent some form of parental status because the courts are concerned that
otherwise this other parent (be it the known donor or the ex co-mother) will be marginalised
by the legal parent(s). Preventing the marginalisation of important parental figures in the
child’s life thus seems to be an important issue in deciding cases. 
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with the court to replace the mother’s consent to recognition; he claimed that
the birth mother promised to give him consent to recognise the child. This
application was granted at first instance,160 but this judgement was subsequently
overturned by the Amsterdam Court of Appeal and the Dutch Supreme Court.161
When the co-mother subsequently filed an application to adopt the child of her
female partner, the known donor intervened and claimed that he had a family
life with the child; therefore the adoption would not be in the best interests of
the child. The Amsterdam Court of Appeal162 and the Dutch Supreme Court
agreed. The result of this judgement is that the child has only one legal parent,
her birth mother, and that neither the known donor nor the co-mother has
managed to establish a legal link with the child. The known donor has only
managed to prevent the co-mother from becoming the child’s second legal
parent.
Under English law the known donor has the option to apply for a parental
responsibility order pursuant to s. 4 CA 1989 since he is the child’s biological
father. In the English case, the known donor was indeed granted parental
responsibility together with the birth mother and her female partner. His
parental responsibility has been limited by the court, so that he could not
interfere in some areas of the child’s life.163 But he was given a legal status in the
child’s life, because he was the child’s biological father. One of the consequences
of this decision for the co-mother is that she cannot become the child’s second
legal parent, unless the known donor consents to the child’s adoption. However,
as a result of this decision all three adults involved in the child’s life have been
given some form of legal parental status. 164
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6.4.2.  EXTRAMARITAL SEX AND THE RIGHTS OF THE
BIOLOGICAL FATHER
A number of cases have been mentioned in this chapter concerning the possibil-
ity for a third party biological father to acquire a legal relationship with a child
born into a different-sex marriage. In both jurisdictions the marital father is the
legal father of the child unless he denies his paternity on the ground that he is
not the child’s biological father. However, if he does not deny his paternity, for
instance because he is perfectly content to raise the child concerned as his own,
does the biological father have any options to acquire some rights with regard
to the child?
Under Dutch law the answer is straightforward and negative; he cannot acquire
any rights with regard to the child. In a case that recently came before The
Hague Court of Appeal such a biological father was denied any rights with
regard to the child.165 This case concerned a request by a biological father for
contact with his child, conceived during an affair while the mother was married
to another man. The affair ended and the mother returned to her husband before
the birth of the child. As the child was born during the marriage of the mother
and her husband had not denied his paternity, the child is the legal child of the
married couple; the biological father has no possibility to exercise any rights
with regard to the child. The Court of Appeal was critical of the law and the case
law which left it with no maneuverability to attach sufficient weight to the
child’s interest to know his or her biological father that it could thereby make
a contact order. The more so, since the legal parents had made it very clear that
they would not tell the child that his or her legal father is not her biological
father. The court noted that it does not consider this to be good parenting. ‘It
may be expected of parents, putting the interest of the child first that they will
tell the child who his or her biological father is and enable him or her to have
contact with him in one way or another, the more so since the biological father
has indicated that he does not mean to interfere with the parenting of the child.’
This case illustrates that a mother’s power to select the legal father of her child
is practically absolute.166 
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not want to have to force her into a position where she felt obliged to be the child of two
fathers. Shortly before the court gave its judgement, the mother of the children gave birth to
twins fathered by yet another man. It is unclear from the transcript of the judgement whether
the mother is still married to the same man. 
167 For instance Re H (Paternity: Blood tests) [1996] 2 FLR 65;  Re T (Paternity: Ordering Blood
Tests) [2001] 2 FLR 1190 and Re H and A (Paternity : Blood Tests) [2002] 1 FLR 1145.
168 England: s. 27 HFEA 1990; The Netherlands: art.1:198 DCC.
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Under English law a different approach has been taken during the past decade
or so.167 Third party biological fathers do have the option to establish their
paternity and acquire a parental responsibility or a contact order with regard to
a child born within the birth mother’s marriage with another man. It is the best
interest of the child that is paramount consideration in these decisions; nowa-
days the interest of the child is often considered to be the establishment of the
truth.168
6.4.3.  SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS
From the above examples, and the rest of the chapter, it becomes clear that the
English approach, as can be tentatively discerned from the case law discussed,
is more inclusive, and offers more scope for including all three parents in the
child’s life. This is probably due to the fact that more than two people may have
parental responsibility with regard to a child, on the one hand, and to the status
of a biological father, on the other. Dutch law is more geared towards the two-
parent model, room has been made for same-sex parents, but to the exclusion of
the biological father, who may play a role in the child’s life. 
As a consequence of the legal rules in place at the moment there is a group of
children in both jurisdictions that may only establish a legal relationship with
one parent. Since it is impossible for a child to establish a legal relationship with
a co-mother against her will, whether a child may acquire a second legal parent
at present depends on the possibility to establish the paternity of the known
donor. Under Dutch law this is not possible unless the child was conceived
through sexual intercourse with the biological father. In England this is possible
where the female couple did not make use of a HFEA donor. If the female couple
made use of a HFEA donor, the paternity of this donor cannot be established.
One may conclude that under certain circumstances adults apparently have the
right not to become the parent of a child who was conceived either at their
instigation or by their genetic material. This means that the manner of a child’s
conception may have substantial consequences for his or her legal position in
life. 
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6.5. SURROGACY IN COMBINATION WITH EGG OR
SPERM DONATION
In this section on surrogacy in combination with sperm or egg donation the
following four scenarios will be discussed. 
Scenario 1: A different-sex couple engage a surrogate mother to carry and to give
birth to a child conceived with the surrogate mother’s egg and the commission-
ing father’s sperm.
c + b f c
Non-bio mother Bio father Child Bio mother (surrogate)
Scenario 2: A different-sex couple engage a surrogate mother to give birth to a
child conceived with the commissioning mother’s egg and donor sperm
c + b f  c b
Genetic mother Non-bio father Child Gestational mother Bio father
Scenario 3: A female same-sex couple engage a surrogate mother to give birth to
a child conceived with an egg of one of the women and donor sperm.
c + c f  c b
Genetic mother Non-bio mother Child Gestational  mother Bio father
Scenario 4: A male same-sex couple engage a surrogate mother to give birth to
a child conceived with the surrogate mother’s egg (or a donor egg) and the sperm
of one of the men:
b + b f c
Bio father Non-bio father  Child Bio mother (surrogate)
The means by which full parental status can be transferred from the surrogate
parent(s) to the commissioning parents in the two jurisdictions have been
extensively discussed in Chapter 5. This section will focus on the differences
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170 See Chapter 5.3 for an extensive discussion of the legal position of genetic commissioning
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171 See Chapter 5.3.
172 Rechtbank Rotterdam 8 February 2007, LJN: BA0238.
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between the position of genetic surrogate families as discussed in Chapter 5 and
partially genetic surrogate families. The comparison between English and Dutch
law will be simultaneous.
6.5.1.  SCENARIOS 1 AND 2: PARTIALLY GENETIC
COMMISSIONING DIFFERENT-SEX COUPLES
The options for partially genetic commissioning different-sex couples in the two
jurisdictions are almost the same as those of genetic commissioning couples.
Under English law the only differences in the options available to the respective
couples can be found in the fact that a non-biological commissioning father may
not register his name on the child’s birth certificate, unless he is to be treated as
the child’s father pursuant to s. 28(3) HFEA 1990.169 Otherwise, their legal
position is similar to the position of genetic surrogate families, which has been
extensively discussed in Chapter 5.2.
In principle, it makes no difference under Dutch law for the commissioning
couple whether or not both or only one of them is/are genetically related to the
child borne by the commissioning mother.170 However, in practice it may make
a difference. First of all the supervised surrogacy services supplied by Dutch
hospitals are only accessible for genetic commissioning parents.171 Furthermore,
it may be more difficult for partially genetic surrogate parents to acquire full
parental status with regard to the child they are raising than it is for genetic
surrogate parents. This may be illustrated by a recent decision of the Rotterdam
District Court. The Court decided that transferring parental responsibility from
the surrogate parents to the commissioning parents would be in breach of art. 7
of the Children’s Convention, because it would result in the child not being
raised by his or her natural parents (c.q. birth mother).172 The fact that the
commissioning father was the child’s biological father played no part in the
decision, nor did the fact that the child concerned had been living with the
commissioning couple since his or her birth.
A recent Dutch/Belgian surrogacy case has rekindled discussions about surrogacy
in The Netherlands. The case concerns a Belgian surrogate mother who agreed
to carry a child for a Belgian commissioning couple with the sperm of the com-
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missioning father. Towards the end of the pregnancy, the surrogate mother told
the commissioning parents that she had miscarried. However, this turned out to
be a lie. After the baby was born in February 2005 she gave the child to a Dutch
couple. The Dutch couple had informed the appropriate authorities that they
would receive a new born baby into their family for the purpose of adoption, but
not that it concerned a child from abroad. This is important, because the couple
had not followed the necessary procedure for inter-country adoption. When the
question came before the court whether the child could stay with the couple
despite the fact that they had not proceeded in accordance with the relevant
provisions, the child had been living with the couple for some 7 months. The
Utrecht District Court decided that there was ‘family life’ between the child and
the couple on the basis of the fact that the child had been living with them since
her birth. The child was allowed to stay with the couple for the time being.173
Meanwhile, the Belgian commissioning parents discovered that the surrogate
mother had given birth to ‘their’ child. More than 2 years after the baby was
born DNA-testing revealed that the commissioning father was the child’s
biological father, a fact that had been contested by the surrogate mother from
the start. The commissioning father subsequently started proceedings with the
Dutch courts to have the child turned over to his and his wife’s care. The case,
which is still pending, gives rise to moral and legal questions about surrogacy,
the freedom to have another couple raise your child, the meaning of ‘family life’
and the genetic link between a father and a child. Leaving the questions raised
by private international law aside, and placing the case in a national context, it
illustrates important difference between the possibilities that a commissioning
father would have under English and Dutch law to acquire parental rights with
regard to his biological child. Under Dutch law the commissioning father in
principle has no standing to have his paternity established if the surrogate
mother is married and her husband claims to be the child’s father. In England
the commissioning father may file an application for a declaration of parentage
with regard the surrogate mother’s child, regardless of the question whether or
not she is married.
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6.5.2.  SCENARIO 3: PARTIALLY GENETIC COMMISSIONING
FEMALE SAME-SEX COUPLES
In both jurisdictions female same-sex couples may only acquire the status of legal
parents with regard to the child borne by the commissioning mother through
adoption. However, in England, the Tissue Bill, which has been discussed earlier,
proposes to make same-sex couples, whether or not they have entered into a civil
partnership, eligible for a parental order, provided one of the women is geneti-
cally related to the child.174
6.5.3. SCENARIO 4: PARTIALLY GENETIC COMMISSIONING
MALE SAME-SEX COUPLES
The position of commissioning male same-sex couples is very similar to that of
the unmarried commissioning different-sex couples from scenario 1. At present
the options male couples have in England for acquiring full parental status with
regard to the child borne by the surrogate mother, in part depend on the surro-
gate mother’s relationship status and the legal status of her male partner with
regard to the child. If the surrogate mother’s male partner is to be treated as the
child’s father pursuant to s. 28 HFEA 1990, the male commissioning couple can
only both acquire the status of legal parents through joint adoption. If the
surrogate has no partner or if her male partner is not to be treated as the child’s
father pursuant to s. 28 HFEA 1990, the commissioning biological father may
register on the child’s birth certificate. The other commissioning father may
subsequently adopt the child. 
In The Netherlands a male commissioning couple who have engaged a married
surrogate mother can acquire the status of legal parents by joint adoption. If the
surrogate mother is not married, one of the fathers may become the child’s legal
father by recognition. 
There are two issues that require further attention. First of all, regarding Eng-
land, the earlier mentioned Tissue Bill proposes to make male and female same-
sex couples and cohabiting couples eligible for a parental order, provided one of
the partners of the commissioning couple is genetically related to the child and
all the other conditions have been met.175 This means that the couples in all the
four scenarios discussed will become eligible for a parental order, regardless of
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their legal relationship status or their sex, provided that all the conditions set out
in the relevant sections in the HFEA 1990 have been met. Commissioning
couples of whom neither partner is genetically related to the child borne by the
surrogate mother will not be eligible for a parental order. 
The other issue concerns the prohibition in Dutch law for a married man to
recognise the child of a woman other than his wife. A married man may only
recognise a child outside his marriage if he is in a close personal relationship
with either the mother or the chid at the time of the recognition.176 The provi-
sion concerned has not been extended to men in formalised same-sex relation-
ships, be it marriage or registered partnership. However, it is difficult to say
what will happen if a man in a formalised same-sex relationship tries to recog-
nise a child outside his relationship. 
Originally, the provision that prevents a married man from recognising a child
outside his marriage was introduced to protect the marriage and the interests of
the wife.177 However, in the private international law context this provision has
recently become important for a different reason. During the parliamentary
debates on the law that regulates the recognition of parentage established
abroad, it was stated that recognition abroad of a child born outside the marriage
may be used by married couples to circumvent adoption law.178 As a conse-
quence, the present private international law provisions on this issue determine
that recognition abroad of a child not born to the man’s wife will not be recog-
nised in The Netherlands if the recognition would have been void under Dutch
law.179 This means that such a recognition will only be valid if there was a close
personal relationship between the man and the child or between the man and
the child’s mother before the recognition. Given this additional use of the
provision, it cannot be said with certainty that a man married to another man or
a man in a registered partnership will be allowed to recognise a child outside his
formalised relationship without the prior existence of a close personal relation-
ship with the child or the child’s mother.
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Table 6.3. Surrogate families 
6.6. THE BIRTH MOTHER REIGNS (ALMOST)
SUPREME
The birth mother and the legal status of her relationship determine in the first
instance whether the child will have a second legal parent and who this parent
will be. It is irrelevant whether she has a genetic link with the child. The most
far-reaching consequences of this state of affairs may be found where the surro-
gate mother gives birth to the genetic child of the commissioning mother. If the
surrogate mother refuses to hand over the child to the commissioning mother,
there is nothing the commissioning mother can do to force her to comply. In
these circumstances the intention of the parties involved at the outset is of very
little consequence for the attribution of parental status, except in a limited
number of cases covered by the English parental order. Here intention does not
play a role in the automatic attribution of legal parenthood but for the transfer
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Table 6.3. Surrogate families 
of parental rights from the surrogate mother to the commissioning couple if the
surrogate mother is willing to comply. 
In a substantial number of non-surrogacy situations, it is also the mother who
determines who will be the child’s other parent, either because she has entered
into a formalised relationship with this person or because she has given consent
to this person to become the child’s parent or to acquire parental responsibility
or because she does none of the above. In a limited number of cases this other
person, who intended to be the child’s parent, may acquire the status of legal
parent or parental responsibility without maternal cooperation. In the case of
attribution of legal parenthood or parental responsibility without maternal
cooperation, the court will often have to test whether such attribution would be
in the child’s interest.
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Furthermore, facts, such as relational status, biology, consent and a family
relationship with the child do not always carry the same weight in the attribu-
tion of legal parenthood and parental responsibility. It is usually a combination
of factors that determines who will have a legal relationship with the child
besides the birth mother. A clear example of this is the difference in the legal
position with regard to legal parenthood of different-sex couples using sperm
donation and the position of same-sex couples using sperm donation. Where the
husband acquires the status of legal parent by virtue of his marriage to the child’s
birth mother, the married or registered co-mother does not acquire this status
automatically. Apparently the fact that the husband is a man and the co-mother
a woman plays a crucial role in the attribution of legal parenthood also were
neither are biological parents. Moreover, it seems as though the position of the
sperm donor warrants more protection if he donates sperm to a female couple.
In England the same applies to unmarried different-sex and same-sex couples
who make use of assisted conception services with donor sperm under the HFEA
1990. The male partner becomes a legal parent by operation of law, the co-
mother, at present, does not.
All in all, it may be concluded that of the different categories of families dis-
cussed in this chapter, it is mainly with regard to different-sex couples using
donated gametes that the legal position of the parents in traditional genetic
families has been very closely adhered to, in particular with regard to the
attribution of legal parenthood. For the other types of families, same-sex and
surrogate, solutions have been found in the form of adoption or a kind of adop-
tion (parental order). Whether a solution may also be found in the regulations
existing for traditional genetic families (maybe by inserting some family-specific
rules) is the topic of Chapters 7 and 8.
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ALL OTHER THINGS BEING EQUAL
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hood: biology, care and agreement.
2 This use of the term connecting factor in this context is not to be confused with the term
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CHAPTER 7
FAMILY ANALYSIS
7.1. INTRODUCTION
On the basis of the information gathered in the Chapters 3 to 6, the analysis in
this chapter seeks to gain insight into the factors that determine whether or not
a legal relationship between child and parent may be established. In order to
achieve this aim, the knowledge gained in the previous chapters has been put
into tables. These tables either concern the establishment of a legal link between
child and parent by operation of law or establishment of such a legal link
through subsequent action either by one or both of the parents or the child.
7.1.1.  KEY CONCEPTS IN THE ANALYSIS
To gain insight into the grounds on which a legal link between parent and child
may be established use is made of two key concepts that have been distilled from
the previous chapters: fundaments and connecting factors.1 These concepts can
be defined as follows: 
– A fundament is a constituent element of legal parenthood and parental
responsibility, it is the foundation on which the system of legal parenthood
and parental responsibility is based. 
– A connecting factor is an element in social reality that is used by the law to
assign the status of a legal parent or parental responsibility to a person, i.e.
connecting factors are the visible legal factors that are found in the provisions
themselves, such as the parents’ relationship status.2 
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The fundaments and connecting factors that are used in the analysis have been
distilled from the law, on the basis of the description and comparison in Chap-
ters 3 to 6. For instance the fundaments distilled in this manner with regard to
legal parenthood, are biology, and the intention to be a parent to the child.3
Since the fundaments as such are not visible and additional factors, such as a
relationship with the child’s birth mother, may be required to attribute a person
with the status of a legal parent or parental responsibility the law uses connect-
ing factors. The connecting factors for legal parenthood are relationship status,
maternal consent and consent to the conception of the child. 
It is the combination between the legal fundaments and the connecting factors
as they exist in a factual situation that determines whether and how a person
may be attributed with the status of a legal parent. The aim of applying the
fundaments and connecting factors in this manner is to reveal similarities and
differences between the legal positions of children in the various families
discussed. Furthermore, this approach makes it possible to evaluate whether the
different situations may be treated as similar in the light of the assumptions
beneath the fundaments and the connecting factors in the law at present.
7.1.2.  THE STRUCTURE OF THE CHAPTER
Section 7.2 contains an analysis of legal parenthood in traditional genetic and
partially genetic primary families. These two family categories will be discussed
together in order to analyse the similarities and differences between the legal
position of children. Parental responsibility will be analysed in section 7.3, and
adoption and the transfer of full parental status in section 7.4. The position of the
new parent in a secondary family will also be discussed in section 7.4 on adop-
tion. In section 7.5 the position of children in male same-sex families will be
discussed; they receive separate attention because their status is much less clear
than that of children born into female same-sex families. Finally in section 7.6
the conclusions that may be drawn on the basis of the analysis will be visualised
in a diagram in Figure 7.
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7.2. LEGAL PARENTHOOD IN TRADITIONAL
GENETIC AND PARTIALLY GENETIC PRIMARY
FAMILIES
In the analysis of the possibilities for a parent to acquire the status of a legal
parent with regard to a particular child, the fundaments biology and intention
will be used, and the connecting factors relationship status, consent to concep-
tion and maternal cooperation.
 
Table 7.1: Fundaments and connecting factors
 fundament
connecting
factor 
different -sex marriage: both
parents are biological parents biology marriage 
different-sex marriage, one
of the parents is a consensual
non-biological parent intention marriage 
Before the analysis begins a few words on the fundament intention. This funda-
ment will usually take the form of consent to conception as will become clear
from section 7.2.2.1. Consent to conception, has a hybrid nature and is used in
English law both as a fundament and a connecting factor. In order to further
investigate the nature of consent in the two legal systems, the use of consent in
the tables below is not unequivocal. In the majority of cases it is refered to as a
fundament, in which case it is proof of intention in the sense that DNA evidence
is proof of genetic parenthood. However, in one particular case consent in the
law has been given the status of a connecting factor, namely in the status provi-
sions of the HFEA 1990 concerning unmarried consensual non-biological
fathers.4 Consent in the first sense need not necessarily be included, since the
actual fundament is intention, but in order to gain more insight into the function
of intention in the present provisions, it is included nonetheless.
Furthermore, during the analysis, it is important to keep in mind that in England
a biological father is a legal parent unless he is a sperm donor pursuant to the
HFEA 1990. Furthermore, a HFEA father is a legal father. These fathers are
included in the table on paternity by operation of law (no. 7.3.) and are therefore
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not included in the other tables. Furthermore, it needs to be noted that in all the
situations where use of donor material is made and the partner of the birth
mother has consented to such use, that the birth mother consented to the legal
parenthood of her partner as well. In a marriage this is implicit, but in a non-
formalised relationship this might lead to problems where the birth mother later
disputes that she consented to the legal parenthood of her partner.5 The situation
where the mother later disputes her consent is not discussed.
7.2.1.  THE BIRTH MOTHER 
In both jurisdictions, the woman who gives birth to a child is the child’s legal
mother. A birth mother’s legal parenthood cannot be challenged if she is not the
child’s genetic mother.6 However, the position of the birth mother is also no
longer as straightforward as it once was. The possibility of egg donation and
embryo transfer has had some effect on the way the fundaments and connecting
factors for legal motherhood are regarded. 
Despite the fact that a non-genetic birth mother cannot deny her maternity, nor
a genetic mother claim legal parenthood, one may say that intention has come
to play a role as a fundament for legal motherhood. However, it is not (yet) as
strong as the kind of fundament on the basis of which one may claim the posi-
tion of a legal parent. But the English parental order, for instance, finds its basis
in the intentions of the two mothers involved. Such an order requires both the
consent of the commissioning mother and the surrogate mother to the transfer
of parental status. Below this connecting factor of consent lies hidden the
fundament of the commissioning mother’s intention to be(come) a parent to the
child (and the intention of the surrogate mother not to become a parent to the
child). 
Table 7.2. illustrates two possible situations with regard to the position of the
non-genetic mother: gestational surrogacy and assisted conception with a donor
egg. The difference in these two situations lies in the intention of the birth
mother. In the case of surrogacy it is not the intention of the birth mother to be
a parent to the child. In the case of the egg donation it is the intention of the
birth mother to be the child’s parent. In the latter case the intention may be
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regarded as the fundament for legal parenthood, akin to the use of the funda-
ment intention for non-biological parents.
Table 7.2: The birth mother
fundaments and connecting 
factors -->
genetics
intention to 
be a parent
giving birth 
relationship
status
Factual situations I EN NL EN NL EN NL EN NL
birth mother is the genetic
mother
Fu Fu - - C C - -
birth mother is not the genetic
mother 
- - Fu Fu C C - -
Fu = fundament; C = connecting factor; - = not applicable
7.2.2. LEGAL PARENTHOOD FOR THE BIRTH MOTHER’S
PARTNER BY OPERATION OF LAW
In a number of situations the birth mother’s partner may be attributed with the
status of a legal parent by operation of law.7 It may be concluded from Table 7.3.
that there are far more similarities than differences between the two jurisdic-
tions in this field. It is clear that only a limited group of partners will become
legal parents by operation of law.8 However, there are a number of issues in this
table that require closer attention. These issues, which all concern the use of
third-party genetic material, are the following:
• what is covered in the two jurisdictions by the term consent?
• what is the status of the supplier of the genetic material?
• what role, if any, does consent play in the attribution of legal parenthood for
same-sex couples?
Another issue, which is only relevant for Dutch law, is the legal position of
children born into different-sex registered partnerships. 
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Table 7.3: Legal parenthood for the birth mother’s partner by operation of law
fundaments and connecting
factors --›
Biology Intention Consent Relationship
status
factual situations I EN NL EN NL EN NL EN NL
different-sex marriage,
male partner is bio-father Fu Fu Fu Fu - - C C
different-sex marriage,
male partner is not bio-father - - - - Fu Fu C C
 
different-sex registered,
male partner is bio-father  -  -  -  -
different-sex registered,
male partner is not bio-father  -  -  -  -
 
different-sex non-formalised,
male partner is bio-father Fu/C - - - - - - -
different-sex non-formalised,
male partner is not bio-father - - Fu - C - - -
 
fem. same-sex married  -  -  -  -
fem. same-sex registered - - - - - - - -
fem. same-sex non-formalised - - - - - - - -
 
male same-sex married  -  -  -  -
male same-sex registered - - - - - - - -
male same-sex non-formalised - - - - - - - -
Fu = fundament;  C = connecting factor;  - = not applicable; shaded means that this situation
does not exist
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husband will be presumed to be the child’s legal father even where consent is lacking. Unless
this presumption is challenged, the husband will in practice be regarded as the child legal
parent.
11 See section 6.2.2 for an extensive discussion of this issue.
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7.2.2.1.  Legal consequences of the use of third-party genetic material
The nature of consent and the legal position of the supplier of third-party
genetic material
In both jurisdictions intention plays a role in the attribution of the status of legal
parent to the birth mother’s male partner where third-party genetic material has
been used. However, in both jurisdictions intention only plays a role if it takes
the form of consent by the partner to the conception of the child with the
genetic material of a third party.9 Where there is no consent, there is no funda-
ment for attributing a non-biological parent with the status of a legal parent.10
Despite the fact that in both jurisdictions consent is used as a fundament for
attributing a non-biological father with the status of a legal parent, the circum-
stances in which consent functions as a fundament differ considerably. 
In England the birth mother’s male partner’s consent to the conception of a child
with donor sperm only has consequences for the establishment of legal parent-
hood if the couple were receiving fertility treatment with donor sperm in
accordance with the HFEA 1990. If such treatment takes place within the
context of the HFEA 1990, the supplier of the third party genetic material will
have consented to the use of his material in this manner.11 This means that the
fundament consent in England is based on double consent, the consent of the
non-biological father on the one hand and the consent of the donor on the other
hand. If the conception with third party genetic material of the child falls
outside the scope of the HFEA 1990, the intention of the non-biological parent
is not a fundament for the attribution of legal parenthood. Under those circum-
stances the supplier of the genetic material will in principle be regarded as the
child legal parent. Non-biological parents who fall outside the scope of the
HFEA 1990 will be refered to in this chapter as intentional non-biological
parents. Non-biological fathers who fall within the scope of the HFEA 1990 are
refered to as consensual non-biological parents or HFEA fathers.
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13 See section 6.2.4.1.
14 However, the legal parenthood of the unmarried father needs to be made operational for
instance by registration on the child’s birth certificate, through an application for parental
responsibility pursuant to s. 4 CA 1989 or by a declaration of parentage. The legal fatherhood
of the married father has been made operational by virtue of the marriage.
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In The Netherlands, the consent of the male life partner covers any act that may
have resulted in the conception of the child. This may range from consent to
licensed fertility treatment with donor sperm to consent to have sexual inter-
course with another man to conceive a child. Consent as a fundament for legal
parenthood under Dutch law is not based on the notion of double consent. Only
where the birth mother and her partner receive fertility treatment with donor
sperm in a clinic, will the consent of the non-biological father be matched with
the consent of the donor. For children conceived outside the fertility treatment
context, this situation may or may not exist. The fact that double consent is not
a requirement may be due to the categorisation of biological father into begetters
and sperm donors. The latter category includes all biological fathers who are not
in a relationship with the birth mother and have contributed to the conception
of the child with their genetic material without sexual intercourse. In principle
a begetter may acquire legal rights and duties with regard to his biological child,
and a sperm donor may not. However, if the birth mother is not married to the
begetter but to another man, the intentions of the birth mother’s husband will
determine whether the begetter may acquire a legal relationship with the child.
The begetter in such a situation has no standing to challenge the legal parent-
hood of the birth mother’s husband.
Establishment of the legal parenthood of a consensual non-biological father 
In England, consent to fertility treatment with donor sperm, in accordance with
the requirements of the HFEA 1990, will result in the consensual non-biological
father being regarded as a legal parent whether or not this man and the birth
mother have entered into a formalised relationship.12 One of the major differ-
ences between the two jurisdictions concerns the position of the consensual non-
biological father in a non-formalised relationship.13 If the conditions of s. 28(3)
of the HFEA 1990 have been met, the birth mother’s partner is the child’s legal
father. This means that the position of the unmarried HFEA father is the same
as that of the married HFEA father.14 Despite the fact that this is a far-reaching
provision which needs to be applied with the utmost care, it seems to be in line
with the general thrust of the system created by means of the HFEA 1990. Since
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the donor has consented to the use of his sperm in this manner and is excluded
from any responsibility with regard to the child, there is room for another
parent. Given the fact that the general common law idea that a biological father
is a legal father is not applicable in this case, it seems natural to find the most
appropriate substitute: the man who has actively participated in the conception
of the child. His participation does not involve his own genetic material, but his
intention to be a parent in the form of consent to the conception of the child.
The consequence attached by law to this intention is the assignment of responsi-
bility to the non-biological father for the child, akin to the responsibility that is
assigned to a biological father. 
In contrast in The Netherlands, the legal implications of consent for establishing
legal parenthood by operation of law depend on the legal status of the relation-
ship between the partners. If the consensual non-biological father is married to
the birth mother he will be a legal parent by operation of law. If he is not
married to the birth mother he will not be the child’s legal parent by operation
of law. On the one hand, this may be due to the fact that marriage may be
regarded as a commitment that includes the intention to take care of any chil-
dren born into the marriage, whereas this may or may not be true for couples in
non-formalised relationships. However, on the other hand, this may also be due
to the fact that no distinction is made between fertility treatment with donor
sperm in a licensed clinic, and the use of a DIY sperm donor (who may inciden-
tally be the birth mother’s life partner). As a consequence of this fact, one cannot
be certain that the supplier of the genetic material consented to the use of his
material in this manner. This means that the partner will have to take action to
establish his legal parenthood with maternal cooperation by means of recogni-
tion. He cannot establish his legal parenthood without maternal cooperation In
contrast, the child or the child’s mother may have the consensual father’s legal
parenthood established by court order, if the non-biological father consented to
the conception of the child in this manner and may be regarded as the birth
mother’s life partner. 
The legal position of the intentional parent in England where there is no consent
Where there is no double consent, the intentional non-biological father can in
principle not acquire the status of a legal parent with regard to the child, either
voluntarily or involuntarily.15 Registration of the father’s name on the child’s
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17 In England the Tissue Bill aims to bring female same-sex couples under the status provisions
of the HFEA 1990. In The Netherlands the Minister of Justice has recently installed a commit-
tee to advise the government on the possibilities for establishing legal parenthood for the
female same-sex partner by operation of law, Dutch Second Chamber 2006-2007, 30 551, no. 8.
18 See sections 3.3.2 and 6.3.2 for more detail.
19 BOELE-WOELKI et al. (2007a) p. 226.
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birth certificate is limited to biological fathers and HFEA-fathers.16 False regis-
tration may lead to prosecution for perjury; however, no checks are required to
confirm that the registering father is indeed a biological father. However, it is
likely that such ‘false’ registration takes place from time to time, either because
the non-biological father has assumed responsibility for the child, or simply
because he is not aware of the fact that he is not the child’s biological father. If
such a registration remains unchallenged, the non-biological father is, in prac-
tice, regarded as the child’s legal father.
Consensual non-biological parenthood in same-sex relationships
In neither of the two jurisdictions do same-sex partners acquire the status of a
legal parent by operation of law, regardless of the legal status of their relation-
ship or the kind of sperm donor they used. The partner’s consent, which plays
an important role for different-sex couples, is of no relevance for same-sex
couples. The only way a same-sex partner may acquire the status of a legal
parent with regard to a child born to his or her partner is by means of adoption.
In both jurisdictions legislative action is being undertaken to address this issue.17
7.2.2.2.  Children in Dutch different-sex registered partnerships
A problem specific to the Dutch legal system is the position of children in
different-sex registered partnership.18 The legal parenthood of the male regis-
tered partner is not established by operation of law. It has to be established
voluntarily or involuntary. Recent research shows that not all male partners in
a different-sex registered partnership do in fact recognise the children born into
their relationship. The research did not show whether or not these particular
fathers were aware of the fact that they were not automatically attributed with
the status of a legal parent by operation of law. But it did show that a substantial
group of different-sex registered partners who were questioned on this issue,
presumed that the male registered partner would be the legal father of any child
born into their relationship.19 
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7.2.3. VOLUNTARY ESTABLISHMENT OF THE LEGAL
PARENTHOOD OF THE BIRTH MOTHER’S PARTNER
WITH MATERNAL COOPERATION 
Table 7.4: Voluntary establishment of legal parenthood by mother’s partner with
maternal cooperation
fundaments and connecting
factors --›
Biology Intention Consent
mother
Relationship
status
factual situations I EN NL EN NL EN NL EN NL
different-sex registered,
male partner is bio-father  Fu  -  C  -
different-sex registered,
male partner is not bio-father  -  Fu  C  -
 
different-sex non-formalised,
male partner is bio-father Fu Fu - - C C - -
different-sex non-formalised,
male partner is not bio-father - - - Fu - C - -
 
fem. same-sex married  -  -  -  -
fem. same-sex registered - - - - - - - -
fem. same-sex non-formalised - - - - - - - -
 
male same-sex married  -  -  -  -
male same-sex registered - - - - - - - -
male same-sex non-formalised - - - - - - - -
Fu = fundament;  C = connecting factor;  - = not applicable; shaded means that this situation
does not exist
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6.2.3.1 and 6.2.6.1 (both) for more detail. 
21 An exception is the situation discussed in section 7.2.1.1 concerning the position of the
unmarried consensual non-biological HFEA father who may register on the child’s birth
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22 See sections 3.2.2, 3.2.3, (England), 3.3.2, 3.3.3, 3.3.4 (The Netherlands), 3.4 (comparison),
6.3.2.1, 6.2.5 and 6.2.6 (both jurisdictions) for more detail.
23 See previous section.
220 Intersentia
Table 7.4. reveals that there are a number of differences and similarities between
the two jurisdictions on this issue.20 In both jurisdictions biological fathers may
acquire the status of a legal parent with maternal cooperation. With regard to
the possibilities of non-biological to become legal parents, the jurisdictions
differ. Under English law registration of a non-biological father’s name on the
child’s birth certificate is not allowed, unless he is to be treated as a father
pursuant to s. 28 HFEA 1990.21 Under Dutch law a non-biological father may
recognise the birth mother’s child with her consent. The fundament for the
ensuing legal parenthood is the non-biological father’s intention to be the child’s
parent.
7.2.4.  VOLUNTARY ESTABLISHMENT OF THE LEGAL
 PARENTHOOD OF THE BIRTH MOTHER’S PARTNER 
 WITHOUT MATERNAL COOPERATION
In both jurisdictions biological fathers may establish their legal parenthood
without maternal cooperation.22 However, under Dutch law not all biological
fathers may establish their legal parenthood, only those who have begotten the
child with the birth mother in a natural way. This provision is meant to exclude
sperm donors from trying to establish their legal parenthood. Unfortunately, as
was explained in Chapter 3.3.3, this restriction may also exclude others from
establishing their legal parenthood, such as the long-term unmarried partner of
the birth mother who contributed his sperm to the conception of the child
through AI or IVF. 
A non-biological father cannot establish his legal parenthood without maternal
cooperation in either jurisdiction. Although this is understandable in English law
because there a consensual non-biological HFEA father is regarded as a legal
father,23 it is more difficult to comprehend in the Dutch system. The Dutch
system does allow the legal parenthood of the consensual non-biological father
to be established against his will, but does not give him the possibility to estab-
lish this legal parenthood against the birth mother’s will. Furthermore, non-
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biological same-sex parents cannot establish their legal parenthood with or
without maternal consent in either jurisdiction, even in those cases where the
legal parenthood of the biological father cannot be established.
Table 7.5: Voluntary establishment of legal parenthood without maternal
cooperation
fundaments and connecting 
factors --›
Biology Intention Consent Relationship
status
factual situations I EN NL EN NL EN NL EN NL
different-sex registered,
male partner is bio-father  Fu  -  -  -
different-sex registered,
male partner is not bio-father  -  -  -  -
 
different-sex non-form,
male partner is bio-father Fu Fu - - - - - -
different-sex non-form,
male partner is not bio-father - - - - - - - -
 
fem. same-sex married  -  -  -  -
fem. same-sex registered - - - - - - - -
fem. same-sex non-form. - - - - - - - -
 
male same-sex married  -  -  -  -
male same-sex registered - - - - - - - -
male same-sex non-form - - - - - - - -
Fu = fundament;  C = connecting factor;  - = not applicable; shaded means that this situation
does not exist
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7.2.5. INVOLUNTARY ESTABLISHMENT OF THE LEGAL
PARENTHOOD OF THE BIRTH MOTHER’S PARTNER
Table 7.6: Involuntary establishment of the legal parenthood of the mother’s
partner by the mother, the child or a third party (EN)
fundaments and connecting 
factors --›
Biology Intention Consent Relationship
status
factual situations I EN NL EN NL EN NL EN NL
different-sex registered,
male partner is bio-father  Fu  -  -  -
different-sex registered,
male partner is not bio-father  -  Fu  Fu  -
 
different-sex non-formalised,
male partner is bio-father Fu Fu - - - - - -
different-sex non-formalised,
male partner is not bio-father - - - Fu - Fu - -
 
fem. same-sex married  -  -  -  -
fem. same-sex registered - - - - - - - -
fem. same-sex non-formalised - - - - - - - -
 
male same-sex married  -  -  -  -
male same-sex registered - - - - - - - -
male same-sex non-formalised - - - - - - - -
Fu = fundament;  C = connecting factor;  - = not applicable; shaded means that this situation
does not exist
Involuntary establishment of legal parenthood concerns those cases where the
establishment of the legal parenthood of the biological father or the birth
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25 See sections 3.4.3 and 6.2.6.1 for a more detailed discussion of this topic. 
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mother’s consensual partner is established against his will.24 In both jurisdictions
the legal parenthood of a biological father may be established against his will.
However, the legal parenthood of a sperm donor cannot be established in this
manner. For more information on the biological fathers and sperm donor see
section 7.2.2.
With regard to the position of the same-sex partner, one can be very brief: at
present it is impossible in either jurisdiction for the child, the birth mother or
any other interested party to apply to the court to establish the legal parenthood
of the birth mother’s same-sex partner. 
Under Dutch law the legal parenthood of the consensual non-biological father
can be established against his will at the request of the birth mother or the child
if he may be regarded as the mother’s life partner. Once the consensual non-
biological father’s legal parenthood has been established, it cannot be challenged
by the child.
7.2.6.  CHALLENGING NON-BIOLOGICAL LEGAL PARENTHOOD
It is necessary to pay separate attention to the issue of challenging non-biological
legal parenthood, because it reveals crucial differences between the two jurisdic-
tions where the application of the fundaments biology and consent are con-
cerned. In both jurisdictions a child may, under certain circumstances, challenge
the legal parenthood of a non-biological father. Others may also, under certain
conditions, challenge the legal parenthood of the non-biological father.25 How-
ever, there are substantial differences. One of the most striking differences
between the jurisdictions is the fact that in England a biological father outside
the family unit may challenge the legal parenthood of the mother’s partner
whereas in The Netherlands this is not possible. 
Another very important difference between the two jurisdictions concerns the
legal parenthood of the non-biological father established on the basis of consent.
In England this legal parenthood cannot be challenged by any person, including
the child. The legal parenthood of this consensual non-biological father is thus
as solid as the legal parenthood of a biological father. Given the fact that this
legal parenthood may only be established if there is double consent, it fits within
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have a father. Dutch Second Chamber 1994-1995, 22 700, no. 5, p. 3.
27 This is of course not the case where a single woman or a lesbian couple make use of licensed
assisted conception facilities, under those circumstances the child has only one legal parent and
there is no other parent who can be regarded as a legal parent.
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the common law system in which a child always has two parents, namely a
biological father and a biological mother.26 The consensual non-biological father
takes the place of the biological father and thus the two-parent system is main-
tained.27 This may in part also explain the inclusion of section 13(5) in the HFEA
1990 which requires the provider of the fertility treatment to take into account
the welfare of any child who may be born as a result of the treatment, including
the need of that child to have a father.28 The legal parenthood of an intentional
non-biological father may be challenged by any interested party, including the
child’s biological father.
Table 7.7: When may the child challenge the paternity of a non-biological
father?
 
 father is not the child'sbiological father 
if legal parenthood was
established I
EN NL
by operation of law No Yes
voluntary with consent Yes Yes
voluntary without consent Yes Yes
Involuntary - No
Under Dutch law, a child may always deny the legal parenthood of a non-
biological father, regardless of the means by which he or she was conceived.
However, other interested parties, including the mother and the father, may not
challenge the consensual non-biological father’s legal parenthood. There are
strict time-limits attached to the right to a challenge of legal parenthood, which
means that the lapse of time may leave the parenthood of the non-biological
father in place. There is one exception to this rule; if a court has established the
legal parenthood of a consensual non-biological father, the child cannot chal-
lenge the legal parenthood of this father. 
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Figure 6 shows for both jurisdictions whose legal parenthood will continue to
exist after the paternity of this parent has been challenged by the child. 
Figure 6: Challenging paternity by the child 
7.2.7.  COMPARISON 
There are many similarities between the jurisdictions where the attribution of
the status of a legal parent is concerned, for instance with regard to the establish-
ment of the legal parenthood of the birth mother and the establishment of the
legal parenthood of the married father. The legal parenthood of the birth mother
is based on giving birth; the legal parenthood of the married father is based on
his being married to the child’s mother. 
However, in the other situations there are substantial differences between the
two jurisdictions. Although voluntary establishment in England is based purely
on the fundament biology, in The Netherlands it is based either on the funda-
ments biology or intention. With regard to the involuntary establishment of
legal parenthood, the English system is based on biology, with a minor exception
for the group of unmarried non-biological fathers who fall under the status
provisions of the HFEA 1990. In The Netherlands there is a dual system where
legal parenthood can either be established on the basis of biology or on the basis
of intention in the form of consent to an act that may have resulted in the
conception of the child. This fundament is only applicable to a person who was
regarded as the mother’s life partner at the time the consent was given. This
means that a child may have two persons whose legal parenthood he or she may
try to establish, that of the biological father and that of the consenting life
partner. 
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Table 7.8: Factual situations compared
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Also with regard to the possibilities to challenge a non-biological father’s legal
parenthood there are substantial differences. In England legal parenthood based
on the fundament biology or on the fundament intention in the form of double
consent cannot be challenged by any person. Both of the fundaments used for
attributing the status of a legal parent (if they can indeed be proven to exist) will
hold out against a challenge to legal parenthood. In contrast, in The Netherlands,
only the fundament biology will hold out against a challenge to legal parent-
hood. Intention will give way as a fundament for legal parenthood, unless this
legal parenthood has been established by a court. Since under English law
consent means double consent, and in The Netherlands consent is a vague
concept that may be disputed,29 this distinction is understandable.
Furthermore, an English biological father has more straightforward opportuni-
ties to acquire parental status with regard to a child than a Dutch biological
father. Nevertheless, neither jurisdiction attributes a child born outside of
marriage with two legal parents by operation of law, in the sense that both have
rights and duties without some additional requirements being fulfilled, such as
registration or recognition.
Table 7.8 summarizes the information provided in table 7.3/7.6 and gives an
overview of the means by which the birth mother’s partner in the different
family categories may acquire a legal relationship with the children born into
their family. On the basis of the information provided in this table, it may be
concluded that there are two types of situations in the analysis that lead to
unclarity: those situations where the same fundaments and connecting factors
exist, but the couple concerned are a same-sex instead of a different-sex couple;
and the situation where there are fundaments but no connecting factors, for
instance if the birth mother’s partner is the child’s biological parent, but the
couple have not entered into a formalised relationship.30 In the first situation the
parenthood of the same-sex partner cannot be established within the current
legal framework at all. In the second case the legal parenthood may be estab-
lished but not by operation of law. This leads to the conclusion that the follow-
ing issues in the field of legal parenthood require further scientific and legislative
attention:
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1. The position of children in unmarried traditional genetic families. This
concerns children born outside marriage and registered non-marital relation-
ships in England and The Netherlands; moreover, in The Netherlands special
attention is required for the legal position of children conceived through
assisted conception with the couples’ own genetic material.
2. The position of children born in unmarried partially genetic families. In
England this concerns children born with the help of DIY sperm donation
and in The Netherlands children born with the help of DIY and anonymous
sperm donation outside marriage, including those born in a registered part-
nership.
3. The position of children born into formalised same-sex relationships. In
England this concerns children born during a civil partnership and in The
Netherlands children born during marriage or a registered partnership.
7.3. PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY
The differences made for the establishment of legal parenthood between funda-
ments and connecting factors is also relevant for analysing the attribution of
parental responsibility. It will be obvious that the fundaments and connecting
factors do not fulfil exactly the same role for parental responsibility as they do
for legal parenthood. Nevertheless, they may be very useful to gain insight into
the grounds on which parental responsibility is attributed to parents in the two
jurisdictions. The fundament distilled from the previous chapters is the parent’s
intention to parent the child The connecting factors used in the analysis of the
attribution of parental responsibility are: legal parenthood, relationship status,
the factual relationship with the child, and the cooperation of the legal parent(s)
with parental responsibility.
In the following section the situation of primary families will be discussed and
in section 7.3.2 the position of secondary families.
 
7.3.1. TRADITIONAL GENETIC AND PARTIALLY GENETIC
PRIMARY FAMILIES
This section is concerned with the attribution of parental responsibility to
parents in traditional genetic and partially genetic primary families. When
discussing English law on this issue, it must be borne in mind that where the law
relating to legal parenthood is concerned, the fact that a biological father is a
legal father does not mean that all biological fathers are automatically attributed
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6.3.3, 6.3.5 and 6.4.2 (both jurisdictions) for more detail.
33 S. 10(1)(c)(i) and s. 10(1)(c)(i) BDRA 1953.
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with parental responsibility. A distinction has to be made between those fathers
who are ‘merely’ biological fathers and those whose legal parenthood has been
made operational, either because they are married to the child’s mother or
because they have registered their name on the child’s birth certificate. The same
is true for HFEA fathers; without marriage to the birth mother or registration on
the birth certificate, they will not automatically acquire parental responsibility.
In this section the following issues will be discussed: the position of the birth
mother, the attribution of parental responsibility to the partner by operation of
law, the attribution of parental responsibility to the partner with maternal
cooperation and, finally, attribution to the partner without maternal coopera-
tion.
7.3.1.1.  Birth mother
In both jurisdictions the birth mother has parental responsibility by operation
of law.31
7.3.1.2.  Attribution to the birth mother’s partner by operation of law
Table 7.9. reveals that there are similarities but also a number of substantial
differences between the two jurisdictions on this point.32 A few issues require
closer attention: the position of the unmarried father and the position of same-
sex couples who have entered into a formalised relationship. 
With regard to the attribution of parental responsibility to unmarried fathers,
there are substantial differences between the two jurisdictions. Neither of the
two jurisdictions automatically confers parental responsibility on the unmarried
father purely on the basis of biology. However, under English law, an unmarried
father who registers his name on the child’s birth certificate, either with mater-
nal consent or on the production of a declaration in the prescribed form stating
that he is the father of the child,33 will automatically be attributed with parental
responsibility. Under Dutch law an unmarried biological or non-biological father
who recognises the child with maternal consent is not attributed with parental
responsibility by operation of law. 
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Table 7.9: Parental responsibility for the mother’s partner by operation of law
fundaments and connecting
factors --›
intention to
parent the
child
legal
parenthood
relationship
parent
factual
relationship
child
factual situations I EN NL EN NL EN NL EN NL
different-sex marriage,
male partner is bio-father Fu Fu C C C C - -
different-sex marriage,
male partner is not bio-father Fu Fu C C C C - -
 
different-sex registered,
male partner is bio-father  Fu  C  C  -
different-sex registered,
male partner is not bio-father  Fu  C  C  -
 
different-sex non-formalised,
male partner is bio-father Fu - C - - - - -
different-sex non-formalised,
male partner is not bio-father Fu - C - - - - -
 
fem. same-sex married  Fu  -  C  -
fem. same-sex registered - Fu - - - C - -
fem. same-sex non-formalised - - - - - - - -
 
male same-sex married  Fu  -  C  -
male same-sex registered - Fu - - - C - -
male same-sex non-formalised - - - - - - - -
Fu = fundament; C = connecting factor; - = not applicable; shaded means that this situation does
not exist
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Furthermore, under Dutch law different-sex couples who have entered into a
registered partnership also acquire joint parental responsibility by operation of
law. It is of no relevance whether the male partner has become a legal parent or
not. However, the parental responsibility of this male partner is based on a
different article in the DCC if he has recognised the child prior to its birth (art.
1:253aa DCC instead of 1:253sa DCC). In that case his parental responsibility is
based both on the legal status of his relationship with the birth mother and his
legal parenthood, whereas it would otherwise only be based on the legal status
of his relationship with the birth mother.
Further differences are found in the legal position of same-sex couples. In The
Netherlands, same-sex couples in a formalised relationship will have parental
responsibility with regard to a child born into their relationship, unless the child
already has a legal parent outside the relationship. In practice, this provision
only applies to female same-sex couples, since in a male same-sex family the
child will always have a legal parent outside the relationship. The legal position
of male same-sex couples with regard to the children raised in their relationship
will be discussed separately in section 7.5. In England civil partners, at present,
do not acquire joint parental responsibility with regard to the children born into
their relationship by operation of law. However, proposals to this end have been
made in the Tissue Bill with regard to co-mothers who are to be treated as legal
parents pursuant to cl. 48 of the Bill.34 
7.3.1.3.  Parental responsibility for the partner with parental cooperation
As may be gathered form Table 7.10 a legal father may acquire parental responsi-
bility with maternal agreement in both jurisdictions. In England by entering into
a parental responsibility agreement with the child’s mother and in The Nether-
lands by registering their joint parental responsibility in the parental responsibil-
ities register.35 Under English law the mere fact of being a biological father or an
HFEA father gives a father the possibility to enter into a parental responsibility
agreement with the mother; in The Netherlands the father needs to have recog-
nised the child before he can jointly register his parental responsibility with the
child’s mother. Moreover, the registrar may refuse to register the joint parental
responsibility under a number of circumstances. Where the Dutch father has not
become a legal parent, he has the same options as those open to same-sex part-
ners, which will be discussed below.
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Table 7.10: Parental responsibility for the partner with parental cooperation 
fundaments and
connecting factors --›
intention to
parent the
child
legal
parenthood
relationship
parent
factual
relationship
child
maternal
cooperation
factual situations I EN NL EN NL EN NL EN NL EN NL
different-sex non-
formalised, male partner
is bio-father
Fu Fu C C - - - C C C
different-sex non-
formalised, male partner
is not bio-father
Fu Fu C C - - - C C C
 
fem. same-sex 
registered Fu - - - C - - - C -
fem. same-sex 
non-formalised Fu Fu - - - - - C - C
 
male same-sex married  -  -  -  -  -
male same-sex 
registered Fu Fu - - C - - C C -
male same-sex 
non-formalised Fu Fu - - - - - C - C
Fu = fundament; C = connecting factor; - = not applicable; shaded means this possibility does
not exist
Even though in both jurisdictions same-sex partners may acquire parental
responsibility, the means by which they may acquire it differ substantially. First
of all, as was shown in the previous section, in The Netherlands same-sex
partners who have entered into a formalised relationship will acquire parental
responsibility with regard to the children born during their relationship by
operation of law, unless the child has a second legal parent outside the relation-
ship. All non-legal parents who do not fall into this category may only acquire
parental responsibility by means of a court order upon a joint application with
the child’s birth mother. Such an application may only be filed if the parent is
the only holder of parental responsibility and if the partner is in a close personal
relationship with the child.
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parental responsibility as unmarried fathers have. See sections 6.3.3.3 and 6.3.3.4.
37 See the next section for the acquisition of parental responsibility with the consent of the other
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38 See sections 3.5.2, 3.5.3 (England), 3.6.3, 3.6.4 (The Netherlands), 3.7 (comparison), 6.3.2, 6.3.3,
6.3.4, 6.3.5 and 6.4.2 (both jurisdictions) for more detail.
39 This is based on the presumption that the CAR criteria: the degree of commitment which the
new parent has shown to the child, the degree of attachment between the new parent and the
child and the reasons why the new parent is applying for the order, developed on the basis of
Re H (Minors)(Parental Responsibility: Parental Rights)(no. 3) [1991] Fam 151, will also apply
in the case of a new parent who applies for parental responsibility.
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In England the legal status of the relationship between the same-sex partners
also plays an important role in their options to acquire joint parental responsibil-
ity. There is, however, no attribution of parental responsibility by operation of
law by virtue of a civil partnership at present.36 Having entered into a civil
partnership with the parent of the child gives the same-sex partner the opportu-
nity to enter into a parental responsibility agreement with the child’s parent(s).
Same-sex partners who have not entered into a civil partnership with the child’s
parent may acquire a residence order upon application to the court with the
consent of the other holder(s) of parental responsibility.37 The court may attrib-
ute parental responsibility to the partner subject to the interests of the child. 
7.3.1.4.  Parental responsibility for the partner without parental cooperation
With regard to the issue of the acquisition of parental responsibility by the
partner without parental cooperation there are mainly differences between the
two systems (see Table 7.11).38 In this section the following issues will be dis-
cussed: 
• the position of unmarried fathers; and
• the position of same-sex parents and other non-biological parents.
Unmarried fathers
Under English law an unmarried biological father and an HFEA father may
apply to the court to be attributed with parental responsibility. In general he will
be attributed with parental responsibility if he meets the criteria developed at
common law.39 In the decision whether or not to attribute parental responsibility
the relationship between the father and the child plays a role. 
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Table 7.11: Parental responsibility for the partner without parental cooperation
fundaments and
connecting factors --›
intention
to parent
the child
biology or
consent
legal
parenthood
relationship
status
factual
relationship
with child
factual situations I EN NL EN NL EN NL EN NL EN NL
different-sex non-
formalised, male partner
is bio-father
Fu Fu C - C C - - C C
different-sex non-
formalised, male partner
is not bio-father
Fu Fu C - C C - - C C
 
fem. same-sex
registered Fu - - - - - C - C -
fem. same-sex
non-formalised Fu - - - - - - - C -
 
male same-sex married  -  -  -  -  -
male same-sex 
registered Fu - - - - - C - C -
male same-sex 
non-formalised Fu - - - - - - - C -
Fu = fundament;  C = connecting factor;  - = not applicable; shaded means the situation does not
exist 
Under Dutch law an unmarried legal father may pursuant to case law apply for
parental responsibility without maternal cooperation. At present the DCC only
allows him to apply for sole parental responsibility to the detriment of the
mother. However, the Dutch Supreme Court has already decided on a number
of occasions that not granting an unmarried legal father standing to apply for
joint parental responsibility is in breach of arts. 6 and 8 of the ECHR.40 There is
no requirement that the father needs to have a certain kind of relationship with
the child; however, granting responsibility to the father should not be contrary
to the child’s interests. A biological father who has not recognised his child
cannot acquire parental responsibility without maternal cooperation.
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Same-sex parents and other non-biological parents 
With regard to the position of same-sex parents there are substantial differences
between the jurisdictions. Under English law a distinction is made depending on
whether the same-sex parents have entered into a civil partnership. Those same-
sex parents who have entered into a civil partnership may apply for a parental
responsibility order and those who have not may apply for a residence order. It
is true that for both these orders the relationship with the child plays a role;
however, the role played by this factual relationship is a different one. When
faced with an application for a parental responsibility order a court will consider
the degree of attachment between the social parent and the child. However,
with regard to an application for a residence order, the social parent who is not
in a formalised relationship with the parent, and does not have the parent’s
consent for the application, needs to have lived with the child for three out of
the five preceding years, before he or she has standing to apply for a residence
order without prior leave of the court. The Tissue Bill proposes to grant co-
mothers who are to be treated as legal parents pursuant to cl. 49 of the Bill the
same option unmarried fathers have with regard to the acquisition of parental
responsibility. In The Netherlands, it is not possible for a same-sex parent to
acquire parental responsibility without maternal cooperation.41 
7.3.2.  SECONDARY FAMILIES
In both jurisdictions the law provides possibilities for new parents to acquire
parental responsibility with regard to their partner’s children. Although accord-
ing to Dutch law only two persons may hold parental responsibility with regard
to a child, English law permits more than two holders. This difference has a
substantial influence on the question whether a new parent may acquire parental
responsibility in practice. In this section the possibilities to acquire parental
responsibility for the new parent are analysed in the following order: by opera-
tion of law, with parental cooperation or without parental cooperation.
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7.3.2.1.  Parental responsibility for the new parent by operation of law
Table 7.12: Parental responsibility for the new parent by operation of law after
adoption
fundaments and connecting
factors --›
intention to
parent the
child
legal
parenthood
relationship
parent
factual
relationship
child
factual situations I EN NL EN NL EN NL EN NL
different-sex marriage Fu - C C - - - -
different-sex registered  -  C  -  -
different-sex non-
formalised Fu - C ? - - - -
 
fem. same-sex married  -  C  -  -
fem. same-sex registered Fu - C C - - - -
fem. same-sex 
non-formalised - Fu C ? - - - -
 
male same-sex married  Fu  F  -  -
male same-sex 
registered Fu - C C - - - -
male same-sex 
non-formalised Fu - C ? - - - -
Fu = fundament;  C = connecting factor;  - = not applicable; ? = unclear; shaded means this situa-
tion does not exist 
New parents only acquire parental responsibility by operation of law if they
become the child’s legal parent through adoption or re-registration/recognition.42
Table 7.12. shows which adoptive parents will acquire parental responsibility by
operation of law after adoption. See Table 7.9 for the situation after re-registra-
tion/recognition by the mother’s new male partner. For those new legal parents
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45 See section 6.4 for more detail.
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who do not acquire parental responsibility by operation of law, see Tables 7.10.
and 7.11. It is, however, important to note that the legal parenthood of the re-
registering non-biological father in England may at any time be challenged by
any interested party.43 
All adoptive parents, regardless of their relationship status, acquire parental
responsibility by operation of law in England. In The Netherlands the situation
is unclear where unmarried couples and couples in a registered partnership are
concerned.44
7.3.2.2.  Parental responsibility for the new parent with parental cooperation
From Table 7.13. it may be concluded that there are a number of differences
between the two jurisdictions.45 These not only concern differences in the
connecting factors used, but also differences in the means by which a new parent
may acquire parental responsibility with the parent’s cooperation. It is important
to note that in The Netherlands the only means by which a new parent may
acquire parental responsibility with the cooperation of the child’s parent is by
means of a court order, whereas in England new parents may also acquire
parental responsibility without court intervention under certain circumstances.
The two issues will be discussed in the remainder of this section.
Parental responsibility for the new parent without court intervention
In England a new parent who has entered into a formalised relationship with
one of the child’s parents may acquire parental responsibility by agreement with
the child’s legal parent(s). Only the agreement of the child’s parent who is also
a holder of parental responsibility is required. Legal parents who are not holders
of parental responsibility and holders of parental responsibility who are not legal
parents need not be party to such an agreement. 
Furthermore, in England new parents who have not entered into a formalised
relationship with the child’s resident parent may apply to the court for a resi-
dence order. The consent of the other holder(s) of parental responsibility is
required for such an application, unless the child has lived with the new parent
for three out of the five preceding years. It is presumed in the legal literature
that the court will apply the same criteria as developed for unmarried fathers in
deciding whether or not to grant a residence order.
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In The Netherlands it is not possible for new parents to acquire parental respon-
sibility by agreement with the child’s parents.
Table 7.13: Parental responsibility for the new parent with parental cooperation
fundaments and connecting
factors --›
intention to
parent the
child
relationship
 status
factual
relationship
child
cooperation
parent(s)
with PR
factual situations I EN NL EN NL EN NL EN NL
different-sex marriage Fu - C - C C C C
different-sex registered  Fu  -  C  C
different-sex non-formalised Fu - - - - C C C
 
fem. same-sex married  -  -  C  C
fem. same-sex registered Fu - C - C C C C
fem. same-sex 
non-formalised - - - - - C C C
 
male same-sex married  Fu  -  C  C
male same-sex registered Fu - C - C C C C
male same-sex non-formalised - - - - - C C C
Fu = fundament; C = connecting; - = not applicable; PR = parental responsibility; shaded means
this situation does not exist
By court order 
Both in England and The Netherlands new parents may acquire parental respon-
sibility by a court order. Since in England the new parent has other means of
acquiring parental responsibility if the child’s parent cooperates, applying for a
parental responsibility order will probably be his or her last resort, for instance
where one of the parents with parental responsibilities refuses to enter into a
responsibility agreement with the new parent. It is presumed in the legal litera-
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ture that the court will apply the same criteria when deciding on such an
application as are used in the case of unmarried fathers.46 
In The Netherlands a court order is the only way by which a new parent may
acquire parental responsibility with regard to the child of his partner. However,
this option is only open to the new parent where the resident parent is the only
holder of parental responsibility. Furthermore, the new parent needs to be in a
close personal relationship with the child.
7.3.2.3. Parental responsibility for the new parent without the cooperation of
the parent
On this issue there are only differences to be found in Table 7.14 between the
two jurisdictions.47 Under Dutch law it is not possible for the new parent to
acquire parental responsibility without the cooperation of the child’s resident
parent, regardless of the length of time the child has lived with the new parent.
Under English law new parents who have entered into a formalised relationship
with the child’s parent may apply for parental responsibility to the court with
the cooperation of the resident parent or any other holder of parental responsi-
bility. The court will decide upon such an application in accordance with the
child’s interests.48 The new parent who has not entered into a formalised rela-
tionship may apply for a residence order, but only if the child has been living
with the new parent (and the partner) for three out of the preceding five years.
This means that there needs to be a social relationship of substance between the
child and the new parent.
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Table 7.14: Parental responsibility without cooperation
fundaments and
connecting factors --›
intention to
parent the
child
relationship
status
factual
relationship
child
cooperation
parent(s)
 with PR
factual situations I EN NL EN NL EN NL EN NL
different-sex marriage Fu - C - C - - -
different-sex registered  -  -  -  -
different-sex 
non-formalised Fu - - - C - - -
 
fem. same-sex married  -  -  -  -
fem. same-sex registered Fu - C - C - - -
fem. same-sex 
non-formalised - Fu - - C - - -
 
male same-sex married  -  -  -  -
male same-sex registered Fu - C - C - - -
male same-sex 
non-formalised Fu - - - C - - -
Fu = fundament; C = connecting factor; - not applicable; PR = parental responsibility; shaded
means this situation does not exist
7.3.3.  COMPARISON
There are two striking differences concerning the attribution of parental respon-
sibilities in primary families between the two jurisdictions. Firstly, in relation to
the automatic attribution of parental responsibility to the unmarried person
upon registration as the father on the child’s birth certificate, this is possible in
England but not in The Netherlands. Secondly, in relation to the automatic
attribution of parental responsibility to female registered partners upon the
child’s birth, which is possible in The Netherlands but, at present, not in Eng-
land. 
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Furthermore, in England no distinction has been made between the possibilities
for non-biological parents in a primary family on the one hand, and new parents
in a secondary family on the other. A same-sex parent in a primary family who
has had an active role in the decision to conceive a child and the process of
conception has the same options as a new parent in a secondary family
(different-sex consensual non-biological parents have a different position). Both
intentional same-sex parents and new parents have the same options of acquiring
parental responsibility, which depend on the legal status of their relationship
with the child’s legal parent or, if there is no formalised relationship, on the legal
parent’s/parents’ cooperation or the factual relationship with the child. On the
one hand, this means that intentional parents do not acquire parental responsi-
bility by operation of law (unless they are male and married to the birth mother,
or registered on the child’s birth certificate with the birth mother’s consent). On
the other hand, most social parents may acquire parental responsibility with or
without parental cooperation if they are living with the child, or have been
living with the child for a substantial period of time. 
In contrast, in The Netherlands a distinction has been made between intentional
non-biological parents and new parents with regard to their options to acquire
parental responsibility. Intentional parents who are not legal parents but have
entered into a formalised relationship with the child’s birth mother, will acquire
parental responsibility by operation of law, unless the child has a second legal
parent outside the relationship. However, new parents in a secondary family will
have great difficulties in acquiring parental responsibility with regard to their
partners’ children, and they can certainly not acquire it without the cooperation
of the child’s parent(s). Other social parents who are living with the child cannot
acquire parental responsibility at their request. In the context of child protection
provisions, foster parents may be attributed with guardianship over the children
for whom they care, but only at the request of the institution for family guard-
ianship (one exception).
A number of these differences are due to the fact that in England more than two
people may have parental responsibility with regard to a child, whereas in The
Netherlands this number is restricted to two. Moreover, in The Netherlands only
legal parents may acquire parental responsibility without court intervention,
whereas in England non-legal parents in a formalised relationship with the
child’s parent may acquire parental responsibility by agreement with the child’s
parent(s). Furthermore, the existence in England of an order such as a residence
order, which regulates where a child resides and in the process grants parental
responsibility to the holder of the residence order, gives recognition to the
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position of social parents. Such recognition does not exist in Dutch law outside
the scope of child protection measures. 
Why can more than two people hold parental responsibility with regard to one
child in England? When the option of parental responsibility for new parents
was introduced in the Children Act 1989, it was clear that in many cases the
parental responsibility of the child’s original parents could not be terminated.
For instance, the parental responsibility of a married father cannot be terminated
after separation upon anybody’s request. It can only be terminated by adoption
or death. Since adoption was no longer a viable alternative for attributing a new
parent with parental responsibility, the solution had to be sought elsewhere.
Since terminating the original parent’s parental responsibility was not an option
and adoption was no longer regarded as desirable, the only solution that had any
substance was providing new parents with rights additional to those of the
original parents: in short, parental responsibility. Before that time new parents
could acquire parental responsibility by means of a residence order, which was
also additional to the parental responsibility of the parents, but as has been
explained in Chapter 4.4, there are differences between parental responsibility
acquired in accordance with section 4A, CA 1989 and parental responsibility
pursuant to a residence order. 
In The Netherlands the introduction of parental responsibility for a parent and
a person other than a parent, coincided with the introduction of continued joint
parental responsibility after divorce. In practice, the intentions of the legislator
to give legal recognition to the position of a new parent in the lives of his or her
partner’s children and to introduce an alternative to adoption have not been
realised. Only a very small percentage of parents with parental responsibility
will lose their parental responsibility after the breakdown of their relationship.
The Dutch Supreme Court has interpreted the provisions on the continuation of
parental responsibility after separation in a very strict manner, both for formerly
married parents, unmarried parents and non-legal parents. Moreover, there are
more recent trends to allow unmarried or divorced parents who have never held
parental responsibility, or have lost it upon separation, the opportunity to apply
for parental responsibility without the mother’s cooperation. If all parents
continue to have parental responsibilities after divorce, and if unmarried legal
parents may acquire parental responsibility after divorce, there is virtually no
possibility for the new parent to acquire parental responsibility. These possibili-
ties can only be created if the Dutch legislature abandons the ‘no more than two
persons with parental responsibilities’ system.
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7.4. ADOPTION AND TRANSFER OF FULL PARENTAL
STATUS
When a child is born, the legal status of the child is determined in accordance
with the provisions described for primary families. If the parental status of one
or both of the birth parents is to be transferred to one or two other parents, the
(legal) relationship with the original parent(s) may need to be severed. This
concerns partner adoption as described for the partially genetic primary family,
adoptions by the new parent in secondary families, adoption by intentional
parents in the case of a surrogacy arrangement or the transfer of parental status
pursuant to section 30 of the HFEA 1990. All these situations will be discussed
in this section. For more detail on these issues one is referred to the relevant
chapters and sections.49
7.4.1.  ADOPTION
Adoption will also be discussed in terms of fundaments and connecting factors
despite the fact that these issues are usually discussed in the context of adoptions
in terms of conditions or requirements to be met by the adopters. However, since
adoption is discussed in a comparative context it is important, where possible, to
adhere to the terminology introduced for the establishment of legal parenthood
in primary families. In the context of adoption the connecting factors are the
conditions that need to be met and the fundament supporting these factors is the
intention of the adopting parent to be a parent to the child. 
For partner adoption the connecting factors, once the hurdle associated with
parental consent has been overcome, are twofold: a relationship with the parent
on the one hand and a factual relationship with the child on the other. The one
cannot and does not replace the other. However, above all, the adoption needs
to be in the best interests of the child. The connecting factors for adoption are
the same in primary and secondary families and for surrogate families; therefore
Table 7.15 is used for these three different family categories. The analysis of
adoption is divided into two sections; the first section is concerned with joint
adoptions by a couple and the second with adoption by a partner of a parent
(partner adoption). The first section will include surrogacy cases where neither
of the intentional parents has acquired the status of a legal parent with regard to
the child, which means that the couple will have to adopt jointly (or succes-
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sively). The second section is concerned with partner adoption. In this section
three categories of partners will be discussed simultaneously because their
position is relatively similar, where there are differences either within or be-
tween the jurisdictions these will be discussed.
Table 7.15: Adoption by the legal parent’s partner
fundaments and 
connecting factors --›
intention to
parent
the child
legal status
relationship
factual
relationship
factual
relationship
with child
consent
parent(s)
factual situations I EN NL EN NL EN NL EN NL EN NL
different-sex marriage Fu - C - - C C C C C
different-sex registered  -  -  C  C  C
different-sex 
non-formalised Fu - - - C C C C C C
 
fem. same-sex married  -  -  C  C  C
fem. same-sex registered Fu - C - - C - C C C
fem. same-sex 
non-formalised - Fu - - C C - C C C
 
male same-sex married  -  -  C  C  C
male same-sex registered Fu - C - - C - C C C
male same-sex 
non-formalised Fu - - - C C - C C C
Fu = fundament ; C = connecting factor; - not applicable; shaded means this situation does not
exist
Table 7.15 shows that there are many similarities between the two jurisdictions.
In both jurisdictions different-sex and same-sex couples may adopt, regardless
of their relationship status, provided they have a factual relationship with the
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child. Furthermore, the consent of the parent with whom the family relationship
will be terminated through the adoption is required.50 
The difference that is directly apparent from Table 7.15, however, is the fact that
English law uses the legal status of the partner’s relationship as a connecting
factor and if there is no such relationship, the factual relationship between the
partners is used, whereas Dutch law only takes the factual relationship, living
together for three years, as a connecting factor. Couples who are married but do
not live together, in principle do not qualify for joint or partner adoption.
English law is less clear on this point; in the case of partner adoption, the child
must have lived with the partner for a period of six months. A person is a partner
of a parent if he or she is married to the parent, has entered into a civil partner-
ship with the parent or lives in an enduring family relationship with the parent.
Neither marriage, nor civil partnership requires the spouses/partners to live
together.51 One may assume that married couples and civil partners live together,
but it is not a hard and fast requirement where adoption is concerned. 
7.4.1.1.  Joint adoption
For joint adoption there are requirements with regard to the relationship of the
adopters and the relationship of the adopters with the child. In England if
neither of the prospective adopters is a parent of the child and the child is not
placed with the prospective adopters by an adoption agency, the child must have
lived with one or both of the spouses/partners for three out of the five years
preceding the application. There is no requirement as such that the couple need
to have lived together during that period, or that they were in a formalised or
non-formalised relationship during the whole of that period. But at the moment
of the application they must be married, have entered into a civil partnership or
live in an enduring family relationship with each other. 
In The Netherlands there are requirements with regard to the relationship
between the couple; they need to have lived together for the three years preced-
ing the adoption application. Furthermore, there are requirements with regard
to the couple’s relationship with the child: they must have cared for the child
jointly for a year prior to the adoption application.
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7.4.1.2.  Partner adoption
The requirements with regard to the relationship between the prospective
adopters and the relationship between the prospective adopter and the child are
the same for the three categories of partners mentioned in the introduction:
1. adoption by the partner of the birth mother in a primary family;
2. adoption by the legal parent’s new partner in a secondary family;
3. adoption by the other commissioning parent where (one of) the male part-
ner(s) has established a legal link with the child through recognition/regis-
tration on the birth certificate.
In England the partner needs to have had his home with the child for six
months, furthermore this partner needs to be in a formalised relationship with
the child’s parent or in a non-formalised enduring family relationship. In The
Netherlands the partner and the parent need to have lived together for three
years prior to the application and have taken care of the child together for one
year prior to the application (in the case of a child born into a lesbian relation-
ship this last requirement need not be met.)
The main difference between these three kinds of partners is whether the
consent of a parent outside the relationship is required for the adoption and the
degree to which the existence of another parent may play a part in the decision
whether or not the adoption is considered to be in the child’s best interest. There
need not have been a relationship of any substance between the child’s original
parents, this may range from a once-only sexual encounter to a long-term stable
relationship. However, as became clear from Chapter 4, the nature of the rela-
tionship between the child’s original parents may have consequences for the
possibilities of the new parent to forge a legal link with the child. It is difficult
for a new parent to acquire the status of a legal parent, even in those cases where
the child has no other legal parent his or her position is not always straightfor-
ward. The acquisition of legal parenthood by means of re-registration or recogni-
tion is solely based on the consent of the mother, even though in the case of re-
registration the man is presumed to be the child’s biological father. This is not
the case for recognition in The Netherlands. 
The period of time during which the couple need to have lived with the child in
England in non-agency cases is substantially influenced by the question whether
the adopter is the partner of the child’s parent (six months) or whether a couple
jointly adopt an unrelated child (three years). If a child is placed with a couple
for adoption by an agency or pursuant to an order of the High Court this period
is only ten weeks. In The Netherlands the adopter(s) needs to have lived with
the child for one year. This provision does not apply if a child is born into a
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female same-sex relationship. In that case the co-mother may start adoption
proceedings immediately after the birth.52
7.4.2. THE TRANSFER OF FULL PARENTAL STATUS
AFTER A SURROGACY ARRANGEMENT
Only in England have provisions been introduced to regulate the transfer of legal
parenthood and parental responsibility from the surrogate parent to the inten-
tional parents (commissioning parents). Subject to a number of strict conditions,
the status of a legal parent and parental responsibility may be transferred from
one set of parents to another. Couples who do not meet these strict criteria have
to make use of the existing adoption regulations to acquire a legal link with the
child. The White Paper discussed earlier proposes to expand the couples who are
eligible for a parental order to unmarried different-sex and same-sex couples and
couples in a civil partnership. This means that both same-sex couples and
different-sex couples who are in an enduring family relationship may apply for
a parental order if one of the partners is genetically related to the surrogate
mother’s child. If all the other criteria for granting a parental order have been
met, parental status will be transferred from the surrogate parent(s) to the
intentional parents by a court order. Couples who do not meet the criteria, for
instance because neither of them is genetically related to the child, can only try
to become legal parents through adoption.53
In The Netherlands there are no provisions specifically geared towards the
transfer of parental status from the surrogate parent(s) to the commissioning
parents.54 The only option is divestment of the parental responsibility of the
surrogate parent(s) and subsequent adoption by one or both of the intentional
parents. The divestment procedure is not geared towards surrogacy, which
makes the outcome of such cases very difficult to predict. Moreover, a possible
genetic connection between the intentional parents and the child plays no part.
Intentional parents in a genetic surrogate family are in the same position as
intentional parents in a non-genetic family; they have to adopt in order to
become the legal parents of the child. (For the subsequent attribution of parental
responsibility to the parents see Table 7.9. under legal parenthood). 
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Table 7.16: Transfer of parental status from surrogate parent(s) to intentional
parents by a specified order 
fundaments and connect-
ing factors --›
intention to
parent the
child
biological
parenthood
relationship
parents
relationship
child
consent
birth
parent(s)
factual situations I EN NL EN NL EN NL EN NL EN NL
different-sex marriage Fu - C - C - C - C -
different-sex registered  -  -  -  -  -
different-sex 
non-formalised - - - - - - - - - -
 
fem. same-sex married  -  -  -  -  -
fem. same-sex registered - - - - - - - - - -
fem. same-sex 
non-formalised
- - - - - - - - - -
 
male same-sex married  -  -  -  -  -
male same-sex registered - - - - - - - - - -
male same-sex 
non-formalised
- - - - - - - - - -
Fu = fundament; connecting factor; - = not applicable; shaded means this situation does not exist
7.4.3.  CONCLUDING REMARKS
In both jurisdictions adoption fulfils a number of different functions; it is used
to give a new set of parents to a child who is in need of a home, it is used to give
non-biological parents who have engaged a surrogate mother the status of legal
parents with regard to the child, it is used to grant a consensual non-biological
parent the status of legal parent where the regular provisions of legal parenthood
do not provide for that particular situation and it is used to give new parents in
secondary families the status of a legal parent. 
With regard to the last group, new parents in secondary families, both jurisdic-
tions have introduced alternatives to adoption because adoption is no longer
regarded as the most appropriate solution for such families. Furthermore, both
jurisdictions are struggling with the best manner to secure the legal position of
children born into a same-sex relationship, at present adoption is the only
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option, but the question arises whether this is the most appropriate option. It is
a lengthy and costly procedure, but above all it remains a voluntary choice on
the part of the birth mother’s partner whether or not to adopt; she cannot be
obliged to become a legal parent if she refuses to adopt.
Furthermore, both jurisdictions struggle with the practice of surrogacy. It is not
forbidden in either jurisdiction and both facilitate partially genetic or full genetic
surrogacy to a certain extent. However, only English law offers commissioning
couples who meet the criteria set out is s. 30 HFEA 1990 relative certainty about
the outcome of a procedure aimed at transferring full parental status from the
surrogate parent(s) to the commissioning couple. Moreover, the Minister of
Health in a recent White Paper has even proposed to expand the couples eligible
for such an order to include same-sex partners and partners in non-formalised
relationships. In The Netherlands couples are left in the dark about their possi-
bility to become the legal parents of the child concerned, despite the fact that
the government allows for hospitals to facilitate surrogacy under very strict
conditions. It is this issue that requires attention in The Netherlands, where
couples meet these very strict conditions and where the surrogate parent’s/
parents’ consent to the transfer of full parental status, it is the duty of the
legislature to provide all the parties and in particular the child, with clarity
about their legal status as soon after the child’s birth as possible. Proposals to
amend the law on this issue will be discussed in Chapter 8.
7.5. THE LEGAL POSITION OF CHILDREN IN MALE
SAME-SEX RELATIONSHIPS UNDER ENGLISH
AND DUTCH LAW
There are differences between the two jurisdictions where the position of male
same-sex couples is concerned. In both jurisdictions it is more difficult for the
male partner of the biological father to acquire a legal relationship with the child
than for the (fe)male partner of the birth mother. If the male partner wants to
adopt the child of the biological father (which presupposes that the biological
father is the child’s legal father) there is always another legal parent (the birth
mother) who will have to consent to adoption. However, even where the birth
mother unconditionally consents to the adoption, the court may nevertheless
refuse to grant the adoption request if it is not considered to be in the child’s best
interests.
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With regard to the acquisition of parental responsibility male couples also face
more obstacles than female same-sex couples, in particular under Dutch law. It
is easiest to demonstrate the position of male same-sex couples with regard to
parental responsibility in the two jurisdictions by means of an example. In the
example Mr A and Mr B, who have entered into a non-marital registered rela-
tionship, have engaged a surrogate mother, Ms C, to conceive and give birth to
Mr A’s biological child. For the sake of expediency, it is presumed that Ms C has
not formalised her relationship. 
b + b f c
Mr A Mr B Child Ms C 
(biological father) (genetic and biological mother)
In England Mr A is a legal father by virtue of his being a biological father (unless
the HFEA exceptions apply). It would however be wise to register his name on
the child’s birth certificate with the mother’s consent, since this will automati-
cally attribute him with parental responsibility over the child together with
Ms C. Subsequently, his male civil partner may enter into a parental responsibil-
ity agreement with him and the birth mother; the three of them would then
share parental responsibility with regard to the child. Once the child has been
living with the father and his male civil partner for a continuous period of six
months, the partner may file a partner adoption application.55 
A new development in English law with regard to male same-sex parents may
come from the recently published Tissue Bill. This Bill proposes to make it
possible for a male same-sex couple to apply for a parental order if all the criteria
set out in the HFEA 1990 have been met. This means, among others, that one of
the men must to be the child’s biological father and that the conception took
place by means of assisted conception.56
In The Netherlands the biological father has no legal relationship with the child
by operation of law. In order to obtain such a relationship he must recognize the
child, for which the mother’s consent is required. Subsequently, the father and
the mother may jointly register their joint parental responsibility in the joint
responsibilities register. However, since only two persons may hold parental
responsibility with regard to a child, this would leave no room for the male
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partner. The legal father may ask the court to be attributed with sole parental
responsibility to the detriment of the mother. The court will only grant such a
request if it is in the best interests of the child. If the application is successful,
the father and his male partner may apply for joint parental responsibility after
the father has held sole parental responsibility for three years.57 Furthermore,
the male partner may only apply for adoption if the child’s mother no longer has
parental responsibility with regard to the child. 
This is in stark contrast with the position of a female couple in a formalised
relationship under Dutch law where they will have joint parental responsibility
by operation of law if the child has no other parent outside the relationship.
Moreover, a co-mother may apply for adoption immediately after the child’s
birth, since a biological father is not a legal father by operation of law and will
not hold parental responsibility with regard to the child. This means that the
members of a male same-sex family will not have the legal status with regard to
each other that matches their factual family situation. 
For these families and for the other atypical families described in the previous
chapters, it is relevant to question what techniques may be used to render these
atypical parent-child relationships visible in the law, and, once visible, what
consequences we can attach to them.
7.6. FAMILY ANALYSIS VISUALISED
Now the time has come to take stock of the information yielded by the chapter
as a whole. First, the fundaments and connecting factors that are used to assign
legal parenthood and parental responsibility to parents by operation of law will
be analysed in section 7.6.1. Subsequently, the use of all the fundaments and
connecting factors in relation to the possibilities for parents to become legal
parents and/or to acquire parental responsibility will be visualised in the diagram
in the diagram in section 7.6.2.
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7.6.1.  ON FUNDAMENTS AND CONNECTING FACTORS
 
Biology and intention
The fundament biology plays a very important role in the attribution of parental
status. The fundament intention plays a less important role, but is certainly not
irrelevant. It does not only play a role in the context of assisted conception but
in The Netherlands also in the context of recognition. Below the fundaments
biology and intention lies the notion of responsibility for one’s children. Such
responsibility may be referred to as procreational responsibility. This new
concept includes two forms of responsibility:
1. responsibility before conception, and 
2. responsibility after conception.
Responsibility before conception concerns the notion that the responsibility of
a parent starts before the conception of a child. This responsibility includes, for
instance, coming to terms with the fact that a third procreational party is in-
volved in the conception of the child. In such a situation it is the responsibility
of a parent to try to come to an agreement beforehand on the division of parental
roles between the parties involved. Furthermore, procreational responsibility
also includes respect for the personal integrity of the child yet to be conceived.
From the point of the child’s right of access to information about his or her
genetic parents, this means ensuring that this information is available.58 Respect
for the child’s personal integrity also includes ensuring that the circumstances
surrounding the child’s conception and birth are acceptable, this is of particular
importance in the context of surrogacy.
Responsibility after conception concerns the fact that both biological parents and
intentional parents are responsible for the children they (pro)create.59 This side
of procreation responsibility forms the layer below the fundaments biology and
intention and explains why both kinds of parents may be held responsible as
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parents for the child during his or her life. The notion of procreational responsi-
bility will be further explained and applied in Chapter 8.
Marriage
A connecting factor that plays a role both in the attribution of legal parenthood
and parental responsibility is marriage. Different-sex married couples will
acquire both the status of a legal parent and parental responsibility by operation
of law. With regard to the attribution of the status of a legal parent to a married
father one may say that, despite the changes in society and the concept of the
family, it is still reasonable to assume that the birth mother’s husband is the
child’s biological father, or in cases of assisted conception, that the husband is
the child’s intentional father. Thus the legal parenthood conferred on a married
father is based on a presumption of biological and/or intentional parenthood.
This biological connection and/or intention creates a responsibility with regard
to the child, which is translated into legal parenthood. Legal parenthood for
instance ‘makes the child a member of the family generating for that child a legal
relationship with wider kin going well beyond the parental relationship’60 and
it creates a financial obligation with regard to the child’s maintenance.
The attribution of parental responsibility on the basis of the connecting factor
marriage is concerned with the fact that marriage suggests solidarity between the
spouses and a shared view of a future life. That a substantial amount of marriages
fail does not mean that a married couple do not set out in the belief that they
will live a shared life. Such a joint enterprise, which suggests mutual solidarity,
also suggests that the parents will both participate in the care and the upbringing
of the children born into the marriage.61 In order to enable parents to fulfil their
role of parents in daily life, they are attributed with parental responsibility. In
conclusion one may say that, on the one hand, marriage is a connecting factor
for attributing legal parenthood to the birth mother’s husband because he is
assumed to be the child’s biological or intentional father and is therefore respon-
sible for the child. On the other hand, marriage as a connecting factor for
parental responsibility is concerned with the notion that married parents will
both participate in the upbringing of the child and thus need parental responsi-
bility.
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Non-marital registered relationships
In both jurisdictions non-martial registered relationships serve as a connecting
factor for parental responsibility but not for legal parenthood. In The Nether-
lands the use of a registered partnership as a connecting factor is confined to
children born into the relationship, whereas in England the use of the civil
partner as a connecting factor extends beyond primary families to exclude
secondary families. In The Netherlands such attribution takes place by operation
of law, in England civil partners have easier access to shared parental responsi-
bility. Could the connecting factor non-marital registered relationship be used
for the automatic attribution of parental responsibility or legal parenthood in
primary families? As has been explained earlier marriage suggests solidarity
between the spouses and the notion of a shared future.62 The same is true for
non-marital registered relationships; moreover, the differences in the two
jurisdictions between marriage and a non-marital registered relationship are very
minor and do not have consequences for the children born into the relation-
ship.63 Therefore, non-marital relationships like marriage can be used as a con-
necting factor for the automatic attribution of parental responsibility or legal
parenthood in primary families. In particular the situation in The Netherlands
is confusing at present, it must be difficult to comprehend for different-sex
registered partners that they share parental responsibility with regard to the
children born into their relationship, but do not both become legal parents.
Moreover, research has shown that a substantial number of different-sex regis-
tered partners are not aware of this fact.64
Non-formalised relationships
Despite the fact that unmarried parents may both be biological and/or inten-
tional parents and may experience the same solidarity as married parents, only
the birth mother is automatically attributed with full parental status (relation-
ship A). At present the law contains no connecting factor on which the pre-
sumption that a certain man is the child’s biological father or intentional parent
can be based. The question is where such a connecting factor is to be sought. 
According to ECtHR case law the connecting factor for establishing a relation-
ship between the child and the unmarried parent needs to be sought either in
the factual relationship between the child and the father (B) or between the
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father and the mother (C).65 It will be difficult, but vital, to devise a connecting
factor for the automatic attribution of legal parenthood to the unmarried biologi-
cal or intentional father in this respect. It has been submitted that ‘the fact that
a couple have produced a child together should make them responsible for each
other as well as the child.’66 However, since this concerns the broader subject of
the recognition of de facto relationships, it falls outside the scope of this research
to provide a well-founded solution, therefore further research is required on this
topic.67
Figure 8: Children and parents in non-formalised relationships
  Non-formalised relationship
Biological
Father
Biological
Mother
Child
BA
C
7.6.2. A DIAGRAM OF FUNDAMENTS AND CONNECTING
FACTORS
On the basis of the analysis, the diagram in Figure 7 depicts the fundaments and
connecting factors that give access to legal parenthood and parental responsibil-
ity for the partner of the birth mother. In this diagram use has been made of the
three legal dimensions of the child’s family circle as introduced in Chapter 1 of
the book: biological/genetic parenthood, legal parenthood and parental responsi-
bility. In the diagram the means of access to the dimensions have been visualised
without including the persons who are eligible for access to the dimensions. The
majority of parents will form part of all three dimensions. However, this is not
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true for all parents; a number of parents will only be part of only two or even
one of the legal dimensions of the child’s family circle.
A birth mother will automatically be part of all three dimensions of the child’s
family circle. It may be the case, however, that she is not the only mother who
is part of the biological/genetic parenthood dimension. If the child is conceived
with another woman’s ovum, the birth mother is the biological mother, but the
woman who donated the ovum also forms part of the biological/genetic parent-
hood dimension. However, only one of these women has access to the status of
a legal parent and parental responsibility; in both jurisdictions this is the woman
who gives birth to the child. 
Figure 7: Family analysis in a diagram
Fundament:
biological and / or
genetic parenthood
Connecting factors:
-  relationship status
-  factual relationship
   with the child
-  cooperation of parent(s)
Legal
parenthood
Parental
responsibility
Fundament:
intention to be a
parent to the child
Voluntarily or by operation of law
Involuntarily by court order
Connecting factors:
-  relationship status
-  consent to conception
-  maternal consent 
For the partner of the birth mother the situation is different. There are always
connecting factors between one dimension and the next that need to be fulfilled,
except in this cases where the legal parenthood of the partner is established by
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court order. In those cases biology or the intention is the fundament and no
additional connecting factors are required.68 For example, if the partner is the
biological father of the child, the biological/genetic parenthood dimension may
give access to legal parenthood, provided there are connecting factors between
the father’s position as a biological parent and the legal parenthood dimension,
such as marriage to the birth mother. This also applies to English law, despite the
fact that a biological father is a legal parent. In order to make this legal parent-
hood operational some additional fact (marriage) or action (registration) is
required. The same is true with regard to the partner’s acquisition of parental
responsibility; there has to be a connecting factor for his acquisition of parental
responsibility.
7.6.2.1.  Legal parenthood
In the diagram in Figure 7 the connecting factors for legal parenthood are
consent to the conception of the child by the non-biological parent, the legal
status of the relationship between the parent and the non-biological parent and
the consent of the parent to the acquisition of the status of a legal parent by the
non-biological parent. These connecting factors do not all apply at the same
time. 
In both jurisdictions the partner’s consent to the conception of the child plays
a role in the attribution of the status of a legal parent. However, there are
substantial differences between this concept as it is used in English and Dutch
law. Neither jurisdiction has as yet used the concept of consent to attribute
same-sex partners with the status of a legal parent by operation of law. Relation-
ship status also plays an important and very similar role in the two jurisdictions
for the attribution of the status of a legal parent to a non-biological parent.
Neither jurisdiction has used relationship status as a connecting factor for
establishing the legal parenthood of a same-sex partner. Furthermore, the birth
mother’s consent to the establishment of the legal parenthood of a non-biological
parent plays a role in both jurisdictions, though this role is far more substantial
under Dutch law, where there is no legal status by operation of law for an
unmarried non-biological father than it is under English law. Again neither
jurisdiction has as yet opted to use the birth mother’s consent as a connecting
factor for establishing the legal parenthood of a same-sex partner. 
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7.6.2.2.  Parental responsibility 
In the diagram in Figure 7 the connecting factors for parental responsibility are
the legal status of the relationship between the parent and the non-legal parent,
the factual relationship between the non-legal parent and the child and the
cooperation of the parent with the acquisition of parental responsibility by the
non-legal parent. The fundament is always the intention to parent the child;
therefore no direct link has been created between biological/genetic parenthood
and the connecting factor for parental responsibility. A biological parent either
acquires parental responsibility through legal parenthood or the intention to
parent the child.
In both jurisdictions relationship status plays a role in the attribution of parental
responsibility where a child is born during the relationship. However, in Eng-
land this role is, at present, confined to marriage, whereas in The Netherlands
a registered partnership is also included in the relationships that confer parental
responsibility on the parents. The factual relationship with the child as a con-
necting factor plays a substantial role in English law and a far less important role
under Dutch law. Under English law, it is an independent connecting factor for
acquiring parental responsibility, whereas in The Netherlands it is an accessory
to other starting points such as parental cooperation. Finally, parental coopera-
tion plays a part in both jurisdictions where the acquisition of parental responsi-
bility by a non-legal parent is concerned, but it plays a far greater role in Dutch
law, where non-legal parents have no standing to apply for parental responsibil-
ity without parental cooperation.
7.6.3.  TOWARDS THE FUTURE
The fundaments and connecting factors in the diagram are used in both jurisdic-
tions, but as has been described their content and applicability to non-legal and
non-biological parents may differ. All the fundaments and connecting factors
have been extensively discussed in the analysis for the law as it stands at present.
In the next chapter, this diagram will be used to suggest what the law might be,
by evaluating whether other persons may not have access by means of the
existing fundaments and connecting factors to the dimensions of legal parent-
hood and parental responsibility.
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CHAPTER 8
TOWARDS A NEW CONCEPT OF
PARENTHOOD: PROCREATIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY
8.1. INTRODUCTION
The previous chapters described, compared and analysed whether and how new
parent-child relationships have been made visible in English and Dutch law. The
comparison of the two jurisdictions revealed both similarities and differences.
Moreover, the jurisdictions have not only been compared with each other, but
the position of children born into the different family categories has also been
compared within the two jurisdictions. The analysis revealed, for instance, that
the law has adapted to some of the new parent-child relationships by recognising
intention as a fundament for attributing the status of legal parent to non-biologi-
cal parents, but only for a very limited group of non-biological parents. 
This chapter will answer the questions raised in Chapter 1 with regard to the
legal position of children in a family with one biological and one non-biological
parent (section 8.2) First, the child’s options to acquire two legal parents will be
discussed (section 8.2.1) and then the child’s legal position in his or her family
(section 8.2.2). In section 8.2.3 a possible explanation for the differences and
similarities between the two jurisdictions will be provided. The next section will
introduce a new concept of legal parenthood: procreational responsibility. In
order to provide the framework for this concept the three legal dimensions of
the child’s family circle are further explained in section 8.3.1 on the basis of the
analysis made in Chapter 7. Subsequently, the notion of procreational responsi-
bility, as introduced in section 7.6.1, will be expanded upon in order to seek a
solution for the deficiencies encountered in the law in this area (section 8.3.2).
The new concept will then be applied to the legal position of children in families
with one biological and one non-biological parent and to surrogate families
(section 8.4). The chapter will close with some recommendations on how to
proceed in amending existing legislation in this field (section 8.5) and a brief
glance at the future (section 8.6).
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The majority of this chapter is concerned with children born into different-sex
families and female same-sex families, simply because children cannot be born
into male same-sex families. The male couple will have to engage a surrogate
mother to conceive and give birth to a child which is genetically related to one
of the male partners. The position of children in surrogate families will be
summarily discussed in section 8.3.3.3. However, where relevant, reference will
be made to the position of children in male same-sex families.
8.2. THE LEGAL POSITION OF CHILDREN IN A
FAMILY WITH ONE BIOLOGICAL PARENT
AND ONE NON-BIOLOGICAL PARENT 
8.2.1. THE CHILD’S OPTIONS TO ACQUIRE TWO LEGAL 
PARENTS
Children in different-sex and female same-sex families
In both legal systems, children will in general have the possibility to acquire two
legal parents. In some cases they will acquire them automatically and in some
cases they acquire one automatically and may acquire another. The systems in
the two jurisdictions are largely in accordance with the following notion ex-
pressed in the Council of Europe’s White Paper on principles concerning the
establishment and legal consequences of parentage: ‘It should be underlined that
it is in the best interests of the child, first of all, to establish parentage as from
the moment of the birth and, secondly, to give stability over time to the estab-
lished parentage.’1 Hence the White Paper leaves room for social factors to
prevail over biological factors: ‘The law may opt not to allow the parentage to be
established on the basis of biological affiliation, for instance in cases of medically
assisted procreation with an anonymous donor of sperm.’ 
That having been said, how about the possibilities for children with one biologi-
cal parent and one non-biological parent to acquire two legal parents? The
system in England with regard to this question is clear-cut. In principle all
children have the possibility to acquire two legal parents. Children born into a
marriage will have two legal parents by operation of law; children born outside
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marriage may have the legal parenthood of their biological or HFEA parent
established by means of a declaration of parentage. 
The one exception to this rule is the child conceived with donor sperm in
accordance with the HFEA 1990 by a single mother or a mother in a same-sex
relationship.2 In the first case there is no other legal parent available because the
biological father is a sperm donor in accordance with the HFEA 1990 and is thus
protected from any claims by children conceived with his sperm. In the second
case the child can neither establish the legal parenthood of the sperm donor nor
the legal parenthood of the intentional non-biological second parent, because
this parent is also a woman. This means that the child is entirely dependent on
the willingness of the co-mother to adopt. If the co-mother does not adopt there
is no possibility for the child to establish the parenthood of this co-mother,
despite her role in planning the conception and her implicit or explicit consent.
In The Netherlands the situation is less clear. This is due to the distinction that
is made in Dutch law between begetters and sperm donors which is based on the
question whether or not the biological father has had sexual intercourse with the
birth mother. Children born into a different-sex marriage will have two legal
parents by operation of law. Children born into any other kind of relationship
will not have two legal parents by operation of law. Children may establish the
legal parenthood of a begetter, a man who has had sexual intercourse with their
mother. If there is no begetter the child may establish the legal parenthood of
his or her mother’s life partner if this partner consented to an act that may have
resulted in the conception of the child. The legal parenthood of a sperm donor
cannot be established by the child, unless he was the mother’s consenting life
partner. 
The child conceived with donated sperm outside of a different-sex marriage may
establish the legal parenthood of his or her mother’s partner, if this partner is a
man and he consented to the conception with donated sperm. If the partner is
a woman her legal parenthood cannot be established regardless of her consent
to the conception and her relationship with the child’s mother. If there is no
consenting male life partner, and the sperm donor did not have sexual inter-
course with the child’s mother, the child cannot establish the legal parenthood
of a second parent. On the other hand, where the conception occurred outside
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marriage through intercourse with a third party with the consent of the mother’s
male life partner, the child has a choice whose legal parenthood he may estab-
lish, provided of course that the legal parenthood of the biological father has not
already been established. 
This means that in The Netherlands where a single woman or a woman in a
relationship with another woman (whether married, in a registered partnership
or in a non-formalised relationship) makes use of sperm donation (without
sexual intercourse) the child cannot establish the legal parenthood of a second
parent. The only means by which the birth mother’s female partner can become
the child’s legal parent is through adoption. However, if the co-mother is
unwilling to adopt the child, the child cannot make her a legal parent against her
will. 
In conclusion, with regard to the legal position of children in families with one
biological parent and one non-biological parent, one can say that almost all
children in different-sex families have the possibility of acquiring two legal
parents, whereas this is not true for children in same-sex families. 
Children in male same-sex families 
Since children in male same-sex families are born into another family, they have
at least one legal parent outside their family. Their legal position within their
resident family can only be secured by the transfer of legal parenthood from the
family of their birth to the family in which they are being raised. This is an issue
that is covered by the provisions on surrogate families and adoption and will not
be discussed here. 
8.2.2. PROTECTION OF THE CHILD’S POSITION IN HIS OR HER
FAMILY 
Children in different-sex and female same-sex families
The protection of these children in their families has two sides. On the one hand,
it concerns the recognition of the fact that the child has a biological parent
outside his or her resident family, and, on the other hand, the legal protection
of the child’s position in his or her resident family. This protection entails that
the child’s resident parents have the rights and duties to take care of the child
on a daily basis, in practice this means that they will have parental responsibil-
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3 As has been mentioned in Chapter 1, it will be attempted to find a solution with the concepts
that operate within the present system of the law. Creating in-between statuses may lead to
first-class and second-class parents. As has been established in English case law with regard to
unmarried fathers, it is important for the child that this parent is given a seal of approval. See
for instance Re S (Parental Responsibility) [1995] 2 FLR 648; Re H (Parental responsibility)
[1998] 1 FLR 855 and Re C and V (parental responsibility) [1998] 1 FLR 392, CA (a parental
responsibility order is independent from a contact order). For more information see section
3.5.2.
4 See section 6.1 for more information on this topic.
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ity.3 On the basis of the study carried out in this book and the subsequent
analysis, the question may be answered whether such protection exists in the
two jurisdictions at present.
With regard to the first issue: both jurisdictions have introduced legislation
which ensures that children conceived with donor sperm during assisted concep-
tion services have a right to information concerning the person and the identity
of the donor of the genetic material. A register has been set up in both jurisdic-
tions to store this information.4 Furthermore, both jurisdictions also recognise
that a child has a right to know his or her biological/genetic history outside the
context of assisted conception services. However, there is no register where such
information is collected and children very much depend on what their parents
tell them.
The second part of the question concerns the legal protection of the child’s
resident family. There is a distinction between children born in a formalised
relationship and children born in a non-formalised relationship. In The Nether-
lands all married parents and parents who have entered into a registered partner-
ship will have parental responsibility with regard to the children born into their
relationship, unless the child already has a legal parent outside the marriage or
the registered partnership. Children born in non-formalised relationships will
have one parent with parental responsibility ex-lege: namely their birth mother.
The birth mother’s partner may acquire parental responsibility, but the complex-
ity of this process depends on his or her sex. A male partner may recognise the
birth mother’s child and subsequently register joint parental responsibility in the
parental responsibilities register with the birth mother. A female partner may
only acquire parental responsibility with regard to the child by court order on
her joint request with the birth mother, or by means of adoption. 
In England a child born into a marriage will have two parents with parental
responsibility. A child born into a civil partnership or in a non-formalised
relationship will not automatically have two resident parents with parental
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responsibility. The non-biological parent in the child’s resident family may
acquire parental responsibility, but how this may be done depends on the sex of
this parent and the status of his or her relationship with the mother and the
child. The birth mother’s male partner (provided he is an HFEA father) may
register on the child’s birth certificate with the mother’s consent and will
subsequently acquire parental responsibility. Alternatively, he may also enter
into a parental responsibility agreement with the child’s mother or apply for a
parental responsibility or a residence order. The birth mother’s female partner,
provided she has entered into a civil partnership with the child’s mother, may
enter into a parental responsibility agreement with the child’s mother and apply
for a parental responsibility order or a residence order. A female partner who has
not entered into a formalised relationship with the child’s mother may apply for
a residence order with maternal consent or without consent if she has lived with
the child for three years or if the court gives her leave to do so. 
In both jurisdictions the parental responsibility acquired by the non-biological
parent does not cease upon separation. It may be terminated by court order
(except in England if the non-bio parent is a legal parent and in both jurisdic-
tions in the case of adoption), but only subject to the child’s interests. 
In conclusion, one may say that the position of the child in a family with one
biological parent and one non-biological parent is well protected in The Nether-
lands in those cases where the child is born into a formalised relationship.
Furthermore, children born into non-formalised different-sex families receive
a higher measure of protection than children in non-formalised same-sex
families. In both cases the parents need to undertake certain action to acquire
parental responsibility, but this is more complex for same-sex parents than it is
for different-sex parents. This is partially due to the fact that the male partner
of the child’s mother has access to the status of legal parent on the basis of his sex
whereas a female partner has no access to the status of a legal parent outside the
possibility of adoption. 
In England there is only parental responsibility by operation of law for children
born into marriage. With regard to all other children, also those born into a civil
partnership, the parents need to undertake certain action to acquire parental
responsibility with regard to the children born into their relationship. The
nature of the action that needs to be undertaken depends on whether the
mother’s birth partner is a legal parent, a same-sex parent in a formalised rela-
tionship or a same-sex parent in a non-formalised relationship. The first two
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agreement with the birth mother (s. 4 CA 1989). Subsequently, the biological father’s male
partner may enter into a parental responsibility agreement with the birth mother and the
biological father (s. 4A CA 1989). 
6 As a result s. 28 HFEA 1990 has unincorporated the existing common law rules with regard to
paternity.
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kinds of parents may acquire parental responsibility without court intervention,
the last kind of parent cannot.
Children in male same-sex families
In England male same-sex partners who have entered into a civil partnership
may jointly acquire parental responsibility with regard to the children they raise
in their family by entering into a parental responsibility agreement with the
child’s birthmother, provided one of the men is the child’s biological father.5
Furthermore, they may acquire parental responsibility on the basis of the fact
that the child has been living with them for a certain period of time. In The
Netherlands male same-sex partners who have entered into a formalised rela-
tionship (either marriage or a registered partnership) will not automatically
acquire parental responsibility over the children they raise in their family, since
the child always has a legal parent outside the relationship of the male couple,
namely the birth mother. Moreover, it is not possible for them to acquire joint
parental responsibility as long as the child’s mother holds parental responsibility.
8.2.3. POSSIBLE EXPLANATION FOR THE DIFFERENCES AND
SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE JURISDICTIONS
When trying to explain the differences in the approach taken in the two jurisdic-
tions towards securing the legal position of the child, the differences between
common law and civil law play an important role in the case of legal parenthood.
Traditionally, legal parenthood is in both jurisdictions based on biology. In the
approach taken by the English system this basis remains more or less intact
because legal parenthood not based on biology is regulated in a specific piece of
legislation. Due to the lack of statutory interference in the field of legal parent-
hood, the English legislature was able to provide for a completely enclosed
statutory framework to operate alongside, and instead of the existing common
law rules.6 In The Netherlands adaptations to developments in society in this
area have to be made within the existing framework of the Dutch Civil Code.
This means that legal parenthood for non-biological parents is regulated in the
same Title in the DCC that also regulates legal parenthood for biological parents.
Amendments in this area touch the very heart of Dutch law on legal parenthood.
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7 With regard to English law, for instance, WOELKE (2006) p. 100 states that with the introduc-
tion of the Children Act 1989 ‘the question of parents’ status or relationship has become
secondary and the welfare of the child has become paramount in questions surrounding all
aspects of what was once called custody. As a result the law in England has to some extent been
flexible enough to adapt to changing family structures.’
8 See for instance ANTOKOLSKAIA (2006) p. 452: ‘At the same time, neither can the diversity of
present-day filiation laws be regarded as merely being diverse in the technical aspect of the
chosen solution. That is to say, this diversity is based on dissimilar political choices made with
regard to the position of the parents, rather than merely a matter of dissimilar legal means to
reach similar ends.’
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The differences in the field of parental responsibility are less likely to be ex-
plained by the common law-civil law dichotomy. It is far more likely that an
explanation is to be found with the fact that both jurisdictions are in the middle
of a process of transforming from the traditional parent-centred approach to a
child-centred approach. An element of this process is the recognition of non-
legal parents who have a child in their care. This has resulted in a loosening of
the connection between legal parenthood and parental responsibility.7 Such
parents may not become legal parents but they may be attributed with parental
responsibility. How and at what pace the transition from a system that assigns
children to parents to a system that assigns parents to children is made may in
part be determined by the legal system, but also by politics, pressure groups and
other factors.8 
Both jurisdictions are striving to give greater recognition to intentional parents
and other social parents; however, the aim and underlying considerations of
legislative changes, and thus the results, may differ. A prominent example in the
field of parental responsibility is the fact that in The Netherlands registered
partners acquire parental responsibility with regard to a child born into their
relationship and civil partners in England do not. This difference is a conse-
quence of the fact that in England no distinction has been made between chil-
dren born during the civil partnership and children born in a relationship prior
to the current civil partnership. Since in the latter case the child may very well
have a legal parent with parental responsibility outside this civil partnership, an
automatic attribution of parental responsibility to the parent’s civil partner is not
advisable. 
Despite the fact that both jurisdictions are in the process of moving from a
parent-based to a more child-oriented system, it has become obvious from
section 8.2.1 and 8.2.2 that the legal position of children in a number of families
with one biological parent and one non-biological parent is still far from optimal,
in particular where children in same-sex families are concerned. They have no
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9 See ANTOKOLSKAIA (2006) p. 443-453. 
10 For example for The Netherlands Dutch Second Chamber 26 672/26 673 no. 15 p. 7. 
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possibilities to acquire a second legal parent and their parents will not always be
able to acquire parental responsibility. Is it just that a child, through no actions
or choices of his or her own, is from the moment of his or her birth in a position
which is less favourable than the majority of his or her peers? With regard to
children born outside marriage this question has been answered in the negative,9
but with regard to children born into same-sex relationships the answer has not
been unequivocally negative. 
The argument against legal parenthood by operation of law for a consensual non-
biological mother is that such automatic parenthood fails to take into account
the possible parenting intentions of the biological father.10 This is in itself a
reasonable argument and indeed the parenting intentions of the biological
father, if they exist, need to be considered; but only in those cases where such
intentions do exist. Nevertheless, when considering the intentions of the biologi-
cal father and the means by which they may be taken into account, it should be
kept in mind that article 3(1) of the Children’s Convention requires the interests
of the child to be the primary consideration in any actions undertaken, including
those undertaken by legislative bodies. 
8.3. PROCREATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
 
In order to conceive of a system that takes into account the child’s interests in
a solid legal position on the one hand, and the possible parenting intentions of
both the consensual parent and the biological father on the other, the notion of
procreational responsibility may be used. In order to establish the framework in
which this notion may function, it is necessary to return once more to the three
legal dimensions of the child’s family circle introduced in Chapter 1. Subse-
quently, the notion of procreational responsibility will be discussed.
8.3.1.  THE LEGAL DIMENSIONS REVISITED
In Chapter 1 the following three legal dimensions of the child’s family circle
were introduced:
• Dimension I: Genetic/biological parenthood (afstamming) 
• Dimension II: Legal parenthood (ouderschap) and 
• Dimension III: Parental responsibility (ouderlijk gezag)
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Figure 3: Separating the three legal dimensions
Biological / genetic
parenthood
Parental
responsibility
Legal parenthood
The analysis in Chapter 7 has given an insight into the connections between
these three dimensions in the present provisions on legal parenthood and
parental responsibility. It has been revealed that there are additional points of
access to the dimensions of legal parenthood and parental responsibility for
which presence in another dimension is not required. 
 
Taking into account the role played by these dimensions in the present provi-
sions on parent-child relationships and subsequently expanding on them some-
what, the following functions may be assigned to the different dimensions.
Dimension I on genetic/biological parenthood (afstamming) is concerned with
safeguarding and registering the child’s biological/genetic history. This dimen-
sion will in principle give access to the dimension of legal parenthood, unless the
law provides otherwise, for instance in the case of egg donation and some forms
of sperm donation. Dimension II on legal parenthood (ouderschap) is concerned
with assigning legal parents to children. Legal parenthood, among other things,
has consequences for the child’s financial position in life, for his or her national-
Machteld Vonk, 'Children and their parents'
Towards a new concept of parenthood: procreational responsibility
11 As BAINHAM (1999) p. 44, concludes on this issue: ‘It could have been exceptionally neat and
tidy to say that those with a proven genetic connection are the parents and everyone else gets
parental responsibility and no more. But this is not the course we have followed in England
and it is too late to turn back now.’ 
12 See CEFL reports on England LOWE (2005) and The Netherlands BOELE-WOELKI, SCHRAMA &
VONK (2005), for the specific content of parental responsibility in the two countries and the
CEFL principles with regard to a common approach BOELE-WOELKI et al. (2007b).
13 In The Netherlands the two dimensions have been partially disconnected but this has not
resulted in changes in the number of persons who may have parental responsibility. In England
more than two persons may have parental responsibility with regard to a child.
14 Recently SCHWENZER has proposed a system in which a child would only acquire one legal
parent by operation of law, namely the birth mother. The legal parenthood of the other parent
may be established with maternal consent or by court order, subject to the child’s interest.
SCHWENZER (2006) articles 3.4 to 3.10.
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ity and for his or her position with regard to inheritance law. This dimension is
no longer exclusively reserved for genetic and biological parents.11 Dimension
III on parental responsibility is concerned with ensuring that the parents who
are caring for the child have the rights and duties associated with this task.12
The separation of the three dimensions makes it possible to recognise the role
played by different parents in the child’s life. The child’s biological/genetic
history can be protected because the non-biological legal parent and the donat-
ing biological parent will both be present in the child’s family. Whether this
presence is limited to the fact that the person-identifying information of this
biological parent is accessible to the child at a later date, depends on the inten-
tions of the parents involved and the child’s interests. Furthermore, the separa-
tion of the three dimensions also allows for the possibility to increase the num-
ber of persons who may hold parental responsibility with regard to a child, since
parental responsibility is not necessarily connected with legal parenthood.13
The recommendations made in this chapter are based on the ‘two legal parent
model’, since this model has for a long time had a satisfactory application for the
overall majority of children.14 This means that where there are tensions between
biological and consensual non-biological parenthood, choices have to be made
between possible legal parents. Depending on the circumstances and the inter-
ests of the child either the biological parent or the intentional parent will be the
child’s legal parent. The point of departure should be, however, that the child’s
position in his or her resident family will be protected, and third parties outside
this resident family will be recognised in such a manner that the interest of the
child is best served.
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8.3.2. EXPLANATION OF THE NEW CONCEPT PROCREATIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY 
Having made a distinction between genetic/biological parenthood (afstamming)
and legal parenthood (ouderschap), the question must be asked what is the exact
delineation between biology-genetic parenthood and legal parenthood on the
one hand, and intentional parenthood and legal parenthood on the other . In
order to answer this question it will be useful to take a closer look at the concept
of procreational responsibility that has been introduced in Chapter 7. Procrea-
tional responsibility is the foundation for the fundaments biology and intention,
in the sense that both biological and intentional parents are responsible for the
child that they (pro)create. This responsibility has two sides: responsibility
before conception and responsibility after conception. 
Procreational responsibility before conception is concerned with the personal
integrity of the child to be conceived. This entails ensuring that the child’s
genetic/biological history is available for the child at a later date, and being
aware of the fact that the story surrounding his or her conception and birth must
be accessible and acceptable to the child. Furthermore, this responsibility before
the child’s conception involves considering who will have what position in the
child’s life when a known donor is used. Not everything can be foreseen, but
these things need to be thought through beforehand.
Procreational responsibility after conception concerns the responsibility for the
child during its life and is the basis for attributing legal parenthood to a parent.
It is based on the idea that those persons who are responsible for the conception
of the child, either because they are a biological parent or because they planned
and arranged for the conception of the child, should be responsible for the child
during his or her life. The child must be able to depend on the fact that this
responsibility may become operational in practice. This means that it must be
possible to establish a legal relationship between the child and the parent on the
basis of the parent’s responsibility by giving this parent the status of a legal
parent. Whether this attribution is automatic and how possible conflicts between
biological parents and intentional parents should be resolved will be discussed
in the next section. 
When applying the concept of procreational responsibility to the analysis made
in Chapter 7, it becomes obvious that the beginnings of this system are already
present in both jurisdictions. However, as was concluded earlier there are a
number of situations in both jurisdictions where only the procreational responsi-
Machteld Vonk, 'Children and their parents'
Towards a new concept of parenthood: procreational responsibility
15 To use the words of ARCHARD (1995) p. 104: ‘The developments I mentioned at the outset – in
household forms and in reproductive technology – mean that we need to be much clearer than
we presently are about the principles which should inform the formation of families. If blood
does not matter, or matters far less than is presumed, it is crucial that we can agree what should
matter.’ Apparently blood in these cases does not matter, but an alternative has not been
sought. 
16 It has to be noted that the birth mother need not be a genetic parent but she is a biological
parent by dint of giving birth.
17 A birth mother is automatically a legal parent even if she is not the child’s genetic mother.
Unless otherwise indicated, the following sections concern the position of a sperm donor.
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bility of the birth mother is recognised and other parents, be it biological or
intentional, are safeguarded from responsibility in the form of legal parenthood.
Intentional parents who are willing to take on this responsibility may under
certain circumstances do so, with the consent of the birth mother, but the child
him or herself cannot establish the legal parenthood of these parents.15 Can this
problem be solved through bringing the law into line with the idea of
procreational responsibility? This is the topic of the next section on the legal
position of children in families with one biological parent and one non-biological
parent. 
8.4. APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF
PROCREATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
8.4.1. CHILDREN BORN INTO RELATIONSHIPS WITH ONE
BIOLOGICAL PARENT AND ONE NON-BIOLOGICAL
PARENT
If the concept of procreational responsibility is applied in the law on legal
parenthood there are in principle three parents available to fill the two legal
parent slots: the birth mother,16 the biological father and the intentional parent.
The law determines or should determine which two parents will fill these two
slots.17 
In the contemporary English system a distinction has been made between
donations and assisted conception treatment covered by the HFEA 1990 and
donations outside the scope of the HFEA 1990. Under the HFEA 1990, the
donor’s intention not to parent and the consensual parent’s intention to parent
result in the status of a legal parent being attributed to the consensual parent. In
all cases not covered by the HFEA 1990, the biological father is the child’s
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(potential) legal father. The result of this system is that the child may always
acquire two legal parents, except where fertility treatment in accordance with
the HFEA 1990 has been provided to a single woman. 
In the light of the concept of procreational responsibility it may be questioned
whether assigning the status of a legal parent to a party outside the child’s
resident family, who may or may not have parenting intentions, is the most
appropriate choice. However, this is a question to be answered by the English
legislature. Assigning legal parenthood to non-biological parents outside the
scope of the HFEA 1990 would mean a radical break with the aims of the HFEA
1990.
In addition to further developments in this field in England, it may be worth-
while to adopt the approach taken in The Netherlands and to strengthen the
position of children in same-sex families by attributing joint parental responsibil-
ity to civil partners with regard to the children born during their civil partner-
ship. Furthermore, it may be made easier for unmarried same-sex couples to
acquire joint parental responsibility with regard to the children born during
their relationship. Proposals to this end have been made in the Tissue Bill with
regard to co-mothers who are to be treated as legal parents pursuant to cl. 48 or
49 of the Bill.18
The Dutch system is far less clear-cut. If each child is to have the possibility of
acquiring two legal parents, there are two options. Firstly, a system akin to the
English system could be adopted. This would mean that a clear distinction is
made between a donor from a clinic, who may for instance be refered to as a
genetic father, and non-clinic donors, who will fall into the larger group of
biological fathers. Only the donors who donate to a clinic would be exempted
from any rights and duties with regard to the child. All non-clinic donors would
be regarded as biological fathers whose legal parenthood may be established by
the child. Secondly, the notion of intentional parenthood that is already present
in the law where different-sex couples are concerned, could be expanded to
include same-sex parents. The system under the second course of action could
take two forms based on whether the donor’s intentions are taken into account.
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19 This has been proposed by HENSTRA (2002) with regard to married same-sex couples and by
WORTMANN (1998) for same-sex couples in a registered partnership. See also ROSATO (2006)
p. 74-86 on the United States who argues that children in same-sex families ‘deserve the
security blanket of the parentage presumption.’
20 HENSTRA (2002) p. 180-181 proposed automatic parenthood for the same-sex partner married
to the birth mother, and recognition for the unmarried same-sex partner. 
21 With regard to egg donation and the consent of the egg donor only the first situation is
relevant, since egg donation always takes place in a clinical setting. 
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8.4.1.1. Legal parenthood for intentional parents without evaluating the donor’s
intentions
Attribution without regard to the intentions of the donor is the course followed
in Dutch law at present where married different sex-couples are concerned.
Extending this presumption of parentage in all formalised relationships would
result in a simple, clear provision on the legal parenthood of children born into
any kind of formalised relationship regardless of the sex of the parents.19 With
regard to children born outside a formalised relationship, the position of the
intentional parent (male or female) with regard to legal parenthood should be
the same as that of a biological father.20 This means that either the child, the
intentional parent or the child’s birth mother can establish his or her legal
parenthood. 
However, a disadvantage of such a system would be that it leaves no room for
the evaluation of the donor’s intentions with regard to the child. Furthermore,
such automatic attribution does not provide an opportunity to ensure that any
person-identifying information about the donor is available for the child at a
later date. 
8.4.1.2. Legal parenthood for the intentional parents with regard to the inten-
tions of the donor
The second option concerns a system which makes it possible to evaluate the
intentions of the donor. Three different scenarios need to be considered with
regard to the intentions of the donor:
1. Double consent in a clinical setting; this means that the donor has consented
to the use of his or her genetic material by third parties and the mother’s
partner has consented to the use of this material for the conception of a child
by his or her partner.21 This consent has been given in a clinical setting,
which means that DIY donation and insemination at home are not included.
2. The known sperm donor has consented to the use of his sperm and will
relinquish his parental right to the non-biological parent. The non-biological
parent has consented to the use of this genetic material by his or her partner
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23 However, in a Bill concerning adoption that is currently before the Dutch parliament a
beginning is made by distinguishing between known and unknown donors. It is proposed in
this Bill that a co-mother who produces a declaration by the Donor Data Foundation stating
that use has been made of the sperm of an unknown donor, may in principle adopt her
partner’s child. Dutch Second Chamber 2006-2007, 30 551 1-7.
24 WORTMANN (2001) p. 235-236 stated that adoption was not appropriate in same-sex relation-
ship if use had been made of an unknown donor.
25 The status of the consent given is a subject for further research. Consent given in a hospital
after being informed of the consequences of such consent (informed consent) is not the same
as consent given outside a clinical setting. This latter consent may or may not be informed
consent. 
26 The Civil Code of Québec (CCQ) makes it possible for a non-biological parent, either male or
female, to acquire the status of a legal parent if the parties have entered into a so-called
‘parental project’ for assisted conception, which is defined as the situation ‘when one person,
or spouses by mutual consent, decide to conceive by relying on genetic material donated by
a third party.’ CAMPBELL (2007) p. 254.
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to conceive a child. This concerns cases of DYI donation and insemination
at home. 
3. There is the consent of the partner of the non-biological parent to the use of
third party genetic material by his or her partner for the conception of a
child. However, there is no clarity about the donor’s intentions with regard
to the child’s legal parenthood. Either because the donor is not known (e.g.
sperm has been purchased on the internet) or because the donor is unwilling
to relinquish his parental rights to the non-biological parent. 
The distinction made between situations 1 and 2 is the distinction already made
under English law between an HFEA donor22 and a DIY donor (who is a legal
father in terms of common law). This distinction as such is not made in Dutch
law.23 The position of the donor may be clarified in Dutch law if the sperm
donor who donates to a sperm bank is refered to as a genetic father and the other
kinds of donors are given a position akin to a begetter. 
If there is double consent, either because the donation and treatment have taken
place in a hospital (situation 1),24 or the biological and intentional parents have
agreed that the child to be conceived will grow up in the family of the birth
mother and her partner (situation 2), the birth mother and the intentional parent
will be the child’s legal parents.25 In such a system it is vital that there is proof
of the parents’ intentions and the donor’s consent, to be produced when the
child’s birth is registered.26 Such proof may for instance consist of consent forms
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27 In The Netherlands proof of the consent of the donor could take the shape of a declaration by
the Donor Data Foundation that the child concerned was conceived with the sperm of an
unknown donor. In a proposal concerning adoption that is currently before the Dutch
parliament such a declaration is also mentioned with regard to the adoption of a child by the
birth mother’s female partner. Dutch Second Chamber 2006-2007, 30 551 1-8.
28 Further research into the status of contracts regarding parent-child relationships is required,
in particular the standing of such a contract in case of conflict. Donor contracts or consent
forms are sometimes used by courts in adoption proceedings to obtain clarity about the donor’s
intention. See, for instance, Rechtbank Utrecht, 13 December 2006, LJN: AZ7383 or Rechtbank
Utrecht, 13 December 2006, LJN: AZ7379. For an example of the use of donor contracts by an
Australian court see DEMPSEY (2004) p. 76-102.
29 SHANLEY (2001) p. 146 ‘Providing children with stability and care is among the most pressing
needs of contemporary […] society. The primary source (although not the only one) of such
stability and care is a child’s family.’
30 ARCHARD (1995) p. 105 ‘It is important to be clear that natural parents have a claim to bring
up their own children only because such an arrangement is optimal. It is not the case that the
arrangement is thought best because natural parents have a prior claim to rear their own. This
is the crucial point. For, when there is a dispute over who should rear a child, the claim of the
natural parent to have custody over her own does not carry weight simply in virtue of the
existence of the biological relation. Blood as such does not matter.’ 
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signed at the clinic27 or a contract drawn up between the parties involved.28 In
case of conflict or in case there is no proof of the donor’s intention, the interven-
tion of a court may be required to decide on the legal parenthood of the child
involved. Such a procedure need not be an adoption procedure but may be a new
kind of procedure aimed at establishing the legal parenthood of the child in line
with the child’s best interests. It is not necessarily in the child’s interest that the
legal parenthood of the biological parent is established, although this may be the
case under certain circumstances.29 It is also very important to consider the
child’s position in his or her resident family and the wider family circle of the
two resident parents.30 Recognition by the law of the child’s family situation may
facilitate the child’s integration into his or her wider family and into society
itself.
An advantage of this system is the fact that the donor’s intention may be taken
into account. Moreover, it makes it possible to require that the person-identify-
ing information is made available upon the birth registration so that this infor-
mation can be stored for instance in the donor data register for the child’s future
use.
Whatever choice is made, the point of departure should be that if there are three
persons responsible for the conception of a child: the birth mother, the biological
father and the female partner of the birth mother, it cannot be so that the child
can only have one legal parent. It should be possible to establish the legal
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parenthood of one of the two other responsible parents, either the biological
father or the intentional mother. If the law shields the biological parent from
responsibility in any form with regard to the child, it cannot at the same time
prevent the intentional parent from becoming the child’s legal parent. It cannot
be so that both are excluded from legal parenthood because of the existence of
the other. Furthermore, as is stated by article 7 of the Children’s convention, a
child has a right to be raised and be cared for by his or her parents. If one accepts
that on the basis of the notion of procreational responsibility parents are not
only biological parents, but may also be intentional parents, one must conclude
that the law is obliged to make it possible for a child to acquire two legal parents.
8.4.2.  CHILDREN IN SURROGATE FAMILIES 
The notion of procreational responsibility may also play a role in the context of
surrogate parenthood. First of all, because procreational responsibility before
conception requires the parties to consider the consequences of the arrange-
ments about to be made. With regard to responsibility after the child is born
there is a major difference between surrogacy and the assisted conception with
donor sperm discussed in the previous sections. In the latter case it is the inten-
tion that the child remains in the family into which it was born, whereas in the
case of surrogacy the intention is that the child will be transfered from the
family of its birth to another family. The intention of the commissioning parents
and the surrogate parents plus the question of who is genetically related to the
child may play a part. 
With regard to surrogacy a distinction should be made between three types of
surrogacy:
1. surrogacy arrangements where the commissioning parents are both geneti-
cally related to the child carried by the surrogate mother (gestational surro-
gacy);
2. arrangements where one of the commissioning parents is genetically related
to the child carried by the surrogate mother (gestational or traditional sur-
rogacy depending on whether the egg is provided by the surrogate mother);
3. and cases where neither of the commissioning parents are genetically related
to the child carried by the surrogate mother (gestational or traditional surro-
gacy depending on whether the egg is provided by the surrogate mother).
In the first case, the surrogate mother is not genetically related to the child, but
in the second and third case she may be, but need not be if use is made of a
donated egg. This means that if the concept of procreational responsibility is
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applied with regard to the attribution of legal parenthood, the concept needs to
accommodate a third variable besides biology and intention, namely genetic
parenthood. In cases where the commissioning mother’s egg is used, she is the
genetic and intentional mother whereas the surrogate mother is the biological
mother. 
In England the commissioning parents in situations 1 and 2 can become the
child’s legal parents by means of a parental order if a number of conditions are
met, one of these being that the surrogate parents consent to the transfer of
parental rights. In the recently published Tissue Bill it is proposed to expand the
group of commissioning parents who are eligible for a parental order to include
female and male same-sex couples and co-habiting couples.31 In The Netherlands
there are no provisions specifically designed for the transfer of full parental
status in surrogacy cases. Since surrogacy is allowed under certain conditions, a
provision akin to a parental order may be considered, in particular in cases
where both the commissioning parents are genetically related to the child. At
present such surrogacy arrangements are allowed under supervision after
extensive screening, but the commissioning parents are left completely in the
dark with regard to their possibility of becoming the child’s legal parents. 
Nevertheless, the most difficult cases are those in which conflicts arise with
regard to the child. In those circumstances the concept of procreational responsi-
bility may play a role in that it allows for intention to be a fundament for
assigning legal parenthood.32 A commissioning couple who are both genetically
related and the intention to become the child’s parent may from this point of
view have a stronger claim than a surrogate mother who is not genetically
related to the child.
8.5. HOW TO PROCEED?
The situation in England, if the changes to the HFEA 1990 proposed in the
Tissue Bill actually become law, would protect the position of children born into
families with one biological and one non-biological parent in those cases where
the parents have made use of assisted conception services in accordance with the
HFEA 1990. Whether the proposed cl. 48, which concerns the legal position of
the birth mother’s civil partner, also covers the situation where use was made of
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of the Bill.
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sperm donated outside the ambit of the HFEA is not entirely clear.33 It is advis-
able that this is made clear during the remainder of the legislative course of the
Tissue Bill. Where a female couple who have not entered into a formalised
relationship make use of sperm donated outside the ambit of the HFEA 1990, the
situation is clear: cl. 49 of the Tissue Bill does not apply. In those cases the
common law rules will be applicable. 
Changes in the legal position of children conceived with donor sperm outside
the context of the HFEA 1990 may be slow to come. It may require legislation
outside the context of fertility treatment. Nevertheless, other changes may be
made to enhance the child’s legal position where the intentional parent is not
recognised as a legal parent. For instance, by extending the applicability of the
‘child of the family’ provisions to couples in an enduring family relationship.34
Thus, after relationship breakdown the intentional parent who is not a legal
parent, may still be liable for child maintenance.
Furthermore, the legal position of children conceived outside the context of the
HFEA 1990 may be improved if the Dutch example is followed and a distinction
is made in the law regarding parental responsibility between primary families
and secondary families. For instance, the birth mother’s civil partner would
automatically have joint parental responsibility with regard to a child born into
their relationship.35 Furthermore, it may also be made possible for the birth
mother and the intentional parent who have not entered into a formalised
relationship to acquire joint parental responsibility without court intervention.36
In The Netherlands changes are required to the Dutch Civil Code if it is to be
brought into line with the notion of procreational responsibility. This may be
done by further integrating new regulations with regard to children conceived
with third party genetic material in the already existing provision. However, for
the sake of clarity it may be advisable to regulate the legal position of these
children separately. 
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(2007b) principle 3:5. 
39 See for instance JÄNTERÄ-JAREBORG (2006) for the present situation in Sweden.
40 See for instance ATKIN (2006) p. 311-317 on the situation in New Zealand.
41 See CAMPBELL (2007) p. 242-273 for the situation in Quebec.
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First of all, Title 11 of Book 1 of the Dutch Civil Code which is currently entitled
‘parentage’ (afstamming) should be renamed ‘legal parenthood’ (juridisch ouder-
schap).37 Subsequently, a new Title, Title 11a, should be inserted which regulates
legal parenthood with regard to children conceived with third party genetic
material. This new title would include provisions based on the same concepts as
are used in Title 11, such as recognition, judicial establishment of legal parent-
hood and denial of legal parenthood. Furthermore, it should also contain provi-
sions on issues such as consent to the conception of the child and the donor’s
consent to the use of his genetic material by a third party. It may contain a new
definition of the concepts of sperm donor (genetic father) and biological father
as suggested earlier on in this chapter. And last but not least it should contain a
provision which ensures that a child has the right of have access to his or her
genetic/biological history. 
If intentional parents become legal parents with the cooperation of the child’s
birth mother they should be attributed with parental responsibility.38 However,
where the intentional and biological parent become legal parents without the
cooperation of the birth mother, such a parent will have to apply to a court to
be attributed with parental responsibility.
Moreover, it may also include provisions on the transfer of parental status
pursuant to surrogacy arrangements, where one or both of the commissioning
parents are genetically related to the child concerned. It may in this context be
advisable for the legislature to make an inventory of developments taking place
in England, but also in Sweden,39 New Zealand40 and Canada41 and possibly other
counties that have or are in the process of introducing similar legislation in this
field. 
8.6. A BRIEF GLANCE AT THE FUTURE
Returning in the end to the beginning of this study. The aim of this research
project was to investigate whether the position of children born into families
Machteld Vonk, 'Children and their parents'
Chapter 8
280 Intersentia
with one biological and one non-biological parent receive sufficient protection
from the law. It was concluded that this is not always the case, in particular not
where the legal position of children born into same-sex families was concerned.
The notion of procreational responsibility was introduced as a means by which
biological parenthood and intentional parenthood could both be made opera-
tional in the process of assigning parents to children. 
Figure 9: Procreational responsibility applied
Fundament:
biological and / or
genetic parenthood
Connecting factors:
-  relationship status
-  factual relationship
   with the child
-  cooperation of parent(s)
Legal
parenthood
Parental
responsibility
Fundament:
intention to be a
parent to the child
Connecting factors:
-  relationship status
-  consent to conception
-  maternal consent 
Procreational responsibility
Voluntarily or by operation of law
Involuntarily by court order
Returning at this point to a slightly amended version of the diagram introduced
in Figure 7, which is based on the analysis in Chapter 7, it will be obvious that
the access point to the status of legal parent and parental responsibility in the
diagram contains no reference to the sex of the child’s parents. If the notion of
procreational responsibility is applied in this diagram, the two fundaments for
legal parenthood - biology and intention - will be placed at the same level, as is
clear from the diagram in Figure 9. Both genetic/biological parenthood and the
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intention to be a parent may offer access to the position of legal parent and
parental responsibility; no distinction is made on the basis of the parent’s sex.
Since the intention to parent the child is the fundament for parental responsibil-
ity there is no direct link between biological/genetic parenthood and the con-
necting factors for parental responsibility. A biological parent either acquires
parental responsibility through legal parenthood or through the intention to
parent.
It is now up to the English and Dutch legislatures to ensure that the parents of
the family into which the child is born do in fact have access to legal parenthood
and parental responsibility regardless of their sex. When this is done with the
underlying notion that the child deserves the most favourable legal position in
life, it will indeed be so that the family is made to fit the child and not the child
to suit the family.
We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time.42
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